Factors and Perceptions Influencing the Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Selected Southern Mediterranean Partner Countries

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Presently, and particularly after the 2004 enlargement, the EU finds itself in a rather complex situation where it needs to simultaneously respond to the demands of its citizens and address its internal affairs while developing a comprehensive and consistent external policy that regulates its relations with its new neighbours.

Previously, the enlargement process has been one of the EU’s most successful tools with which to promote peace, prosperity and stability in its close neighbourhood; both the southern countries of Spain and Portugal and the former Soviet countries of Eastern Europe have been fully integrated into the EU’s zone of peace and prosperity. However, the lack of institutional capacity, political willingness and public support leave little hope for larger scale future enlargement.

Although the draft Constitution and the Security Strategy Paper both underline the will and determination of the EU to enhance its role as an international actor, many EU citizens are more concerned with matters of homeland security, energy supply, immigration and jobs rather than the EU’s ability to promote peace and stability and induce prosperity in its immediate region. However, many are well aware that the value of inclusion rather than exclusion will better help the EU combat the changing threats of the 21st century; as the Security Strategy states, the EU cannot simply close its borders.

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched by the European Commission in March 2003, is designed to address the EU’s enlarged neighbourhood and inclusion-exclusion dilemma in conjunction with the demands of its citizens. Put another way, the new policy has been initiated to overcome two foreign policy challenges: enlargement fatigue and the management of external borders. With the adoption of the action plans by Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority and Israel in 2005, the ENP entered a new phase in its implementation.

The ENP was preceded by a number of initiatives launched by the EU in order to address and regulate relations with its neighbours in the Mediterranean. The most significant of these is the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also referred as the Barcelona Process, launched in 1995, which was deemed unsuccessful due to a number of political and economic factors. Although the foreign ministers of the Euro-Mediterranean Partner states declared 2005 to be “the year of Mediterranean”, the future success of the Barcelona Process appears bleak.

As far as the ENP’s Mediterranean dimension is concerned, the ENP could be regarded as a pragmatic way of activating the plugged goals of the Barcelona Process. Yet, it is evident that the new neighbourhood policy has external and internal challenges of its own; notably the imprecision and superficiality of the Action Plans, the insufficiency and ambiguity of the incentives on offer, and the emphasis on interests and stakes rather than shared values and benefits.

The chances of the ENP contributing to a qualitative and quantitative improvement in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership will depend substantially on the political situation that the leaders of the European partner countries are to face in and outside the southern Mediterranean countries. It will also depend on other factors, including the unresolved conflicts in the Mashreq countries, and the structural, economic and societal factors within the individual countries.

A closer look at the Action Plans of Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan shows that the ENP places more emphasis on economic reforms and collaboration than on political and security cooperation. Indeed, effective security cooperation relies upon the EU taking affirmative impartial steps towards resolving the Mashreq countries conflict and reaffirming its stance towards Israel’s nuclear capability. Although all four countries’ main concerns are inner security and stability, and they are primarily interested in the economic reform agenda of the ENP, perceptions, expectations, and the anticipated implementation of the goals of the ENP differ among them.

In the case of Morocco, the leadership sees the ENP as an opportunity to collaborate on illegal migration and counterterrorism as well as a chance to improve its access to the EU market. It is therefore proceeding with the implementation of reforms, albeit in the longer term. Tunisia, however, is more reluctant to reform its political system out of concern for unrest and instability that is anticipated as a result of the establishment of the free trade zone in 2010. However, it is also eager to increase economic cooperation and encourage investment from the EU. For Jordan, implementing social reform and the gradual development of a modern political party system is partly dependent on positive improvements in the Israeli-Palestine conflict. Preserving stability in Jordan is key, as is the case in Lebanon, as interviews have shown.
The Palestinian Authority is a somewhat different case, as it is not a sovereign state and the EU is unsure how to approach current political realities. As the current government is opposed to the existence of Israel and because the question of whether Hamas sees the Action Plan as binding remains unanswered, the ENP cannot start to be fully implemented by either side.

In sum, in countries with which Action Plans have been put into effect, positive tendencies toward cooperation with the EU within the ENP framework are evident, as long as national interests are acknowledged, stability and security are at the forefront of cooperation and there are considerable economic benefits. In Egypt and Algeria, whose Action Plans are expected to be finalized in the coming year, however, outside pressure for democratization is altogether rejected.
I. Why the EU Needs to Engage with its Neighbours

1.1 Introductory Remarks

The EU's most recent round of enlargement, on May 1st 2004, was both historic in breadth and scope, rendering its borders closer to potential areas of instability. In turn, the enlarged EU of twenty-five members will increase to include Romania and Bulgaria in the near future and thus further expand the Union’s borders. Therefore the EU will not only have to address internal questions but also develop a comprehensive and consistent external policy.

The enlargement process has been one of the EU's most successful tools with which to promote peace, prosperity and stability in its close neighbourhood. The southern countries of Spain and Portugal, and more recently the former Soviet bloc countries of Eastern Europe, have been fully integrated into the EU's zone of peace and prosperity. However, the prospect of enlargement for all but its closest neighbours is unlikely to be forthcoming; the EU and member states have underlined that the Union cannot expand ad infinitum.

Indeed, recent referenda on the EU Constitution clearly reflected many citizens' dissatisfaction with the EU. Many citizens and commentators are in fact asking whether the EU does have an institutional capacity. Although further enlargements beyond Bulgaria and Romania could still be envisaged, they are not likely to be in the near or medium term. Therefore the key question is how the EU can promote its founding principles without an ongoing enlargement.

The sweeping transformations of the international environment also complicate the dilemma which the EU is confronted with. The future of Iraq and the possibility of a crisis with Iran, as well as energy security and intra-state conflicts, require, to a certain extent, engagement on behalf of the EU. Until now, the EU's strategy of encouraging further reforms has been largely unsuccessful. Therefore, if it will not offer membership to states in the Mediterranean and the Mashreq countries, the EU needs to find an effective method to encourage reform whilst offering partner countries sufficient incentives for closer cooperation in various fields.

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), introduced by the European Commission in March 2003 was presented as an answer. It was introduced by the Commission as "a new framework for relations with our eastern and southern neighbours". The method proposed is to define a set of priorities with partner countries, which will be incorporated into jointly agreed Action Plans covering a number of key areas for specific action. The objective is to share the benefits of EU enlargement with the neighbouring countries and prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours. As such, the ENP was launched as the new foreign policy tool for the Union. It has, on paper, ambitious goals, especially in the areas of security, energy, and stability.

This paper will attempt to provide an overview of the ENP and assess the future prospects of the new policy for its southern partner countries. The primary concern of this paper is to analyze whether the ENP could make a difference for its southern partners when compared with previous initiatives and mechanisms. This is not to deny the importance of an analysis devoted to the ENP's eastern partner countries; another study would be necessary in this respect. In keeping with the aims of the study, which by necessity restricted its overall scope, it was deemed sensible to focus on case studies. Three Arab countries that signed and adopted the actions plans in 2005 were chosen: namely, Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan. The Palestinian Authority and Israel, which both ratified action plans in 2005, are special cases. Egypt and Lebanon, with which talks have already taken place, and Algeria, which has also been incorporated into the initiative, as well as the Palestinian Authority, are discussed in an overview chapter.

The analysis sets out to assess the ENP's chances of reaching the objectives, especially the normative ones, laid out in the action plans. The states selected are not merely the only sovereign Arab states in the southern neighbourhood of the EU that have adopted Action Plans in 2005 but are also those states that maintain particularly close relations with the EU. As such, the ENP was launched as the new foreign policy tool for the Union. It has, on paper, ambitious goals, especially in the areas of security, energy, and stability.

2 Ibid. This applies particularly to the normative objectives, such as, for instance, democratization, good governance, and the rule of law.
3 Some findings have already been published; see the following studies (all of which have been edited by Sigrid Faath): Politischer und Gesellschaftliche Debatten in Nordafrika, Nah- und Mittelost. Inhalte, Träger, Perspektiven (Political and Social Debates in North Africa, the Near and Middle East. Content, Sponsors, Prospects), Hamburg 2005; Demokratisierung durch externe Druck? Perspektiven politisch-ökonomischer Wandel in Nordafrika/Nahost (Democratization Through External Pressure? The Prospects for Political Transformation in North Africa/Mashreq countries), Hamburg 2005; Politik und Gesellschaft in Nordafrika, Nah- und Mittelost zwischen Reformen und Konflikten: Entwicklungsländerdebaten bis 2010 (Politics and Society in North Africa, the Near and Middle East: Between Reform and Conflict. Debates on Development Up to 2010), Hamburg 2005; Anti-Americanism in the Islamic World (Hurst & Company, London 2006). In chapter II on the individual countries the matching bibliographic data is not always given, except in the case of quotes.
4 Problem-oriented interviews with Ambassadors of the selected countries conducted in May and June 2005 served to expand on the official positions that the 2003/05 studies collected from those departments within the foreign ministries that are charged with cooperation with the EU.
The first section of this study will discuss the question why a foreign policy tool is necessary for the EU. It will be argued that the EU needs to have an effective foreign policy to address its neighbours, so as to both strengthen its position on the international stage and enlarge its security belt. The ENP, as a response to this need, will be outlined in the following chapter. The main section of the paper will subsequently focus on the factors that influence the ENP’s objectives and the perception of the ENP in three selected countries. The final section consists of conclusions and recommendations to the European Union.

The international system has been facing drastic transformations in the 21st century, which alter the strategic outlook of Europe as well as of the rest of the world. Within this system, the European Union has been seeking a new role for itself on the way to becoming an international actor. It finds itself in a position to extend its capabilities to answer the newly defined challenges. The ambitions of the EU are well documented in various documents, yet insufficiently applied for several reasons, such as the mismatch of interests among member states, the unwillingness of member states and the lack of resources.

On the other hand, the EU is acutely aware that it should not continue to be reluctant and develop a coherent and effective foreign policy. Indeed, foreign policy is at the heart of the European Constitution. The articles 1 to 3 defining the objectives of the EU declare that;

“The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights...”

Even if the Constitution has not come into force, some of its foreign policy objectives will be implemented separately. The European Security Strategy (ESS) conceived in 2003, also identifies the Union’s role in the world and its geo-strategic interests in a similar vein. It states;

“Europe should share responsibility for global security and building a better world [and concludes that] the EU has the potential to make major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realize the opportunities. An active and capable EU would make an impact on a global scale”.

The Security Strategy document also lists the threats of the 21st century as follows:
- weapons of mass destruction; failed states; rogue states; regional conflicts and civil wars; political instability; terrorism. These threats have implications for the EU at three levels: global, regional and member state.

