



Drawing Lessons from Turkey's and Spain's Security Sector Reforms for the Mediterranean

EDUARD SOLER I LECHA

DEBORA MIRALLES

ÜMIT CIZRE

VOLKAN AYTAZ



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1. Introduction

Security Sector Reform (henceforth SSR) and more specifically the Democratic Civilian Control of the Armed Forces (henceforth DCCAF) have become key issues in current debates on political reform. As SSR and DCCAF are emerging topics, intersecting both comparative politics and security studies fields of international relations, their theoretical frameworks are largely developed around comparative studies. This project attempts to contribute to the design of the EU's policies on democracy and good governance promotion in the Mediterranean region by drawing lessons from Turkey's and Spain's DCCAF. The study will analyse to what extent the transformations in these two Mediterranean countries, which have led to different outcomes with respect to DCCAF, can be a source of inspiration for the Mediterranean partners as well as for the EU.

As Heiner Hänggi and Fred Tanner have noted while “the EU has assumed the task on engaging with Turkey on SSR” it has “ignored the very same issue when it came to cooperation with partners in North Africa and the Middle East”¹. In this sense, any reevaluation of the political and security basket of the Barcelona process and any revision of the European policies towards its Southern and Eastern Mediterranean partners can no longer ignore such issues. Although the report does not focus on SSR of DCCAF in the Arab world, the lessons drawn from the Turkish and Spanish experiences may be of some relevance for the countries that constituting the Europe's Southern neighbours.

This study starts by building a conceptual framework in which DCCAF becomes the centre of analysis.

Secondly, an overview of the current EU approach towards SSR and DCCAF promotion in an area (the Mediterranean) is provided by underlining deficiencies involved.

Third, DCCAF processes are analyzed in Spain and Turkey, whereby;

- (a) the current roles of the Armed Forces in politics and society;
- (b) the key transformations relevant for DCCAF;
- (c) internal and external pressures;
- (d) the impact of domestic and international terrorism are discussed.

Fourth, based on the comparison and contrast of Spain and Turkey, several key lessons are drawn.

Finally, the study lists and discusses some policy recommendations particularly addressed to the EU.

The researchers suggest that SSR and DCCAF should not be perceived as goals in themselves but as significant and indispensable elements of the democratisation process. A country cannot democratise without efforts to incorporate the principles of DCCAF. Indeed, the pre-eminence of the military in a country's politics and society could hamper other aspects of its democratisation process. Consequently, a holistic approach towards SSR and democracy promotion is needed.

2. Executive summary

Security Sector Reform (SSR) and more specifically the Democratic Civilian Control of the Armed Forces (DCCAF) have become key issues in current debates on political reform. As SSR and DCCAF are emerging topics, intersecting both comparative politics and security studies fields of international relations, their theoretical frameworks are largely developed around comparative studies. This project attempts to contribute to the design of the EU's policies on democracy and good governance promotion in the Mediterranean region by drawing lessons from Turkey's and Spain's DCCAF.

The first part of this study builds the conceptual framework around DCCAF, considered as a narrow central component of a broader spectrum of SSR, which aims at setting up the accountability of military forces to constitutionally-elected civilians and civil society, in line with a transparent and accountable policy making and a clear division of responsibility between the civil and military sectors.

Since the end of the Cold War, democratic and civilian control of the military has climbed high on the agenda of international organisations such as the EU or the NATO. The context and the structures that enforce DCCAF have progressively become inextricably linked with the processes of enlargement and DCCAF has turned into a political precondition for candidate countries, which have to ensure their adaptation to entry requirements, that's to say, democracy and regional security.

The theoretical framework concludes with a definition of what is to be understood for “civilian control”, referring to the setting up procedures of democratic accountability, which

transcend bureaucratic mechanisms of oversight and adopt a more inclusive approach that promotes the participation of wider sectors of civil society, academic circles, all interested parties and the media in public debate on defence and security.

The second part of this paper presents an overview of the current EU approach towards SSR and DCCAF promotion in the Mediterranean area, which so far has not achieved a positive record. This section deals with the obstacles that prevent the full implementation of SSR and DCCAF (pre-eminence of a classical security culture in which states perceive their neighbours as threats; the perception of some sectors of the society as internal enemies, the region's proximity to regional conflicts, etc.). Although the EU is committed to the promotion of democracy and the respect of human rights, being democracy a shared goal of the Barcelona Process, SSR and DCCAF have not yet been directly addressed when cooperating with the Mediterranean partners (neither in the European Mediterranean Process nor the European Neighbourhood Policy). The single mention to SSR has been in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy mission EUPOL COPPS to the Palestinian Territories aimed at supporting police reform but falling short of expectations.

