In recent years, the appeal of non-Western multilateral formats has grown significantly across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This trend reflects both growing disenchantment with Western actors and Western-led institutions, often perceived as fragile, obsolete and contradictory, and a more pragmatic desire among MENA states to broaden the range of their partnerships in pursuit of national interests. The wars in Ukraine and Gaza have further reinforced these dynamics.

It is against this backdrop that BRICS’ growing attraction across the MENA should be understood. Originally comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, BRICS has evolved from an acronym for large and fast-growing emerging economies into a platform with increased political meaning and associated with South-South cooperation. Its 2023–2024 enlargement marked a turning point, with Egypt, Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) formally joining in January 2024.

This paper examines BRICS enlargement in the MENA through a comparative analysis of the accession trajectories of Egypt, Iran and the UAE. It asks how these states understand BRICS membership, what benefits they expect to derive from accession, and how they seek to leverage the same format for divergent purposes. It also considers how incumbent BRICS members have approached enlargement and what they expect from the inclusion of these newcomers.

Drawing on official communiqués, elite speeches and public statements, as well as expert interviews, the paper contributes to debates on South-South cooperation, global governance and the changing nature of multilateralism. Finally, it reflects on the implications of BRICS expansion for the European Union’s leverage in the MENA region.