At the global level, although the root source of these threats might seem distant from the EU’s homelands, they have proved to be a threat throughout the world. As such, the EU should have a coherent policy and an effective tool to tackle these challenges and act on the international stage, in order to take greater responsibility in promoting peace and stability, or, put another way, its own core values.

The nature of international movements renders the EU unable to close its borders, even if it assumed it would lead to an increase in perceived security. The nature of an increasingly globalized world suggests that traditional approaches to international relations may not realize expected results. There is the risk of bowing to the preferences of other actors on the international scene, if it fails to develop and pursue its own. The EU has been criticizing the US way of promoting democracy; however, negative rivalry will not be enough to prevail.

At the regional level, the potential threats emphasized in the ESS are particularly relevant to the EU as some appear directly in its immediate neighbourhood. The EU, especially after the latest round of enlargement, has a heterogeneous neighbourhood, which includes the Balkans and the Southern Mediterranean, as well as the Caucasus and the Middle East. The borders of the EU will widen once more with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania as well as the potential future accession of Turkey.

These regions have been termed part of the “new-strategic geography” as well as the source of potential threats. Many of these areas are sources of regional instability and yet are rich in natural resources and have critical energy reserves. Successful relations with such neighbours are therefore imperative. One way of preventing the EU from importing conflict and instability from its neighbours is to extend its zone of peace and prosperity to these regions. Whereas the EU would have promoted peace and stability
through enlargement in such situations, today it is apparent that it needs to have different strategies to address a diverse neighbourhood. Therefore a key question is how to use the EU’s soft power to promote reforms that would enable a more secure environment? As such, the Neighbourhood Policy was presented as a post-enlargement tool to address such questions.

The EU needs to respond to the demands and expectations of its citizens at the member state level. These may include issues like security, energy supply, immigration and employment. Many European citizens share the concern of President Mitterrand that “the greatest danger of a rolling process of enlargement was that, as the last new member joined, the EU would cease to be able to provide the benefits – of solidarity, shared decision-making, common prosperity and security – which they were seeking”13. However, regardless of the EU’s citizens’ stance towards enlargement, their demands will be, to a certain extent, fixed.

According to Dannreuther, the EU has realized that actualizing its ambitions at the international stage is very much related to how successful it is in its regional policies10. In addition, in order to respond to the immediate expectations of its own citizens as regards security, jobs, migration, and energy11; it again has to address its neighbourhood. Although there has been resistance from some EU member states and other EU institutions, which might limit the scope of the initiative, the Commission has been quick to respond to the demand both from its citizens and from outside the EU12. The EU is aware that in order to expand its security belt, it must facilitate a foreign policy beyond rhetoric that addresses its neighbourhood in a comprehensive and effective manner.

Whether the new neighbourhood policy will succeed in its aim of filling the gap, both in economic and political terms, between itself and its periphery is a crucial question that is not easy to answer. The success of the policy very much depends on more than one variable; the willingness of all parties to engage being of primary importance but other domestic and international factors are also central. It is, however, a rather young policy that has not yet come to fruition, which has been criticized more than it has been praised. Hence, the following section will examine the origins of the ENP and compare it with previous initiatives, namely the EMP, before it will turn towards the country analyses.

The EU has been facing a dilemma, which could be referred to as inclusion versus exclusion14. Inclusion lies at the very heart of the EU; Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome declares that any European country can apply to become a member of the European Economic Community. Whether the new neighbourhood policy will succeed in its aim of filling the gap, both in economic and political terms, between itself and its periphery is a crucial question that is not easy to answer. The success of the policy very much depends on more than one variable; the willingness of all parties to engage being of primary importance but other domestic and international factors are also central. It is, however, a rather young policy that has not yet come to fruition, which has been criticized more than it has been praised. Hence, the following section will examine the origins of the ENP and compare it with previous initiatives, namely the EMP, before it will turn towards the country analyses.

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Although the need to address its immediate neighbourhood gained increased attention following the 2004 enlargement, the EU had taken steps in this direction in early 2002. In anticipation of the 2004 enlargement, the Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council stated that:

“The European Union also wishes to enhance its relations with Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the southern Mediterranean countries based on a long-term approach promoting democratic and economic reforms, sustainable developments and trade, and is developing new initiatives for this purpose. The European Council welcomes the intention of the Commission and the Secretary General/High Representative to bring forward proposals to that end”16.

In fact, when the UK pushed for the Wider Europe initiative in early 2002, the aim was to address Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. Despite the focus of the UK on the EU’s Eastern borders17, France has always stressed the Southern dimension and tried to include the Southern neighbours as well as the Eastern ones18. Along the same lines, Sweden was also
in favour of including Russia, as well as the Southern Mediterranean. The inclusion of the Southern countries as well as the Eastern ones was also advocated by enlargement sceptics as the inclusion into the ENP framework was seen as an alternative to full membership.

Following these developments, the Wider Europe Communication, published by the Commission in March 2003, also underlined that enlargement brings EU citizens closer to their Russian, Western NIS and Southern Mediterranean counterparts, which in turn would supposedly strengthen the Union's interest in enhancing relations with its new neighbours. In this respect, the Communication included the Community of Independent States (CIS – TACIS programme) plus the Mediterranean countries of the Barcelona Process (MEDA programme). Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia were also added in June 2005. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), introduced as the new framework initiative, complements the abovementioned initiatives without replacing them.

The 2004 enlargement has dragged the EU into a more active position on the global stage. On the other hand, as the EU has started to play a more active role internationally, the demands from the EU also increased accordingly. Thus, the EU initiated the new neighbourhood policy to overcome two foreign policy challenges; enlargement fatigue and the management of external borders. Put another way, the ENP was designed to address the EU's inclusion-exclusion dilemma.

Considering that the Union could not enlarge infinitely, new arrangements for cross-border cooperation on a number of issues needed to be developed. These included cooperation on migration policies, customs procedures and border controls to ensure the legitimate movement of people and goods; as well as on infrastructure, efficient border management and interconnected transport, energy and telecommunications networks.

The ENP’s rationale is similar to that of enlargement as it aims to be inclusive. As enlargement is considered to be the EU's most successful foreign policy tool to promote peace, prosperity and stability, the ENP adopts the same logic. As the former external relations Commissioner Chris Patten stated ‘‘...over the past decade, the Union's most successful foreign policy instrument has undeniably been the promise of EU membership’’.

As with addressing its neighbourhood, the EU has been concerned with securing its borders long before the 2004 enlargement. Indeed, two of the EU citizens' top four priorities are directly linked with the issue of borders; namely immigration and security. The other two, energy and employment, are also indirectly linked. As Commissioner Waldner noted ‘‘...the ENP is a way of responding to our citizens' concerns on prosperity, security and stability, not with an abstract concept but with concrete, measurable results’’.

Although national policies and programs have been applied, an EU-wide common asylum and immigration policy was first initiated at the Tampere Summit in 1999. Subsequent events, including 9/11 and the fight against terrorism, have accelerated EU efforts in this direction and lead to the adoption of several conclusions, strategy papers and programs to enhance border and coordinate border controls. In turn, the ENP is designed to contribute to the solution of many of the EU's complex and sensitive border issues, many of which were unsuccessfully addressed in the framework of the Barcelona Process.

As far as the ENP's Mediterranean partners are concerned, the ENP could be regarded as a pragmatic way of activating the plugged goals of the Barcelona Process. Due to a number of political and economic factors, and most significantly being unable to set apart itself from the Middle East Peace Process, the Barcelona Process is not raising hopes for future success. What could be noted as a positive development is the declaration of the 10th Anniversary Euro-Mediterranean Summit Conclusions, which stipulates that Euro-Mediterranean cooperation will be carried out in line with the ENP Action Plans and supported through both the MEDA Program and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument.

Although the ENP could address some of the Barcelona Process's shortcomings, it is evident that the new neighbourhood policy also has its own external and internal challenges. Thus, the following analysis will focus on a comparison of the Barcelona Process with the ENP. In doing so, it will attempt to underline the shortcomings of the new policy and assess whether the policy will significantly affect the Southern partners. The ENP will be analyzed as a "path dependent" of enlargement and a policy that further builds upon the EMP. The first part will outline the differences in approach and methodology between the ENP and the EMP. The second part concentrates on the questions that the ENP leaves unanswered, or ambiguous, on a theoretical level. These theoretical reflections will lead to the formulation of assumptions that will be tested in the context of the findings of the country analyses in Section III.
Although the EU’s contractual relations with its Southern and Eastern neighbours date back further than the launch of the ENP, the policy marks a shift in the way the EU deals with its proximity, especially with its neighbours in the Mediterranean. Until recently, the EMP was the framework for regulating relations, and effecting political, social and economic reform in the Mediterranean Partner states, some of which have become the focal point of the ENP. Indeed, many scholars have argued that the ENP was launched “to enhance the Barcelona Process and address its shortcomings”.  

### Table 1: Contractual Relations of the European Union with ENP partner countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Partnership &amp; Cooperation Agreement</th>
<th>Association Agreement</th>
<th>Action Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Signed, April 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Preparation of Country Report in progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>In force, July 1999</td>
<td></td>
<td>Under development; to be finalized in 2006-2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>In force, July 1999</td>
<td></td>
<td>Under development; to be finalized in 2006-2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Signed, March 1995</td>
<td></td>
<td>NO AGREEMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>In force, June 2004</td>
<td></td>
<td>Under development; to be finalized in 2006-2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>In force, July 1999</td>
<td></td>
<td>Under development; to be finalized in 2006-2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>In force, June 2000</td>
<td></td>
<td>Adopted 11.04.2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>In force, May 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Adopted 11.01.2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Signed, April 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Under development; to be finalized in 2006-2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NO AGREEMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>In force, July 1998</td>
<td></td>
<td>Adopted 22.02.2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>In force, March 2000</td>
<td></td>
<td>Adopted 27.07.2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
<td>In force, July 1997 (interim agreement)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Adopted 04.05.2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Signed, October 2004</td>
<td></td>
<td>NO AGREEMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>In force, March 1998</td>
<td></td>
<td>Adopted 04.07.2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>In force, March 1998</td>
<td></td>
<td>Adopted 21.02.2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources**

European Neighbourhood Policy Website: [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm)


The ENP and EMP were motivated by different factors, and differ in terms of their respective methodologies and approaches. The EMP was designed to foster partnership with the Southern Mediterranean countries that pose multifaceted challenges to the EU in terms of security, stability and economics. The ENP, on the other hand, was inspired and necessitated by enlargement. However, there are certain commonalities between the two policies in terms of their overarching aims regarding the EU’s Southern neighbours. The general policy aims of the EMP were to create a space for dialogue and a partnership for increased security, stability and prosperity in the EU’s immediate surrounding through strengthening democracy, respect for human rights, helping build sustainable economies, aiding in social development and combating poverty. Similarly the ENP aims to share the benefits of EU enlargement with the neighbouring countries and prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours. As stated in its official website, the ENP “complements the multilateral Barcelona Process, which continues to be a key element of EU relations with the Mediterranean countries. With many of the same general objectives, the ENP offers additional bilateral incentives and opportunities, responding to individual countries’ reform efforts.”
The first methodological difference between the ENP and EMP is the Action Plans, developed in cooperation with the countries in question. These are differentiated roadmaps for reform, but not legally binding agreements. They are mainly composed of six parts which are then subdivided into more detailed plans of action. These are:

→ political reform
→ economic and social reform
→ trade, market, and regulatory reform
→ cooperation in justice and home affairs
→ transport, energy, information society, environment, science and technology
→ people-to-people contacts

The Action Plans are then agreed upon after the Commission drafts individual Country Reports. These are baseline assessments of the political, social and economic conditions within the countries in question. In theory, this aspect is an advantage because the more the action plans take into consideration the specific needs and interests of a country, the more realistic the roadmaps will be. The country report also forms the basis for priority issues in the Action Plan, on which a timetable of implementation is jointly agreed upon with the partner government. In practice, however, the Action Plans have been criticized for being superficial and unspecific. A close look at the Action Plans reveals that indeed the formulations very often lack precision.