The third part of this paper is devoted to separately analyse DCAFF processes in Spain and Turkey. The analysis goes through the following aspects:

- 1) The Armed Forces influence on civilian affairs: This section analyses the role and mission of the military and how it is regulated by law (while in Spain its mission is to "guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Spain and to defend its territorial integrity and the constitutional order", in Turkey it prevails a "guardianship role"), its evolution and reforms, the present political class linkage to the military, or the professionalisation and modernisation of the army.
- 2) The key transformations carried out in Turkey and Spain that are relevant to DCAFF: This section deals with the measures that each country has developed to improve defence institutions, national security policy making or control and accountability.
- 3) The internal and external pressures that have contributed to DCAFF: While internal pressures were crucial in the Spanish case (domestic resistance from some military sectors towards DCAFF was braked by the will from some civil sectors and political parties to carry it out), the prominent "guardian role" of the Turkish Armed Forces precluded civil society, political parties and its own officer cadres from exerting effective pressure towards democratic reform and readdressing the civil military balance. As far as external pressures are concerned, while NATO played a "modernising" role, the EU had a more "democratising" impact. EU conditionality criteria played an important influence on both DCAFF processes.
- 4) The impact and conditioning of domestic and international terrorism. Both countries have been affected by terrorist attacks of domestic nature (ETA/PKK), and also have been the target of international terrorist groups linked to Al-Qaeda. This section deals with the fact that the presence of the terrorist threat is subject to political exploitation by those segments that would like to grant the Armed Forces a stronger role in politics.

Once the analysis of each case has been fulfilled, the fourth part of the report concentrates on comparing and contrasting the Spanish and Turkish cases in order to draw some general lessons that can be of use for other countries of the Mediterranean neighbourhood willing to carry out DCAFF processes:

The first of these lessons refers to the fact that there is not a one-size-fits-all prescription that can be used for all cases. The specificities of each case, including historical developments, the self image of the Armed Forces and others, should be acknowledged in formulating and implementing reform policies.

Secondly, the existence of internal impetus, visible pro-reform voices within the Armed Forces, the political arena or the societal forces positively contribuent to guarantee a potential success of DCCAF as well as a far easier and smoother process of implementation. As far as external impetus is concerned, and since in the Mediterranean the prospect for membership does not exist, the EU needs to develop other rewarding mechanisms that serve as a catalyst for countries to follow a pro-democratisation and DCCAF agenda.

The last drawn lesson refers to the impact of terrorism. Since both domestic and international terrorism have been prominent in the Mediterranean countries, it is obvious that DCAFF and SSR have to complement the efforts of these countries in their fight against terrorism.

The last section of the paper is devoted to giving concrete policy recommendations and some policy proposals to the EU and the rest of the EMP members, in order to improve the SSR record and specifically DCCAF in the Mediterranean area.

The first general recommendation refers to the fact that since the lure of EU membership is currently not being offered to the Mediterranean countries, the EU has to rethink the principle of positive conditionality in order to make incentives attractive enough for Mediterranean countries to adhere to democratic principles.

A second general recommendation is the need for a horizontal approach towards the main challenges affecting the region, taking into consideration political, economical and social factors. Although this is not new and it has been extensively debated within the EMP framework, some updating is necessary.

The last general recommendation is centred on the urgency for deeper EU involvement in the open regional conflicts as a precondition for a change in the security paradigm. These include the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Western Sahara dispute and the Cyprus issue. Difficult and costly as these efforts may be, member states should understand that no DCCAF progress is possible if the military in partner countries legitimise their role in politics through external threats.