Critiques of this differentiated bilateral approach have been made on the basis of the ENP abandoning the principle of regionality, in contrast to the EMP’s regional focus. Security in the Mediterranean basin was largely handled through a region-building approach within the EMP framework. This was deemed one of the Barcelona Process’s major strengths, especially during the early 1990s when there were positive developments in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. With the adoption of the ENP, the regional dimension of the EMP has been reduced to intra-regional trade and sub-regional cooperation, and the collective, indivisible gains have been replaced by bilaterally differentiated ones.

Another difference in approach of the ENP when compared to the EMP is the way it operates as regards positive conditionality. This shift from a punitive approach to a positive and affirmative one in terms of conditionality is noteworthy. The ENP puts forth conditions and policy reform priorities, offering upgraded relations with the EU in return for their successful implementation. These include a stake in the EU’s internal market, as well as increased participation in the EU’s programs and aid flows. Offering incentives in return for the will to undertake reform is a strategy that had been successful in integrating the Central and Eastern European countries. However, the argument has been made extensively that even with the “golden carrot” of membership, it is not very desirable for governments to undertake reform. Especially if there is a risk of losing popularity by instigating economic reforms that are costly to society in the short-term, or by implementing legislative reform that may trigger reactions from more conservative parts of society. If the prospect of membership is insufficient to encourage the level of democratic change required by the EU, the “silver carrot” of economic incentives and increased partnership relations is unlikely to be entirely successful either.

On the other hand, the 11-year-old policy of the EU towards its Mediterranean neighbourhood, the EMP, has a different approach with respect to fostering its aims, namely negative conditionality. Operating on negative conditionality means that the EU will penalise a partner government by suspending the Association Agreement if there is any violation of the stipulated principles. In reality, however, the EU has never revoked this principle, although there have been certain instances where agreements could be suspended. This, of course, has led to doubts about the Union’s will and capability to effectively follow-up on certain issues, particularly pertaining to good governance, human rights and political reform in partner countries.

In this respect, the sincerity of the EU in fostering socio-economic development in the Southern Mediterranean has also been questioned. Whereas the rhetoric of the EMP was built on the logic of region-building and emphasized shared values and benefits, the ENP is framed in terms of interests and stakes. The language of interests is used, inter alia, in the 2003 Commission document, where it is stated that in the face of poverty, dictatorships, and conflicts outside its immediate borders, the EU “has a clear interest in ensuring that these common challenges are addressed.”

39 See Section 2.2 for a more thorough evaluation of Action Plan content.
That is not to say, however, that the ENP emphasizes pragmatic gains and does not advocate common values. Indeed, the 2003 Communication is very explicit in advocating the promotion of European values such as liberty, equality, the rule of law, and human rights, which goes hand-in-hand with the idea of promoting common interests. Based on this characteristic, the EU can be said to play the role of a ‘normative power’ on a regional scale.

After the introduction of post 9/11 anti-terrorism measures, the start of the Iraq War in 2003 and now again, subsequent to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 2006, debates about identity - religious and cultural - increased in many North African and Middle Eastern states, while organizations and groups representing ‘anti-Western’ positions and concepts of state and society have been attracting greater attention. As a result, it is now questionable whether the normative aims of the ENP can even be achieved. There is considerable difference, however, in the degree of influence that these positions and concepts have from country to country. Therefore, it is to be expected that the prospects for success of at least a part of the ENP’s normative aims will vary from country to country too (cf. the analyses of countries in Chapter II).

Although the Neighbourhood Policy was welcomed in Europe by some as answering a need in the foreign policy field, others have argued that the ENP is a diversion from the positive aspects of the previously existing policy – EMP – towards the South, or a rewording of its goals at best. Before any evaluation of the ENP itself or in comparison with the EMP can be conducted, the implementation of the action plans will have to be observed over a longer period of time - at least two to three years. It will be necessary to look at each country individually to be able to collate and assess the policy’s positive and negative aspects. Up to this point in time, only the attitudes and perceptions of states and populations to the EU, ENP and the individual areas of reform make it possible to deduce to which degree the action plans will benefit reforms and cooperation with the EU generally, or will prove successful in individual areas (cf. Chapter II). It has already become clear, however, that imprecise details concerning ‘incentives’ and how the ENP is to be financed will become two problematic factors in dire need of clarification.
In November 2004, in The Hague, the foreign ministers of the Euro-Mediterranean partner states declared 2005 to be the ‘Year of the Mediterranean’. Unaffected by this expression of good will, relations among Euro-Mediterranean partners in 2005 have continued to be characterised by setbacks in their cooperation and asymmetries in their political efforts to fulfil agreements. The tenth anniversary of the EMP provided an excellent opportunity to critically assess what had been achieved. This anniversary was dominated by one question: “(…) whether the partners had developed a sufficiently close enough relationship and progress had been made in establishing stability and security, reforming government, introducing democracy, in pushing forward economic and social modernisation and, finally, in integrating the region in the global trade structures – or whether, on the contrary, new potential risks had emerged.”

Nevertheless, it should be positively noted that during the ‘Year of the Mediterranean’ in 2005 new initiatives were concretely implemented. It is worth mentioning, for example, that in Alexandria in August 2005 the Anna-Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures began its efforts to intensify and improve the cooperation between Europe and the Mediterranean. Within this context it is also important to highlight the adoption of the ENP by the EU in 2005, as was explicated above. With the adoption of action plans by Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority and Israel in 2005 and the ENP entered the phase of implementation. The chances of the ENP contributing to a qualitative and quantitative improvement of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership will depend substantially on the political situation that the leaders of the European partner countries are to face in and outside the southern Mediterranean countries. As studies in the last three years have shown, foreign policy issues are having an increasing impact on governments’ freedom to shape reforms designed to modernise the economic, political (including security), and social sectors. That is why those issues will form the focal point of the following analyses of each of the individual countries that have agreed an action plan with the EU.

The case studies will feature Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan. The PA will only be dealt with briefly in a separate section because of that area’s special status. Besides the PA, this separate section is dedicated to the situation in Egypt and Lebanon, both of which are currently discussing action plans with the EU. Agreements with Egypt are at an advanced stage and close to finalization. This section of the analysis will also briefly deal with Algeria, which has an associate agreement within the framework of the EMP, but has not begun discussions with the EU concerning an action plan. The analyses of individual countries will focus on those Arab North African and Mashreq countries partners of the EU whose domestic and foreign policy situation is not subject to the particular foreign policy pressure such as Syria, that results from either the sort of acute conflict or occupation, as found in the Palestinian Autonomous Territories, that can dominate domestic and foreign policy decisions.

It should be noted that there are very pronounced differences between the countries involved in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, e.g.:

→ in terms of the political factors within each country that may ease or obstruct reforms;

→ in terms of the willingness within the countries’ leadership, politically active groups and the population at large to accept reforms devised to modernise state and society.

Regardless of these differences, external influences affect the determination to reform in almost all Euro-Mediterranean countries. These influences, nevertheless, differ from country to country in terms of their intensity and character. In all cases, however, they modify either directly or indirectly the level of acceptance found within political parties and social organisations for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in general. As a result, these external influences are important for decision-makers as regards the implementation of the ENP and its aims. These external factors have emerged subsequent to September 11, 2001. They are the Afghanistan War, the Iraq War and its repercussions for regional and international society, the US-led international war against terrorism, which has often been perceived as being an anti-Islam and anti-Muslim war, and the continuing stagnation of the Mashreq countries Peace Process and the unresolved conflict between the Palestinians and Israel, as well as the conflict between Israel and Lebanon that arose in July 2006.

In the last five years these factors have encouraged an increasingly negative image of ‘Western’ states and ‘Western’ concepts of state, economy and social organisation. The events mentioned above are being used by political organisations and diverse social groups for internal political and religious-cultural reasons to protest against ‘Western’ concepts,
‘Western’ influence and conformity to ‘Western’ wishes. This foreign policy context, for example, since September 11 2001, has enabled Islamist organisations to expand their influence in those countries were they were already well-established[44] by forwarding themselves as the defenders of religious-cultural identity against foreign influence, and against the danger of take-over and extermination by the West. They perpetuate the notion of a ‘Western war’ against Muslims and Islam. Their call to resist the politics of alignment, the adoption of foreign concepts as well as for the defence of identity is the logical consequence of this perception.

The defence of identity, meaning here religious and cultural identity, and the protection of national sovereignty have become prime concerns of diverse political groupings. The demands that the US government has been making since 2002 vis-à-vis the North African and Near and Middle Eastern states to democratis their political systems[55], and the simultaneous strengthening of the EU’s insistence on democratisation, have only served to intensify the debate concerning the need to defend national interests, identity and national sovereignty. Opponents of modernist reforms in North Africa and the Mashreq countries were handed convincing arguments for their case by the Western States’ insistent demands for democratisation. Pressures from abroad to democratisate, and the interventionist policies of the USA in the Mashreq countries, coupled with discussions that placed a ‘new order’ in the spotlight, only served to intensify the re-Islamisation of the debate concerning cultural identity and political reforms. Only a strengthening of religious and cultural identity, especially the Islamic identity, could avert foreign interference, while cultural dominance and an alignment of values was the general tenor of the opponents of an ‘adoption of Western concepts’[54]. This aspect cannot be dealt with in this brief study, instead we would like to draw attention to studies relating to this subject published by the German Institute of Middle East Studies (Hamburg)[55].

The new found strength, or re-found strength, of Arabism and Islamism on the one hand, and of nationalist-Islamic and Islamist alliances and debates in most of the Euro-Mediterranean partner states[56] on the other is, however, also a reaction to the negatively perceived or anticipated consequences of globalization, the dangers of which were most strongly felt to be in the areas of business, culture and identity. These fears have led religious conservatives and Islamists to close ranks with former left-wingers, Arab nationalists and liberals because they are also seeking to defend their countries against heteronomy, to build a national protective barrier and protect their own sense of identity. For that reason it is of major importance that political leaders keen on reforms express their reform initiatives as sovereign, national decisions and the social add-on value of these reforms and the positive effects of a supportive cooperation with foreign countries in the implementation of reforms can be elucidated; tangible positive effects for the individual sections of society need to materialise promptly.

International factors, the unresolved conflicts in the Mashreq countries and the structural, as well as economic, social and societal factors within the individual countries are impeding the implementation of modernising reforms that propagate a convergence of values. The implementation of the ENP’s reforms and aims, including the convergence of norms, is strongly influenced by these international and national circumstances.

The action plans that have been negotiated with individual governments in North Africa and the Mashreq countries are designed to guide cooperation between the EU and these countries in the next three to five years. Nevertheless, their aims are formulated in general terms; the commitments are very similar and are sometimes identical. Those sections that in the widest sense deal with reform of the political system – democratisation, the promotion of the rule of law and human rights, the use of good governance, and the expansion of security cooperation[57] are less detailed and comprehensive than those referring to economic, social and developmental assistance. This difference reflects the key emphasis – also evident in official statements concerning expectations pertaining to the ENP – of the partner states in North Africa and the Mashreq.

The action plans stated that stability and security through shared values and security policy cooperation (shared security objectives), plus the reduction of the prosperity gap through development, are the “common” objectives to be reached by means of the ENP. The action plans, although varying in weight and detail (e.g. they are very pronounced in economic reforms and economic cooperation), deal with the very problematic aspects of political and security cooperation; nevertheless, these areas of cooperation are much less differentiated.
Before “common” security objectives can be pursued it is necessary that progress is made in two problematic areas of security cooperation. It is particularly difficult for the ENP’s partners in the Mashreq (e.g. Jordan, Lebanon) to cooperate with the EU – especially if they consider the perceptions of their populations – so long as the Mashreq countries conflict has not been resolved and Israel continues to occupy Palestinian territory and the Israeli military, which marched into Southern Lebanese territory in summer 2006, has not withdrawn from Lebanese territory.

Moreover, although Israel possesses atomic weapons and has not signed the non-proliferation treaty it has not had to endure massive EU or Western states’ pressure in general. These two aspects have helped to impede attempts to expand security cooperation with those Mashreq countries that are party to the ENP. Nevertheless, all North African and Mashreq countries involved in the ENP contribute to the international fight against terrorism. Furthermore, since 2001 some of the region’s countries have intensified their combined efforts to combat terrorism.

For Israel, Jordan, the Lebanon and the Palestinians in the Autonomous Territories the differentiation between ‘legitimate armed struggle against an occupying power’ and ‘terrorist violence’ is a problem of definition yet unresolved with the EU. This has serious consequences for cooperation with the EU on security matters, especially since a majority of the people living in the Mashreq countries insist on such a differentiation. The different treatment meted out to Israel and Arab states or Iran in relation to the nuclear question is seen as another proof of ‘double standards’ and a bias in favour of Israel. This discrepancy in behaviour has an apparent effect on confidence-building necessary for improved security cooperation and the identification of ‘common’ aims as formulated in the actions plans.

The action plans do not, however, stray away from the EU’s traditional policy approach to the shaping of Euro-Mediterranean relations. Elena Baracani has illustrated this aspect by using Morocco and the agreements made within the action plan concerning the promotion of democracy58; these policy guidelines are also valid for other areas of cooperation and, of course, not only for Morocco but also for other ENP partners in North Africa and the Mashreq countries. According to Baracani the EU’s policy continues to be “limited to achieving partial political reform, rather than a genuine democratic transition. This statement is based, in particular, on the fact that the Commission has not translated into political priorities the necessity to respect the principle of the separation of powers, to increase parliamentary priorities, to strengthen the role of political parties, to guarantee judicial independence and legal accountability, and to guarantee the equal implementation of human rights. (...) The EU approach to democracy and human rights in this region seems to continue to be very cautious (...).”59

Even if Baracani’s statement is accurate, its criticism of the EU’s policy approach is not wholly justified because it ignores the basic characteristics of the ENP approach; namely that they are perceived by the governments in North Africa/Mashreq countries as jointly discussed frameworks for cooperation in the next three to five years. That means governments see the action plans as ‘joint ownership’ even if the EU’s Directorate-General Enlargement developed the action plans, presented them to the governments of the partner states and only then joint discussions and negotiations took place. The cooperative relationship is based accordingly on a step-by-step approach so as not to imperil the system’s stability.

Negotiations dealing with the action plans that strengthened the impression of ‘joint ownership’ in the southern partner countries, can only ever mean that a compromise has to be found; yet that ‘only’ here is not condescending. Such a compromise, in fact, has the advantage that it takes the real conditions on the ground and facts into account: on the one hand, it reflects the effective influence that the EU has within the Euro-Mediterranean partner states and the capacity of the EU to act in foreign policy and on the other hand, via its step-by-step approach it indicates the different capacities of the partner states to implement reforms in the individual areas of reform and cooperation.

The principle advantage of the ENP’s approach to the Euro-Mediterranean partner states is that it leaves space for the rhythm and dynamic of the cooperation, in its reach and intensity, to be adjusted to the reality of the situation in each specific country. With respect to this, an action plan as a jointly negotiated framework for cooperation can prove positive if, during the implementation phase, expectations concerning the timing, synchronicity and intensity of reforms, do not ignore the reality on the ground and demand too much. The action plans can also be a positive approach if, unlike in former years, only single aspects of the reforms are chosen, but the achievements of the reforms taken together are assessed over a particular time-period and are seen in relation to where they started out.
The following analyses are based on that assumption and understanding of the action plans. The sections on the individual countries follow the same pattern. They concentrate on the current factors that most probably will in the medium-term promote or inhibit democratic reforms and an intensification of security cooperation with the EU’s partners states in the Maghreb and Mashreq and, thus be co-responsible for the success or failure of the ENP. Whether the ENP’s aims – stability, security, and prosperity through intensified reform – which are designed to work towards a strengthening of the convergence of values will be achieved or not will depend on these factors.

### 2.2.1 Morocco

#### Favourable Factors at State Level

One of the favourable factors has been Morocco’s consistent orientation towards Europe since its independence in 1956. This has largely been determined by geographical, economic and commercial needs. Morocco’s great willingness to cooperate with the EU during the Barcelona Process was a direct and logical consequence of this traditional orientation towards Europe, which was perceived as an important way of solving the economic problems of Morocco. This relationship, which King Hassan II gradually expanded and intensified from the 1960s onwards, has been continued by King Mohammed since 1999. As in the 1990s, the priorities can be found in cooperation on economic and developmental policies.

Under King Mohammed, however, political and social reforms with far-reaching social implications in the areas of human rights, women’s rights and gender equality, child protection, minority rights, and the state’s religious policies have been introduced and enforced. These reforms run alongside economic and developmental reforms and express the determination of the King to gradually modernise while suppressing the rise of Islamism. “Development and stability through modernisation and reforms” is the guiding principle of this policy, which the King seeks to make successful by exerting his personal power and social influence as the secular and religious leader to overcome any obstructions initiated by parliamentary parties counter-movements within the population.

The extent of the King’s power and the high regard which he enjoys in much of this mostly religious and culturally traditional and hierarchically structured society is a key factor that can work in favour of reform. Nevertheless, the King has to take into consideration both the King is able to overcome any resistance. On the other hand, the traditionalism of the religious and culturally traditional social majority, this traditionalist and paternalist plans, not least because of his power and standing. Thanks to his ability to issue guidelines, the hierarchical structure of relationships has had a positive influence on the King’s reform positive attitude to cooperation with the EU. Despite the relatively small size of the mostly urban, modernist and liberal reformist section of the population and the dominance of traditional, religious and conservative values within the population and the socio-economic situation of the majority of those living in the country when devising imminent reforms. Internal security is closely tied to the social acceptability of reforms and consideration of the “specific nature” of Morocco (in comparison to Europe).

#### Favourable Factors on a Sub-state Level

Even left-wing parties and trade union associations within Morocco lend their support to cooperation with the EU in the priority areas, i.e. the economy, developmental policies, and security policies, whether this occurs in the EMP or the ENP (seen as complementary to the EMP). For most of the parties and trade union associations, Morocco’s cooperation with the EU today is a “strategic option”. The Islamists of the PJD that have seats in parliament share this view in their official declarations. The major Morocco communities living in EU member states that retain close contacts with their country of origin, make substantial financial transfers to Morocco and increasingly act as investors, as well as contribute to a generally positive attitude to cooperation with the EU. Despite the relatively small size of the mostly urban, modernist and liberal reformist section of the population and the dominance of the religious and culturally traditional social majority, this traditionalist and paternalist hierarchical structure of relationships has had a positive influence on the King’s reform plans, not least because of his power and standing. Thanks to his ability to issue guidelines, the King is able to overcome any resistance. On the other hand, the traditionalism of the population and its expectations that the state will act as a “provider state” tends to put a brake on reforms (see 2.2 below).

### Factors Inhibiting the Implementation of the ENP’s Objectives

#### The Influence of International Factors

There is no broad rejection within Morocco of cooperation with the EU. External demands for the democratisation of Morocco, however, are vehemently rejected by all political actors, irrespective of whether these demands are made by the EU or the USA. Political
and social actors unanimously reject all external interference in ‘Morocco’s affairs’ (e.g. in relation to the West Sahara). Foreign relations and the behaviour of foreign states are always perceived through the prism of national sovereignty and national interests. There is recognition, however, of a convergence of interests with the EU (see above). Since 2001, the USA’s Mashreq countries policies have caused their political reputation to deteriorate within the political parties, human rights organisations, sympathisers with Palestine and large portions of the Moroccan population. This negative image has not been transferred to the same degree to the EU and its individual members or other allies of the USA. Only Islamist groups within Morocco, and other North African and Mashreq countries, do not differentiate and talk of the politics and efforts of ‘Western states and institutions’, to promote ‘Western’ concepts of order and socio-politics in North Africa and the Mashreq countries at the expense of local identity.