Taking these three general recommendations into account, the report also provides some concrete policy proposals regarding DCCAF and SSR promotion in the southern and eastern Mediterranean grouped into the five following categories:

1. Conceptual work: Both political actors and civil society in the EU and in the Southern Mediterranean countries should familiarise and incorporate into their discourse the following four new concepts; SSR, DCCAF, human security and peace culture.
2. Coherence: EU foreign policy has been extensively criticised by its lack of coherence, which is of paramount importance in optimising the efforts of the EU and to make it a credible and reliable partner in international affairs. Effective SSR and DCCAF promotion demands coherence at three different levels: within the EU's first community pillar and the second intergovernmental one; between the EU and its member states' policies; between the EU and other international actors; and among regional and multilateral initiatives.
3. Effective conditionality: In order to be really effective, the ENP Action Plans should detail the incentives that could be offered to each country according to the steps that country makes. DCCAF should be considered as one of the many negotiation chapters and the "carrots", adapted to the country's main interests, would only be given if the country is leading a transformation of its security policies towards more democratisation.
4. Cooperative efforts: In those cases where the third country does not seem to respond to incentives, the EU should take into account that opening some cooperation frameworks related to the security field could also be beneficial for DCCAF in the mid or long term (offering know-how in military issues; opening spaces where DCAFF may be debated; etc.).
5. Fighting terrorism and promoting democratisation simultaneously: The EU needs to develop a comprehensive and unwavering policy of fighting terrorism by simultaneously insisting that democratisation and DCCAF should nevertheless proceed. Thus, when the EU expresses its readiness in cooperating with the Mediterranean countries against terrorism, it simultaneously needs to underline the necessity to complement those with DCCAF and SSR efforts.
6. Increasing transparency and providing information: No effective DCCAF promotion policy can be designed and applied without the necessary information on military affairs in partner countries. The EU should rely on organised civil society and the academic *milieu* of third countries as to provide such information in a transparent manner. A concrete way by which this could effectively take place could be, for example, to finance research projects able to find out data pertinent to DCAFF, the publishing of a Yearbook or the launching of a pan-Euro Mediterranean Observatory)

² Hans Born (2003) 'Introduction,' in Alan Bryden and Philipp Fluri (eds.), *Security Sector Reform: Institutions, Society and Good Governance*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, pp., 43.

³ Marina Caparini (2003) 'Security Sector Reform and NATO and EU Enlargement', in Heiner Hänggi and Theodor H. Winkler (eds.), *Challenges to Security Sector Governance*, pp., 55-56.

⁴ Tim Edmunds et. al. (2003) 'Political Conditionality and Security-Sector Reform in Post-Communist Europe', *Conflict, Security and Development* 3 (1) (April): 32-46.

The final conclusion of this paper is that SSR and DCCAF should not be perceived as goals in themselves but as significant and indispensable elements of the democratisation process. A country cannot democratise without efforts to incorporate the principles of DCCAF. Indeed, the pre-eminence of the military in a country's politics and society could hamper other aspects of its democratisation process. Consequently, a holistic approach towards SSR and democracy promotion is needed.

This project is centred around the idea that the principles of DCCAF is a narrow but central component of the broader spectrum of SSR. Both DCCAF and SSR are relatively fresh concepts that now shape academic debates and policy programmes on democratisation, development, defence, international development assistance as well as being part of the political conditions of entry into trans-national blocs. DCCAF aims at setting up the accountability of military forces to constitutionally-elected civilians and civil society, in line with transparent and accountable policy making and a clear division of responsibility. While establishing DCCAF was a priority in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the communist bloc in transitional societies, other non-military problems of security have made it necessary to move onto the larger spectrum of the Security Sector. This new spectrum refers to all state agencies having legitimate authority to order, use, and/or threaten the use of force “to protect the security of the state and its citizens.”² These include the armed forces, military and paramilitary forces, police and gendarmerie, intelligence services, and border/coast guard formations.

SSR serves the purpose of Democratic Governance of the Security Sector, which promotes “democratic accountability, civilian control of security structures, and clear demarcation between internal and external security mechanisms.”³ DCCAF is one of the key components of SSR and it is important to note that establishing democratic civilian control of the armed forces also establishes the mechanisms and principles embodied by the Democratic Governance of the Security Sector.

Although the priority areas for reform of the military are different in each of the post-Communist transition countries, there seems to be a rough consensus on the organizing principles that lie behind DCCAF. Namely, a clear constitutional division of authority between the civil and military sectors, parliamentary control of the defence budget, and, in order to ensure its political neutrality, governmental discretion over the professional, institutional and political activities of the military. When the elements of this consensual definition are brought together, DCCAF amounts to executive control over military activity and parliamentary and civil societal supervision of both the government and military. DCCAF should also involve democratic control of defence and foreign policy areas⁴. In addition, in Central and Eastern Europe, there is a particular need for parliamentary discussion not only on the budget but also on security threats and policy, and their translation into military strategy and tactics. This is presumably not because armies leave their imprint on national security policy-making in the way the Turkish Armed Forces does, but in order to increase the number of legislators who have some knowledge of how security policies are made.