The rejections of external interference in ‘internal affairs’, including notions of order, society and the timing of reforms, stretches across a whole range of parties, associations and unions and deep into the society as a whole; it comprises, in particular, too, the illegal Islamist opposition and violent Islamist groupings. They differ in the vehemence of their rejections, the reasons given and also in what they object to. The political parties, trade unions and most of the associations in Morocco object to outside ‘dictates’, but not to reforms as such. In contrast, Islamist groups’ rejection results from the essential incompatibility of the ideas and values governing policies relating to social order and society.

The Islamist movement has gained in credence because they are able to blame the country’s socio-economic problems on globalization and the terms and conditions set by the international financial institutions. Society’s diffuse fears, which are reinforced by economic reforms and their negative implications for the labour market, are used by the Moroccan Islamists in their arguments to support a strengthening of Morocco’s individual identity so as to prevent the ‘West’ taking over.

Even if the King has been able to use his substantial authority to check resistance to his policies and the threat of counter-mobilisation, the long-term influence of individual lines of argument and the positions to be drawn from them, as articulated by Islamists, and which are aimed against the intensification of Western cultural influence and Western values should not be under-estimated. Given this active Islamist movement, the unresolved Palestine question and the perceived bias of the USA and the EU in the conflict between Palestine and Israel are counter-productive to demands for a greater promotion of the rule of law, human rights and peaceful conflict management, for cooperation based on partnership, and for common definitions of foreign and security objectives. The real politics in the Mashreq countries provide arguments for all those trying to limit EU cooperation.

**Inhibiting Factors Specific to Morocco**

The comprehensive reforms that the government is aiming for and implementing step by step in Morocco are especially influenced by the economic and social problems of the country. These economic and social determinants and the fact that they can be easily used by the Islamist opposition to mobilise protests that, at the very least, may delay or weaken individual reforms, force the government to adopt a specific attitude to reforms that emphasizes social acceptability and maintenance of stability. The scope of the reforms is thus restricted; as a result smaller ‘portions of reform’ are implemented and the time span for reforms is by necessity stretched out. Structural issues make it necessary to concentrate on economic stability and developmental progress since these are the basis for further political and social reforms. The political situation, i.e. the presence of an active Islamist movement whose ideas of state and society diverge in key aspects from the King’s long-term modernisation plans, and the existence of relatively mobilisation-weak parties within the non-Islamist spectrum, help to ensure that existing structures of power and the centralised orientation, decision making and control functions of the King are retained. Political liberalisation measures and an accompanying strengthening of the participative structures to anchor and support the concepts and orientation of the King are nevertheless to be expected in the future.

The passive political culture, in which people wait for help and solutions ‘from above’ is another factor delaying reform that has been repeatedly criticised by the King’s. The implementation of reforms suffers as a result because each decision-maker has to have every single new decision verified by his superior if his decision is to be implemented. Moreover, the current political system, which allows the King to decide without being subject to any other control mechanisms, is not able to replace this hierarchical thinking without long-term ‘training’ in the new forms of behaviour found in formal modern institutions in the...
country. In addition, the political parties, trade unions, and associations generally function according to same paternalistic principles. The education system is still not able to provide and train alternative patterns of behaviour.

Conclusion

King Mohammed is the guarantor of the direction in which reforms that have been agreed by Morocco and the EU within the framework of the ENP will go. The corresponding determination of the Moroccan leadership to reform is proved by its willingness to make use of the new framework provided by the ENP to progress more rapidly and more intensively with reforms, as far as domestic politics will allow. It is obvious, as Morocco has officially emphasized and as political and social activists have acknowledged, that all reform efforts need to take into consideration the political stability and interests of the country.

The ENP's objectives of maintaining stability and security within neighbouring countries, and thus providing the EU with security, are well served by this approach. The close link made by the EU between stability, security and democratisation, as well as supporting the economy and development, receives the general support of the Moroccan regime. Nevertheless, it should be regarded as more of a long-term orientation than an area of reform deserving immediate priority and fundamental intervention. The link to domestic political circumstances that are important for reform decisions and progress clearly indicates a gradual approach leaning on the reform of human rights, women's rights and of the judiciary etc.

Cooperation on illegal migration plays a central role for Morocco in any common security project. As far as Morocco is concerned, the fight against terrorism and illegal migration goes beyond mere security policy and policing measures to include fighting the causes.

An improvement and intensification of cooperation with the EU is being strived for because the necessity of reform has been recognized and cooperation with the EU is regarded as a strategic option. This recognition of the need for reform and of Morocco's willingness to do so is officially Morocco's negative answer to inquiries about the role of incentives for the intensification and expansion of reform processes. With respect to this matter, it has been emphasized that local circumstances must be kept in mind when the reform agenda is being set. It should be emphasized that Morocco sought cooperation with the EU primarily to improve its access to markets.

Favourable Factors to the Implementation of the ENP's Objectives

As in the case of Morocco, Tunisia has had close links with Europe since its independence in 1956, mainly for economic reasons. The Tunisian government has deliberately been developing these ties since the 1970s. The orientation towards Europe in economic and cultural affairs has been consolidated by the expansion of tourism. A majority of the Tunisian population contribute to this pro-Europe orientation. Even if there is no broad anti-Western movement within Tunisia, political actors and the bulk of the population are very sensitive concerning any measures undertaken by 'Western' states in North Africa and the Mashreq countries that could be interpreted as attempts to dominate (e.g. the USA’s policies since 2003);

any measures undertaken by the EU within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation that contradict the propagated ‘partnership concept’ and could be perceived as being attempts to subjugate or dictate (e.g. if there is no prior consultation on programmes and projects).

Economic changes and the Eastern enlargement of the EU in 2004, which have increased pressure on the Tunisian economy to adapt, have contributed to the Tunisian government’s willingness and determination to develop constant close cooperation with European countries and the EU. Cooperation with the EU is seen as the only alternative and a strategic choice. The country's leadership is convinced of the urgency of a more intensive Euro-Mediterranean cooperation for the economic and social development of the country, i.e. as a way of securing Tunisia’s future, and is therefore interested in building up cooperation both with the EU as a whole and bi-laterally with individual member states. National economic and development issues determine expectations of this cooperation; subsequently great attention is paid to reforms in these areas.

2.2.2 Tunisia

67 Precisely this aspect of the ENP, as well as the joint consultations leading to the Action Plan, is seen as a step forward.

The Tunisian government has been pursuing three closely related objectives since the change of power in 1987: the modernisation and development of the economy and society in order to be able to survive on the global market and to improve Tunisia's attractiveness and competitiveness for foreign investors; combating Islamism and the anchoring of the concepts of a modernist state and society, so that they become irreversible. This should be achieved by developing measures relating to social welfare, job creation for young people and school leavers, women's interests and equality, and an incremental modernisation of laws, school books, curricula and religious policies, in particular the promotion of a more modernist liberal interpretation of religion.

Policies aimed at social improvement and combating poverty as well as the restructuring measures undertaken by the party in power, the RCD\textsuperscript{69}, have been successful and were instrumental in gaining a broad base of support for the government's foreign policy strategy and its economic and social modernisation programme. The dependence of the Tunisian economy and the prosperity of Tunisia's people on tourism, exports and foreign investment is a not to be underestimated reason for the leadership's aim of developing cooperation with the EU through the framework of the ENP. At the centre of this cooperation are service industries – the aim is to encourage a greater degree of exchange and the government is trying to make it easier for entrepreneurs and scientists to travel to EU member states; foreign investment and to increase European investment in Tunisia. International (Islamist) terrorism is thought to be a major factor obstructing greater European investment in North Africa. As a result, security cooperation concentrates on bi-lateral efforts with individual EU countries and is seen as an important element in producing a secure environment for European investment\textsuperscript{70}.

Economic consolidation is believed to be a central factor in ensuring stability and therefore has the highest priority; as a result, the leadership is investing the bulk of its energies in this area. If these policies are effective, so that the majority of Tunisians get the impression that cooperation with the EU is rewarding and worthwhile, they may contribute to further reforms and an even greater economic integration of Tunisia in the EU. The willingness of the leadership is obvious as it has has clearly signalled that the economic and social consolidation of the country is a basic pre-requisite for the additional liberalising political reforms.

**Favourable Factors on a State and Sub-state Level**

The relatively homogeneous Tunisian society, which is composed of a relatively large middle-class, is supportive of the leadership's economic ambitions and efforts to build up cooperation. Socially weak sections of the population, young adults and the young unemployed, as well as less developed regions are being targeted for development. The trade unions are under control. There is no opposition capable of mobilising resistance to the reform measures or integration into the EU within the framework of the ENP\textsuperscript{71}.

**Factors Inhibiting the Implementation of the ENP’s Objectives**

The Influence of International Factors

Tunisia is not confronted with opposing actors that are capable of mobilising support against more intensive EU cooperation. Unlike in Morocco or most of the Mashreq countries, the Islamist movement lacks social and political influence and action radius to launch an anti-Western discussion via a debate on the defence of values and identity that would gain broad appeal. Nevertheless, important political and social actors in Tunisia are sensitive to external actors' actions that could be interpreted as an interference in the affairs and sovereignty of the country. As a consequence, external demands for democracy or criticism of the political reform agenda are unanimously rejected. The adoption of Western models is also rejected in favour of a concentration on the country's own history, culture and identity. There is a widespread fear and conviction that a comprehensive political liberalisation might offer opportunities to groups determined to threaten the desired development. The Tunisian government is aware that the ongoing development process and the improvements in Tunisia's competitiveness on the global market can only be successful if a great deal of effort is put in and negative impacts on some sections of the population are avoided. The success of the reforms largely depends on the ability of the leadership to guarantee inner stability, security and order. Any prolonged unrest, strikes or terrorism would mean an end to development. That is the reason why political reforms in the future will continue to follow a cautious path. It will remain important to focus on the calculability and control of the impact of liberalisation and institutional reforms.

\textsuperscript{69} Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique / Constitutional Democratic Rally.

\textsuperscript{70} Just as the Moroccan leadership did, the Tunisian government has stressed the need to devise concepts for resolving the cases of terrorism (and illegal migration).

\textsuperscript{71} The associations of globalisation opponents and former left-wing agitators in Tunisia and Morocco that objected to the policies of the government are marginal in importance.
Inhibiting Factors Specific to Tunisia

The lack of resources in Tunisia and the dependence of its national economy on branches of the economy, including agriculture, textiles and tourism, whose success is largely dependent on factors that cannot be influenced, or if so only with a great deal of difficulty, notably climate, development of the global economy and security concerns-terrorism, make the economy the most important area of reform. The government has responded to the specific economic conditions by implementing fundamental economic and developmental reforms flanked by measures designed to combat social weaknesses and poverty. The dependence of the two most important sources of income, tourism and foreign investment, on the security situation has led to greater state control and only limited political liberalisation. The liberalisation of public life has progressed much more slowly than economic, development and social reforms due to the reasons already mentioned and because of the risks that any revival of Islamism would have for the modernisation of the state and society.

Conclusion

The opportunities to intensify cooperation within the framework of the ENP have been welcomed by Tunisia as the ENP concept at least rhetorically places much emphasis on joint consultation. The will to progress with reforms is very pronounced and the intensification and expansion of the cooperation process will continue albeit to an extent that stability and security are not jeopardised. This means that measures to re-shape the political system towards democratization are not to be expected. The government is very fearful that anticipated economic effects, especially on the labour market, as a result of the setting-up of the Euro-Mediterranean free trade zone in 2010, could incite social dissatisfaction and unrest; as a result, there will be no dismantling of government controls. Incentives for the implementation of reforms or the expansion of the scope of reforms remain ineffective. Package deals are in any case categorically rejected.

2.2.3 Jordan

Factors Favourable to the Implementation of the ENP’s Objectives

Favourable Factors at State Level

Since Jordan lacks natural resources, it is dependent on foreign backing. Its geopolitical location enabled it to become an important ally of the USA, especially after the Second World War, the foundation of Israel and the start of the Cold War. Its orientation to the West has remained constant. Jordan’s economic problems forced it to undergo economic restructuring in 1989 and several liberalisation measures were undertaken along with this economic restructuring. Both the USA, mostly through military assistance, and the EU, mostly via economic and developmental aid, provided Jordan with the necessary help to ensure its stability. This assistance for Jordan increased after it signed a peace accord with Israel in October 1994. The commitment of Jordan’s King to the EMP, introduced in 1995, is closely tied to Jordan’s policy towards Israel, which has largely been rejected and criticised by most of the Jordanian population. It was hoped that the EMP would support economic and social reforms in particular, while improving the socio-economic situation of the people in order to guarantee social peace and to pacify the opposition. Further political reforms aimed at liberalisation and increased political participation were postponed and the control mechanisms of the state improved, as any further liberalisation after the signing of the generally unpopular peace accord with Israel was considered too risky for the country’s internal stability.

The intensified commitment of the EU was designed to counterbalance the close ties of Jordan with and its dependence on the USA, the latter of which was highly criticised by the Jordanian people. This foreign policy constellation, i.e. strong ties with the USA and a positive attitude to the commitment of the EU and the EMP continued after King Hussein died in 1999 and was replaced by King Abdullah II. Consequently, official declarations concerning the EMP, and since 2003 the EMP, emphasize Jordan’s willingness to cooperate and reform. Jordan’s rapid adoption of the EMP action plan in January 2005, soon after it had been approved by the EU in December 2004, underlined the willingness of Jordan’s King and government to make use of this new offer.

Officially it was stressed that the EMP’s reform objectives had been identical with the aims and concepts of Jordan’s leadership since 1989 and that cooperation within the EMP framework was there to support these aims. The King’s generally positive attitude to increasing cooperation with the EU and his key role in setting out the country’s political agenda, which even not a major organisation opposed and critics of his foreign policy
towards the USA and Israel use to mobilise attacks on his person, is a positive factor for cooperation with the EU. On the other hand, it should be born in mind that the King's scope for action is restricted by the nature of conflicts in the region and their impact on the Jordanian people and that security and stability have been the guiding principles behind King Abdullah’s decision-making since 2003 (the Iraq War and its side effects) and that the potential consequences for security and stability of decisions for or against individual reforms are of prime importance.

Favourable Factors on a Sub-state Level

Despite the pronounced criticisms by organised political opposition and a broad spectrum of the population of the King's pro-American and pro-Israeli foreign policy and the generally pro-Israeli stance of Western countries, there has never been a massive mobilisation of resistance to this foreign policy.

There are several reasons for this: firstly, most of the people, the most influential political opposition, i.e. the Islamists - the Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front/IAF - and strongly Islamist infiltrated trade unions and labour organisations are all interested in maintaining stability in the country and are prepared, therefore, to remain loyal to the royal family. The royal family is seen as a guarantor of this stability. The Jordanian's strong sense of tradition makes it easier for the King to gain recognition for his roles as chief mediator and defender of national unity and the interests of individual groups within the country;

In addition, Jordan's lack of resources and its dependence on foreign assistance have convinced the majority of the Jordanian people of the need for international cooperation. The EU is thought of as a relatively positive partner because it is seen as less interventional than the USA's government, which is thought to be merely serving its own ends.

FACTORS INHIBITING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ENP’S OBJECTIVES

The Influence of International Factors

Like in Morocco and Tunisia, also in Jordan, a majority of the political actors and organisations reject any external interference in internal affairs. In Jordan this rejection is specifically directed at Western influences of Jordan's internal and foreign policies. In particular, US American efforts to create a new political order in the Mashreq countries since the beginning of the Iraq War in 2003 are judged negatively; nevertheless, anti-American attitudes are mostly dependent on specific actions. In other words, they are closely tied to America's political activities in the Mashreq countries, especially in Iraq, its strong military presence, as well as its strong pro-Israel stance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In official discussions concerning reforms involving international assistance it is seen as important to avoid the impression that reforms are only being implemented as a reaction to external pressure. Rather, both national interests and Jordan's own initiatives are emphasized. External measures are said to be merely a form of assistance. The ENP 'joint ownership' approach suits this need and reinforces the impression among the politically active that the EU is more open and sensitive to the specific problems and conditions in the region than the USA. Nevertheless, the EU is judged according to the way it behaves in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Jordanian ‘Movement Against the Normalisation of Relations with Israel’ (short: Anti-Normalisation Movement) tries to discredit foreign funding of civil society associations, especially human and women’s rights organisations, by pointing out that the financial resources were being used to increase foreign influence over Jordanian society. In other words, they argued against foreign funding because they perceived it as a means to spreading concepts which ran counter to Arab nationalism while promoting the normalisation of relations with Israel.

Inhibiting Factors Specific to Jordan

By and large Jordan's reform policies are being influenced by regional developments. In a country where 60% of the population originates from Palestine, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the process to resolve it undoubtedly play a central role and affect the scope of the government's internal and foreign policies.

As a result, the outbreak of the second Palestinian Intifada in September 2000, the continuing stalemate in the Mashreq countries Peace Process, Israel's military actions in the West Bank in March/April 2002, followed by the building of a protective wall and finally the Iraq War in 2003 put Jordan's leadership in a difficult position. The Jordanian...
government is bound by existing obligations to Israel and the USA\textsuperscript{46} and yet has to maintain stability and security within the country although a majority of the population rejects the King’s foreign policies. Jordan’s influential Anti-Normalisation Movement is markedly suspicious of external initiatives and offers of cooperation. For this movement the key question is whether such cooperation would help to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict while promoting Arab-national interests, and thus Jordanian interests. Put differently, if Western attempts to normalise relations with Israel do not obviously also serve the peace process, they are categorically rejected.

The sensitivity of the Jordanian people to Palestinian needs, which is a consequence of structure and geography, is one factor affecting the reach and nature of cooperation with countries abroad. King Abdullah pays considerable attention both to this sensitivity and to existing obligations by tightening state controls and restricting liberalisation in order to reduce incalculable risks.

Conclusion

A resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is of critical importance to the intensification of reforms within the ENP framework and if any alignment of values is to be achieved. The Jordanian people reject any concepts for reform or cooperation that do not take their feelings and fundamental attitudes into consideration. Nevertheless, they are not able to hinder the implementation of such concepts by the political elite. But the scope and dynamic of reforms and cooperation, as was the case in the past, can be strongly influenced by the people as the King has to respect their interests and moods\textsuperscript{47} even if the majority of Jordanians does not question his authority and respects the royal family.

A large portion of the Jordanian people is tribal and traditional, therefore social reforms geared towards modernisation, especially as regards women’s rights, can only be implemented with great care. It is this importance of tradition that makes it difficult to develop a modern political party system.

Thus, the retention and expansion of the state’s control mechanisms in a region that is affected by conflict have highest priority. As a result, the government officially emphasises that it is willing to make use of all foreign offers, including the ENP, that may serve Jordanian interests and potentially lead to stability. In relation to the ENP, acceptance of economic and development reforms is widespread. The reform agenda, however, will only progress cautiously due to the reasons explained above.

Palestinian Authority

The relationship between the EU and the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the framework of the EMP and the ENP is a special case, in that the latter partner in this cooperation is not the government of a sovereign state with clearly defined boundaries. In fact, the PA’s integration into the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation framework was supposed to help Palestine on its way to becoming a fully functioning state by providing diplomatic support for the two-state solution and by providing financial support for the setting-up of efficient state administrative, social and economic institutions. The signing of a provisional agreement with the PA in 1997 was the logical consequence of the EU’s commitment to the two-state solution and thus to a potential ending of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The EU, however, has not come closer to realise this aim. Developments since the beginning of the second Palestinian Intifada in September 2000, the latter of which led to the end of the Mashreq countries Peace Talks, show that the EU does not have any influence on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its resolution. Since 1997, the EU has also had little influence over the PA as regards the improvement of its administrative quality and efficiency, transparency, and the fight against corruption, as well as good governance. The PA ignored demands for improvements in these areas and the EU distanced itself from reacting to the lack of reform by withdrawing its assistance. The main aim was to avoid putting the Mashreq countries Peace talks, i.e. the agreements made under the Oslo Treaty, at risk and prevent the PA/Fatah, which had recognised these agreements, from becoming destabilised domestically. After the outbreak of the second Intifada and the subsequent end of the peace talks with Israel the PA/Fatah officially declared its willingness to act. It was reacting to a loss of legitimacy and popularity in the Palestinian Territories and the rise of the Islamist Hamas, as well as to intensified demands for reform, notably expressed by the US government.

2.2.4

Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Lebanon, Algeria

\textsuperscript{46} Katja Herrmann (2005), p. 354. “With a Palestinian state in the making on the other side of the river (Jordan, the question of Palestinian loyalty (meaning the loyalty of Palestinian Jordanians) becomes more and more pressing. In the light of a still tense situation in Palestine and the large anti-Israel camp in Jordan, the Jordanian regime feels under pressure to reaffirm its status as a friendly state towards Israel and the US by suppressing any domestic opposition, either to peace with Israel or against the US policies in the Middle East. In such a situation, domestic reforms are most likely to be blocked (...).”