Since the end of the Cold War, democratic and civilian control of the military has turned into a common priority of NATO and its PfP (Partnership for Peace) partners. Similarly, it has also climbed high on the European agenda of integration, European identity-building, good governance and security. DCCAF is conceived of as consolidating and institutionalizing a democratic model of civil-military relations whereby military subordination to civilian authority is accepted as the norm. The context and the structures that enforce DCCAF are inextricably linked with the process called ‘enlargement’, i.e., shifting the borders of NATO and EU eastwards and southwards which entails fundamental changes for the prospective entrants if they are to adapt themselves to the entry requirements. Since 1993-94, DCCAF has become part of the criteria to qualify for membership in the EU, the Western European Union and NATO. It has, in other words, turned into a political precondition for the candidate countries, ensuring democracy and regional security.

The objective of wanting to establish a system of DCCAF in some states is to preclude the potential threat of a politically powerful military intervening in politics. These states are assumed to be crisis-ridden-transition countries exhibiting ‘peripheral’ features in that they are socio-economically and politically behind the advanced capitalist societies of the West. As the armed forces are still considered to be key players in politics, and therefore capable of praetorian-style military intervention, enlargement turns into a Western security interest. Hence, it is thought that DCCAF is a critical instrument for promoting stability and peace in ‘not-quite’ democracies and in the presence of ‘politicized’ militaries. Underlying this is the assumption that in the enlargement process of NATO and the EU, the expectation of membership in these organizations is the strongest motivation for necessary reforms, helping to stabilize democracy in some countries. The post-September 11 trend towards greater European integration to promote security has enhanced the importance of DCCAF as a strategic instrument.

The “control” dimension of DCCAF entails a revision in the understanding of the traditional concept of civilian ‘control’ over the military: the ‘old’ school of Civil Military Relations theory focused on ‘civilian’ rather than ‘democratic’ control of the military by the emphasis it laid on the parliament and the executive and the formal political and legal mechanisms.

3. Conceptual underpinnings of the report

5 Arnold Luethold (2004) “Security Sector Reform in the Middle East: A Nascent Debate” in Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (eds.) *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*, Münster:Lit Verlag.

6 See, for instance, the Freedom House annual index (www.freedomhouse.org) as well as the annually published Arab Human Development Report.

7 *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities*, Barcelona, 15 September 2004 (available in www.cidob.org).

8 Arnold Luethold (2004) *op. cit.*

9 *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, December 2003.

10 A 2001 Communication of the Commission asserted that “The security sector has not traditionally been a focus of Community co-operation. However in many countries, achieving structural stability may require a fundamental overhaul of the state security sector (i.e. the police, the armed forces and democratic control of the security forces as a whole).” It is important to note that this Communication considered that there are aspects in which the EU member states are better placed to assist the third countries and for the Commission the reform of armed forces is one of them. Hence, we move to, the CFSP/ESDP dimension rather than the external action of the EU and this Communication underlies that the discussion of the Country Strategy Papers is the adequate framework to address this issue. Simultaneously, the Commission considers that the Community should support the “conversion of military sources to civilian use and other structural reforms of the security sector” supporting “human rights training for the whole security sector” as well. See, European Commission (2001) *Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention*, Brussels, 11.4.2001, COM(2001)211 final.

11 Turkey is one of the exceptions (in the first group) and the other is the Palestinian National Authority (in the second).

4. Overview of current EU policies regarding DCCAF in the Mediterranean region

The 'new' concept of civilian control revolves around setting up procedures of 'democratic accountability', which transcend bureaucratic mechanisms of oversight and adopt a more inclusive approach that promotes the participation of wider sectors of civil society, academic circles, all interested parties and the media in public debate on defence and security. In other words, control no longer means zero-sum domination by constitutionally elected civilian bodies over a unified military structure. The media is an essential actor in the process as it plays an important part in disseminating information, questioning and debating defence, security and strategy issues and removing 'secrecy/taboo's that are automatically identified with security and defence issues.

The cardinal principle to remember is that civilian control is not always democratic: non-democratic regimes achieve excellent control over their militaries. However every democratic control is civilian.

In identifying 'democratic control' mechanisms, this study examines internal and external pressures, prime movers, concrete legislation and reform plans facilitating debate and participation of civil society, think-tanks, universities and a community of interested and informed civilians in issues concerning the military and defence.