\textsuperscript{47} The attempt started by the King and his government in October 2000 to initiate the so-called “Jordan First” Campaign (“al-Urdunn awwalan”) to reinforce new values within the society and strengthen national identity, social unity and commitment to public welfare, failed because the basic obligation of the Jordanian people towards Arab nationalism was not fully respected. The campaign was interpreted as being a renunciation of Arab-nationalist ideas and Palestinian needs.
Although the PA presented its so-called ‘Reform Agenda’ in 2002, its implementation, however, has neither moved forward rapidly nor visibly for the Palestinian population. The criticism as regards Fatah dominated the PA throughout the years as its extremely corrupt behaviour, nepotism, opaque administration and generally ‘poor governance’ remained largely unchanged. The PA’s negative image domestically was reflected in the results of the legislative elections in January 2006 during which many voters, disillusioned of and frustrated with the PA/Fatah, voted for the Islamist Hamas, which had promised ‘good governance’ and won 74 of the 132 seats available. Disappointment about Fatah’s inability to reactivate the Mashreq countries Peace Process and achieve a sustainable two-state solution was less important than domestic issues.

When in 2004 the European Commission offered the PA the opportunity to participate in the ENP, the Commission referred to this step as ‘a strategy for responding’ to the economic and political reform agenda of the PA in 2002, which was formally dedicated to democracy, accountability, transparency, the rule of law and an efficient justice system. The jointly devised action plan, approved by both the EU and the PA in 2005, was described as being the first step in assisting the reform agenda during the next three to five years. Yet, the EU’s faith in the PA’s willingness to reform is surprising given the proven lack of effort the latter has made with respect to putting into action the targets announced in 2002.

The current situation in the Occupied Territories, characterised by a cohabitation of sorts in which the President is a Fatah member, while the government is run by Hamas, is impeding the ENP’s plan for intensified cooperation with the EU: first, the balance of power in the Palestinian Territories is still unclear. Hamas and Fatah are in the middle of struggling for supremacy over power and influence. Unless it will clear who will be the leading power, who will be the legitimate representative of the majority of the population and who is able to enforce political decisions, the EU will not have an adequate partner in Palestine. In addition, it is not clear if the action plan agreed to by the PA/Fatah would be seen as binding, at least formally, by a government which had not participated in its conception. For religious, cultural and identity reasons the desire to achieve a convergence of values would seem to be a problematic objective for Hamas to sell to its members and sympathisers; Secondly, Hamas does not officially recognise Israel’s right of existence and thus does not fulfil one of the basic conditions for cooperation set by the EU. The EU’s first reaction was to suspend financial assistance, though not humanitarian aid. The planned cooperation on security, as mentioned in the action plan, has become even more complicated due to the differing opinions revolving around the issue of the legitimacy of suicide attacks.

In light of this, it needs to be concluded that the necessary conditions for the implementation of the ENP’s objectives in the next three to five years, as set out in the action plan, do not yet exist in the Occupied Territories.

**EGYPT, LEBANON, ALGERIA**

Egypt, Lebanon and Algeria are integrated into the Barcelona Process and all three states concluded association agreements with the EU. Thus, they fulfil the formal pre-requisites for participating in the ENP. In October 2004, negotiations leading to an association agreement were initiated with Syria. However, they stalled after the USA and the UN imposed sanctions on April 27, 2006 and May 17, 2006 respectively. Talks have begun to enable Egypt and Lebanon to participate in the ENP and the talks with Egypt regarding the conclusion of an Action Plan are close to completion. All three countries have in common that the popular attitudes in Egypt, the Lebanon and Algeria as regards the EMP and the ENP are shaped by specific domestic political and regional factors.

**Egypt**

The government has a positive attitude to offers of cooperation issued by the EU, especially since Egypt requires outside support and an opening-up of its economy in order to solve its grave economic and social problems. As a result, the ENP is thought to be a potential contributor to solving these problems. For Egypt job creation and the exploration of new markets are highly important when considering cooperation with the EU. Nevertheless, the government emphasizes that efforts to reform must come from inside, i.e. from forces within the country. Pressure from abroad is vehemently rejected and priority is given to cooperation that contributes to a ‘stable and secure Mashreq countries’ and supports economic and social development. Egyptian foreign policy stresses bilateral relations, including those with individual countries in the EU and such relations are seen as an ideal pre-condition for cooperation within the ENP. This gives the impression that the Egyptian leadership regards such bilateral relations as more appropriate to its needs. Generally,

**Footnotes:**

81 According to a survey, 45% of the Hamas voters primarily voted for an end to corruption, whereas only 95% voted Hamas primarily for religious reasons and 15% for its “political agenda”. Details in Martin Beck (2006), "Die palästinensischen Parlamentswahlen vom Januar 2006“ (The Palestinian Legislative Elections, January 2006), Hamburg, p. 49.
The Perception of the ENP in Partner States in North Africa and the Mashreq

2.3 Attitudes towards the EU's Offers of Cooperation

However, it welcomes the ENP's idea that a jointly negotiated action plan may serve as a guideline for cooperation.

Civilian organisations in Egypt, especially human rights groups, have criticised the ENP for not having extended the bilateral negotiations to civil society representatives and demanded from the EU that respect of human rights and political reforms should be made a priority of the action plan. Conservative religious, and especially Islamist organisations, which reject close ties with the West and Egypt's foreign and Israel policies, exert a strong influence on the population at large. Their opposition to the government will continue to ensure that the country's leaders put aspects of internal stability and the control of political and social processes before reforms and will favour economic and developmental cooperation.

Lebanon

The fact that the ENP is a bilateral framework is seen in Lebanon as an advantage of the ENP over the EMP. As the greatest barrier to expanding the areas of cooperation, especially into the security realm, and to intensifying cooperation the unresolved Mashreq countries conflict is mentioned. Yet, it automatically limits cooperation with the EU, whether within the EMP or the ENP. As far as the Lebanese government is concerned the following areas have greatest priority: the opening of new markets, freedom of movement, and assistance in the privatisation of enterprises. Securing social harmony is the guiding factor in Lebanese reform efforts. As a result, any reform that might threaten this social harmony and could provoke mass protest are automatically excluded; in other words, it can be assumed that each stage of the reform in question is taken very cautiously and slowly, irrespective of the goals that are formulated in the action plan.

Algeria

As the only country in North Africa and the Mashreq countries that has concluded an association agreement with the EU, Algeria is an exporter of hydrocarbon products and thus enjoys the benefits of high levels of foreign currency income and reserves (May 2006: $68 bn.). This financial independence allows Algeria to show merely a 'moderate' interest in intensified cooperation within the ENP. Indeed the ENP is of little importance to Algeria. Nevertheless, the Algerian parliament's approval in March 2005 of the country's association agreement with the EU raised Algeria's relationship with the EU onto a new level. This remains true although the association agreement is not without controversy within the political classes and workers' federations because it requires deep and rapid reforms to ensure the country's competitiveness after the introduction of a free trade zone in 2010. In particular, the Islamists, the Workers' Party and other left-wing oriented parties have spoken out against the agreement because they fear that it may negatively affect the labour market and thus lead to greater 'Westernisation'. In the end, however, all parties represented in the Parliament, with the exception of the Workers' Party, voted for the association agreement. In contrast, the government had a more realistic view of the situation and stressed that the agreement simply consolidated the close relations that Algeria had already been developing for years. Moreover, under the present agreement it stated that Algeria was better able to avail itself of the whole spectrum of assistance offered by the EU. The Algerian government gives highest priority to economic reforms, notably privatisation, the issue of freedom of movement and the issuing of visas, and the international cooperation to combat terrorism. It strictly rejects any other interference in the internal affairs of Algeria, e.g. demands for democracy or other political reforms. The general feeling in Algeria is that the country is pursuing its own reform agenda and has its own guideline.
From the perspective of the countries in question, bilateral approaches to cooperation are sensible as they are an expression of the fact that the different conditions found in each country are acknowledged. Countries that are partners to the ENP anticipate assistance for their reforms that is geared towards their individual needs and domestic politics and it helps to increase their perception that cooperation is of national usefulness.

Reform Priorities

In those North African and Mashreq countries that are committed to the ENP, priority is given to cooperation that contributes to stability, whether political, economic, financial or social. As their governments regard the promotion and consolidation of the economy, the promotion of social development and the struggle against poverty as the primary objectives of any state trying to establish stability, they also place them at the heart of ENP cooperation.

Positive Pre-conditions for ENP Cooperation

In the different countries analysed the following positions can be seen as forming a common attitude and they directly point to the pre-conditions that the North African and Mashreq countries partners stress in order to positively shape intensified cooperation:

Each of the governments highlights its own existing reform initiatives. Cooperation is simply designed to give external support for those reform initiatives. Any agreement to cooperate must be compatible with their national sovereignty;

Package deals are rejected; discussions concerning conditionality, whether negative or positive, are thought to be counter-productive; in fact, the very term awakens resentment. The intrinsic nature of the concept of cooperative partnerships excludes conditionality. Instead, individual governments have frequently pointed out that the EU should always consider the local social, economic and political circumstances when evaluating reform measures and their achievements to date. The view is held that the individual stages in each reform process, their progress and any transformation resulting from them cannot be assessed properly without considering the political circumstances within that country, which, in turn, determine the scope and speed of those reforms.

Reforms carried out in each of the countries require greater analysis of their impact on the stability of that country. In this context, it is obvious that any thoughts that Europeans may have as regards the choice of incentives that could promote and consolidate reforms, fail to recognise the interests of the governments of their partner states and the factors that guide their actions. Yet, debates about incentives underestimate the importance that stability and security have for the implementation of reforms in North Africa and the Mashreq countries. Hence, the need to have binding agreements is acknowledged.

In the case of the Mashreq countries, in particular the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict is having a negative effect on the deepening of cooperation with the EU. On the one hand the continuing conflict is impeding cooperation on security. On the other hand a majority of the people living in Jordan and Lebanon see a resolution of this conflict as an absolute priority. In addition, it is difficult to portray cooperation with the EU and its potential usefulness positively to those affected by the conflict. The standoff of the Middle East Peace Process has contributed to enhance the influence of Islamist groups in the Palestinian territories and neighbouring states. The unresolved power struggle that has been going on in the Palestinian Territories since the parliamentary elections in 2006 is still blocking the implementation of the ENP and even puts into question its existence.