As Arnold Luethold underlined, SSR is a nascent debate in the Arab world which has not played "any significant role on the reform debate in the Middle East"⁵. More specifically, DCCAF is lacking both in the reform agenda of the Arab Mediterranean countries and among the priorities of the EU towards the Mediterranean. SSR and DCCAF are closely related with the process of broader democratisation but the Mediterranean Partners do not attain to, in general terms, a positive record in this respect⁶.

In fact the Arab Mediterranean partners, and to some extent Israel, face several obstacles that prevent the full implementation of the principles of SSR and DCCAF. The pre-eminence of a classical security culture, in which states perceive their neighbours as threats, is just one example. Moreover, several governments and militaries perceive certain sectors of their societies as internal enemies. Thus, the maintenance of regional conflicts (Western Sahara, Arab-Israel, Cyprus), the region's proximity to other foci of instability (Iran, Iraq) and the increase of radical, potentially destabilising, local movements prevents a shift in security culture towards a "human security concept", which puts the emphasis on the citizens' security rather than that of the states⁷.

In fact, analysis of the military in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean gives little reason for optimism as far as SSR is concerned. For example, within the region, military expenditure continues to rise, the military have continually interfered in politics (for example, the failed putsches in Morocco in 1971 and 1972 and the cancellation of the second round of the Algerian elections in 1992), democratic defense institution building remains weak (as noted by Arnold Luethold many Arab countries have either no established Ministry of Defense or have a Ministry of Defense, which is run by the military), military modes of justice continue to wield significant power and many countries in the region have problems of transparency on multiple levels⁸.

As previously stated, full democracy is impossible without DCCAF and DCCAF cannot take place outside a broader democratisation process. EU foreign policy is committed to the promotion of democracy and the respect for human rights. In this respect, the EU has declared that SSR promotion has become a key component of its external policies. For example, the European Security Strategy, published in 2003, stated that:

"As we increase capabilities in the different areas, we should think in terms of a wider spectrum of missions. This might include joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. The last of these would be part of broader institution building"⁹.

The EU's policy of endorsing SSR and DCCAF are to be understood both in the framework of security and democracy promotion policies. Significantly, issues related to SSR are important facets of any framework of accession or pre-accession negotiations (that is to say in enlargement policy) or in the case of post-conflict management¹⁰. However, the overwhelming majority of the Mediterranean partners are not included in any of these groups¹¹. In fact, when studying the Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy (henceforth, ENP) it becomes clear that SSR and DCCAF have not been directly addressed when cooperating with their Mediterranean partners.

12 Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Barcelona 27-28 November 1995.

13 European Commission (2002). *Communication from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament of 13 February 2002 to prepare the meeting of Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministers in Valencia on 22 and 23 April 2002* SEC (2002) 159 final.

14 Dorothee Schmid (2003) "Interlinkages within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Linking Economic, Institutional and Political Reform: Conditionality within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership" *EuroMeSCo paper*, n. 27.

15 Roberto Aliboni, (2005) "10 ans de dialogue politique et de sécurité au sein du processus de Barcelone" une tentative d'évaluation" *Géoeconomie*, n. 35.

16 Council of the European Union (2005) *Five Year Work Programme, 10th Anniversary Euro-Mediterranean Summit, Barcelona*, 27 and 28 November 2005, Brussels, 15074/05 (Presse 327)

17 Hänggi and Tanner, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

18 European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EU COPPS) & Palestinian Civil Police Development Programme 2005-2008, Factsheet, 15 February 2006

19 European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah), Factsheet, February 2006.

The omission of SSR and DCCAF in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (henceforth, EMP) is even more paradoxically since democracy is a shared goal of the Barcelona Process. As specified in the Barcelona declaration, the foundational text of the EMP, its members will “develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems, while recognizing in this framework the right of each of them to choose and freely develop its own political, socio-cultural, economic and judicial system” and that “they will encourage actions of support for democratic institutions and for the strengthening of the rule of law”¹². Nevertheless, progress in this field is anything but impressive. What is more, as most analysts and even the EU have noted, the situation has even deteriorated in some countries¹³. In response, the EU has begun to evaluate its democracy promotion policies, questioning the feasibility of applying negative conditionality and rethinking ways to switch to a positive conditionality scheme¹⁴. While good governance, transparency and, to a lesser extent, democratic accountability are some of the main priorities in this new phase, DCCAF, CMR and SSR are notable absentees from EMP discussions on democracy promotion.

DCCAF, CMR and SSR are not directly addressed in the security dimension of the EMP either. Roberto Aliboni has identified three phases in the cooperation in this field during the last decade¹⁵. The third and last phase which still continues can be characterized by pragmatism and voluntarism. Despite the importance that SSR and DCCAF have gained in other regions, these issues remain outside the EMP's security agenda, even in its so-called third phase. For instance, SSR is not included in the most recent five-year work programme agreed at the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean summit¹⁶.

SSR and DCCAF are lacking in the application of ENP towards the Mediterranean. Taking into account that this is a more recent policy and that is developed bilaterally, it is an even more striking deficit. According to Hänggi and Tanner¹⁷, the omission of SSR in the EMP could be compensated through the ENP, possible through its Action Plans. Nevertheless, careful analysis of the already adopted Action Plans, previous proposals of the European Commission and previous country reports, suggests that SSR is not being tackled sufficiently. There are references to some aspects encompassed in SSR, mainly with regard to the police force and judicial reform (particularly in the Action Plan with the Palestinian National Authority), but they are rare in the Action Plans agreed with most of the Mediterranean Partners and in no case there is a reference to DCCAF. Thus, when taking into account the prevalent security culture in the region, the ENP, which explicitly aims to promote good governance, democracy and respect of human rights seems to elude a difficult topic.

In sum, both the EMP and the ENP seem to ignore many central principles related to democracy. Firstly the abuse of power by uncontrolled military elites threatens the security of citizens. Second, the democratic control of the security sector is an essential part of the democratization processes. Third, good practices, good governance and transparency efforts should be extended to the security field.

The European Security and Defence Policy (henceforth, ESDP) fairs slightly better in this respect. Recently the EU deployed its first ESDP mission to the Middle East called EUPOL COPPS (Coordination Office for Palestinian Police Support), which aims to support SSR, in all but name, in the Palestinian territories. This office, established in 2005, coordinates Member States' support to Palestinian police reform. Although its activities endeavour to modernise the force, rather than democratise, the office underlines the need to maintain safety and security for all citizens¹⁸. In fact, ESDP has been more successful at promoting the principles of SSR elsewhere. Following an official request by the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the EU launched an EU advisory and assistance mission to support local security sector reform efforts in May 2005 (EUSEC DR CONGO mission). The mission concentrated on promoting human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards, principles of good public management, transparency and the rule of law¹⁹.

In the foreseeable future, the likelihood that the EU would deploy such a mission in the Mediterranean region or that a partner country, apart from the Palestinian National Authority, would ask for such cooperation is slim. Nevertheless, the EU is offering to strengthen cooperation with the Mediterranean Partners, on a voluntary basis, in areas of conflict prevention or natural disasters, which could take place within the framework of ESDP. Cooperation under an ESDP framework, as defended by several analysts such as Sven Biscop (2003) has started to enter into EMP discourse, following the Valencia Euro-Mediterranean Conference of June 2002, and has subsequently been included in several Neighbourhood Action Plans. In practical terms, some Mediterranean partners have already been involved in ESDP missions. Moroccan troops actively participate in the peacekeeping operation “Althea” in Bosnia, and thus help building confidence between them and the European troops. The extent to which this kind of participation could have a positive effect for SSR and DCCAF among those countries is realm for further study in this respect.

20 This Law abolishes the 6/1980 Organic Act (RCL 1980, 1558) by which the basic criteria of National Defence and Military Organisation are regulated, modified by the 1/1984 Organic Act (RCL 1984, 44, 4474), and the 13/1991 Organic Act related to the Military Service (RCL 1991/ 2979).

21 Art 62 of the Spanish Constitution

22 CNI is the public institution responsible for providing the Prime Minister and the Government with information, analyses, studies or proposals that allow for the prevention and avoidance of any danger, threat or aggression against the independence or territorial integrity of Spain, its national interests and the stability of its institutions and of the rule of law. (Sec. 1, Act 11/2002)

5. DCCAF in Spain and Turkey

Spain and Turkey have undergone two separate processes of political democratisation, which have affected SSR. This report will analyse the reforms that have led to the DCCAF in both Spain and Turkey. It suggests that although Spain has undergone a process of full consolidation of DCCAF, Turkey finds itself in a transitional period – a point which both the European Commission and independent Turkish actors have underlined.