In order to positively strengthen ties within the ENP three other aspects need to be highlighted, such as the necessity of clearly separating the different Euro-Mediterranean initiatives; detailed descriptions of cooperation within the ENP, in order to make clear, and transparent, the advantages they provide and outline the final objective of those reforms that are supported by the EU within the ENP initiatives. In other words, the EU should clearly stipulate that it is supporting modernisation and liberalisation and that it rejects any process leading to a transition towards an Islamist state and social order; the institutionalisation of mechanisms for consultation between the EU and the ENP states, so that issues of mutual interest can be dealt with regularly. For instance, Morocco has explicitly called for the importance of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation to be underlined by the participation of representatives of all EU member states at meetings with their Mediterranean partners.
Among the numerous concerns that the 2004 enlargement brought to the European Union, the issue of how to regulate relations with its new neighbourhood loomed large. Thus the economic prosperity, political stability and security of the EU's neighbouring countries had become priority items on the European agenda. More importantly, and long before extending its borders to the ten new member states, the EU had started to express a will to enhance its role as an international actor in official documents, such as the draft Constitution and the Security Strategy Paper. The importance of a European Foreign and Security policy, thus, became more apparent.

Paradoxically, the faith that EU member states would – and could – agree on a common foreign and security policy, and thus on policy instruments, has been declining. The referenda on the European Constitution and other developments suggest that it is still the member states' individual foreign policies that matter. Taking internal reluctance into consideration, the EU developed a different approach to address the new strategic outlook of the Union. The ENP was therefore devised as a response and an alternative to enlargement. Even though EU officials refrain from using such terminology\(^8\), the ENP was conceived as a post-enlargement strategy intended to build a friendly neighbourhood. Although originally designed as a framework within which the concerns of "new" Eastern neighbours could be addressed, the ENP was then shifted into the realm and jurisdiction of the EMP that is supposed to regulate relations with the Mediterranean neighbourhood.

The ENP entered the implementation phase rather recently with the first Action Plans being implemented in 2005, hence it is too early to assess its overall impact. However, it is possible to make some observations and recommendations based on the realities on the ground. Even so, since the implementation of the action plans has only just begun it has not yet been possible to evaluate their efficacy. Hence, only very general recommendations can be made.

If the ENP is to become an effective EU foreign policy tool for the partner countries in the Maghreb and the Mashreq, i.e. an instrument that is suitable for the implementation and enforcement of jointly identified objectives and interests, the analyses of individual countries suggest that it is not sufficient to alter only a few aspects of the ENP. Instead, more open discussions of the economic concessions and finances necessary to reach the ENP's objectives of 'security, stability and welfare' are needed.

In order for the EU to advance this process of clarification and provide the ENP with fresh impulses, it will have to fulfil several pre-conditions. First, the EU should formulate its interests pragmatically based on a realistic examination of the EU's ability to implement its key interests in North Africa and the Mashreq. Undoubtedly, this would imply the adoption of a 'leaner' agenda. Second, such a critical analysis of its own capacity needs to be accompanied by a critical and realistic assessment of the reform capacity of its partners in North Africa and the Mashreq. The EU should carefully examine whether the governments in question have enough political power to push through reforms. Third, it is important to analyse carefully the room for manoeuvre North African Mashreq countries leaders possess. That means analysing more closely, among other factors, the balance of power within each country, the influence of the opposition, the population's willingness to protest and to mobilise itself, as well as the funds available for softening social hardship caused by reforms. Such an analysis would make it possible to estimate the government's political influence during its efforts to implement reforms and guarantee stability and security.

Any realistic assessment has to be based on a detailed analysis of the partner countries in all phases of the cooperation. The domestic - economic, social and security policies - and the regional political circumstances on which the stability and security perceptions of the North African and Mashreq countries leaders are dependent need to be examined as these perceptions have a direct impact on the implementation of reforms, and as such detailed analyses can also provide insights into those areas of reform that have the best chance of success.

The ENP, as an instrument of EU foreign policy, should, as far as conception and expectations are concerned, firstly recognise that it is inevitable and necessary that different countries reform at a different pace (owing to their specific stability and security needs). The path to achieving the ENP's objectives of 'stability, security and welfare' will vary from country to country as the respective national and regional political conditions play a decisive role in the shaping of transformation. As a result, the chances for dynamic reform in the North African ENP countries of Morocco and Tunisia are greater than in the countries of the conflict-prone Mashreq. Secondly, the EU should concede that it only has a very limited influence on the Middle East conflict. The special relationship between the EU and Israel

\(^8\) According to Eneko Landaburu 2006 (www.eboi.eus) "The question in foreign policy terms should not whether there is an alternative to enlargement or not. The ultimate question to be asked should be how the EU can encourage stability, prosperity and security in its neighbourhood."
was and will remain a constant factor. As a consequence, the states in North Africa and
the Mashreq are not treated equally, especially with respect to security issues (the most
obvious examples being the question of nuclear weapons and the definition of terrorism).
Future security cooperation with partner states in the Mashreq will therefore continue to
be difficult and an intensification of security cooperation will only be possible with some of
the states and merely concern some aspects of security cooperation.

The probability that the ENP will help cement relations between individual states in North
Africa, the Mashreq and the EU and thus achieve a relative improvement in terms of ‘stability,
security and welfare’ in each region is likely to increase if two conditions are fulfilled:

first, if the EU, in addition to the points mentioned above, explicitly considers the interests
and capacities of its partner states, especially their stability and security needs, and is
willing to conduct the evaluation of reform agendas jointly with its partners;

second, if the EU limits the number of cooperation areas to those that are most important
for their partners and that can have a sustainable impact on potential reform initiatives.
This is necessary because of the EU’s own limitations both in the domain of its financial
capacity and its political influence in the region.

The following recommendations are based on the above-mentioned findings of the
individual country analyses.

Recommendations concerning the ENP’s procedures:

The ENP’s goals for the different phases of cooperation, the procedure for the evaluation of
achievements and the pre-requisites that need to be fulfilled in order to conclude an ENP
agreement should be jointly determined in more detail and in a more concrete fashion than
has been the case so far.

The criteria upon which individual countries’ progress is being evaluated and upon which
their efforts are recognised need to be established. For the EU to be able to underline its
achievements, it needs to record both the progress that was achieved commonly and by the
neighbouring countries themselves. Public recognition of success might be an additional
motive for the partner countries to continue to reform and also help to inspire others.

All ENP partners should be regularly invited to discussions within the EU pertaining to
issues that are of interest to both parties and that require trans-national cooperation is to
resolve certain problems. This participation should be institutionalized.

At meetings with participants from North Africa and the Mashreq, representatives from
all EU states should be present in order to underline the importance the EU gives to Euro-
Mediterranean cooperation.

The individual initiatives should be differentiated sufficiently clear, in order to make people
in the Euro-Mediterranean area understand their contents, as well as assess the advantages
that participation brings.

The EU should clarify its financial commitment towards the ENP as it is somewhat crucial
that the EU is able to prove that it keeps its promises.

Recommendations concerning the ENP’s content:

The EU needs to define the concrete outcomes of the ENP. An evaluation of whether and how
the ENP builds upon the ESS and the EMP is needed in order to assess the achievements of
the strategies that were initiated in the recent past. While the EU underlines the importance
it attaches to long-term democratic reform and the principle of sustainable partnership, it
remains rather inert on specific concerns. There also needs to be a thorough assessment
by the partners of the advantages and disadvantages of the ENP, i.e. those areas that are
functional and feasible and those that are not.

The EU should use a detailed analysis of individual countries to clarify the primary interest
each government has in intensified cooperation. In addition, the analyses should at regular
intervals focus on assessing the level of acceptance of the societies in question, their
degree of interest in such cooperation and their willingness to support agreed reforms.
The stakes that are on offer should be diversified and substantiated. The parties should identify the peoples and elites’ priorities in all countries concerned. When the ENP was formulated, the possibility of granting the ‘four freedoms’ to citizens of partner countries was expressed\(^{89}\). However, since then this promise was somewhat diluted as all relevant documents downgraded it. In this respect, more permissive visa policies and more realistic and sustainable economic incentives, such as tariff-free access to certain markets, could be considered for the future.

**Recommendations concerning the EU’s actions:**

The EU should transmit clearer messages to its neighbours. One major difficulty of implementing policies that are geared towards the non-Western world rests with the articulation of what can be expected and what kind of reform needs to be encouraged in the countries concerned. The implications of this are twofold: first of all, the EU needs to be more sincere in its aims. Given the stipulated goal of the ENP, i.e. to create a circle of stable, secure, democratic, prosperous and friendly countries around Europe’s borders, the EU should stress its ambition to intensify political and economic cooperation, as well as its intention to spread values that will bring the periphery closer to Europe. Yet, cultural particularities that may or may not coincide with those values that are perceived as being western should be accounted for, and thus one should be careful not to standardize or Europeanize them. Hence, instead of getting bogged down in complicated definitions and normative discussions, the EU should underline the possible areas of mutual cooperation with the different partner countries that may lead to a normative rapprochement in the long-run.

A more egalitarian discourse should be adopted. Establishing bilateral relations and building those relations on the basis of individual country assessments is a positive aspect of the ENP. In this sense, the relationship appears as one in which the partners are on a more or less equal footing. Yet, the EU still needs to define itself vis-à-vis the ENP’s ‘target countries’, and adopt a language that is not external to the process. In other words, the terminology of ‘conditionality’ and ‘incentives’ should be substituted by ‘assistance’, ‘partnership’ and ‘cooperation’. It is important to note that this non-empathizing language has contributed to a negative image of the West as being hegemonic and comprised of countries that, in the eyes of many, tend to impose certain ways of living and thinking. New rules governing the use of language would provide a necessary basis for a sustainable improvement of the relations.

The EU should remain equidistant to all partners. Even though the EU might have reason to adopt positions in favour of one of the partners in certain circumstances, this should be an exception rather than the rule as the general policies of the EU should not be discriminatory. If they are, the EU will certainly lose its credibility, particularly in the eyes of the public.

The EU should place more emphasis on the public relations dimension of the ENP. In other words, the EU would be well-advised to deal with its own public relations more effectively. Although the literature is more in favour of noting failures than successes, the EU should emphasise what it has contributed to the (little) progress in the region. At the same time, the inclusive policies of the EU member states as regards their minorities from within the region and a better marketing of these policies would be a good way of showing their sincerity and facilitate the upgrading of perceptions of the EU.


http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=338&.


http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/essay_turk_everts.pdf#search=%22silver%20carrot%20%22EU%22


Factors and Perceptions Influencing the Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Selected Southern Mediterranean Partner Countries


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