In order to establish comparisons between the two cases and to draw lessons from them, an analysis of the following aspects is worthwhile:

- (a) The current roles of the Armed Forces in politics and society.
- (b) The key transformations relevant for DCCAF.
- (c) Internal and external pressures.
- (d) The impact of domestic and international terrorism.

5.1 Present role of Spanish and Turkish armed forces in politics and society

This section is devoted to the analysis of the present situation of the Armed Forces in political life, namely the Armed Forces' influence on civilian affairs, the role attributed to the army and to what extent civilian power can exert control over the military, as well as in society in both Spain and Turkey. Therefore the study takes note of public opinion of the role of the military as well as the pressure and control exerted by the media, civil society and other relevant actors. To grasp the place of the Armed Forces in both countries the study not only observes legal changes but also the evolution of mentalities and attitudes.

5.1.1 The Spanish case

The role of the military in Spain is defined in Article 8 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978, which states that the Armed Forces, comprising the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, have the “mission to guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Spain and to defend its territorial integrity and the constitutional order” The present law governing the military organisation is the 17 November 2005 Law of National Defence (RCL 2005, 2245)²⁰. This new law updates the goals of Spanish defence policy by including Spain's contribution to the preservation of international peace and security in the framework of the international subscribed commitments. Although this law increases Parliament's role in defence policy, the executive is still largely responsible for issues of defence. One of the peculiarities of the Spanish case is that the King has, inherent to his role of Head of State, supreme command of the Armed Forces²¹. However, in the current political context this role is rather symbolic.

In contrast to other Mediterranean countries, the Spanish political class has little linkage with the military. Since 1975, no Spanish President has had a military background. Neither did any Ministers of Defence since Gutiérrez Mellado who had served between 1977-1981. This situation is a clear contrast to the Francoist period where, General Francisco Franco concentrated all civil and military power in his hands.

The Spanish Armed Forces amount to a total of 121,090 personnel (77,000 land, and about 20,000 for both the Navy and Air Forces). In addition, the Gendarmerie - a hybrid body depending both on the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Defence -, called Guardia Civil, amounts to 75,000 men and women. This organisation, created in 1844, was originally designed for the protection of rural areas and the maintenance of public order. According to the latest Spanish Law of National Defence, the Guardia Civil will be responsible exclusively to the Ministry of Defence in case of war, in the state of siege or in the performance of military missions. As regulated by the Organic Law 2/1986 of 13 March (RCL 1986, 788), the Guardia Civil will be the responsibility of the Ministry of Home Affairs at all other times. This structure is, however, contested by the very members of the organisation, who have been calling for its demilitarisation, arguing that their fundamental rights (e.g. right of association, subjects to the military justice) are contravened by the military nature of the Guardia Civil. In fact, 2006 has witnessed several demonstrations urging the Socialist Party to fulfil its electoral promise to demilitarising the Guardia Civil.

The Ministry of Defence also has structural control over The National Intelligence Centre (Centro Nacional de Inteligencia - CNI). Nevertheless, the President of the Government is authorised to modify, by Royal Decree, the structural attachment of the CNI²².

While the Guardia Civil reform is still pending, the policies of the current Spanish Government, elected in March 2004, have had a major affect on the security sector. The withdrawal of troops from Iraq remains the most visible policy change. However, the President of the Spanish government José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero also endorsed the new Law on National Defence which stipulates that Parliamentary approval is now necessary for any major troop deployment overseas. In general terms, the new government have further ensured military accountability in comparison to previous laws (Organic Law 1/1984, 5 January).

The new Law of National Defence also established the National Defence Council, which is intended to advise and support the President of the Government in his role as the manager of crisis situations and armed conflicts involving Spain. In addition, the Minister of Defence is now responsible for the enforcement and development of defence policy. To increase the effectiveness of the Armed Forces, the new Law also allows for better coordination of the three forces by considering them as unique entities that are able to give more coherence to their actions without losing their specificities. This law clarifies the differentiation between the Armed Forces' organic structure, led by the three Chiefs of the Forces (*Jefes de Estado Mayor del Ejército*), and the operative one, led by the Chief of the Defence Staff (*Jefe de Estado Mayor de la Defensa*).

The role of the military in Spain is becoming a central topic of political debate. Public discussion of the 2005 Law suggests the country is entering a new phase of maturity in which DCCAF becomes the natural way of dealing with any military issue. Other examples suggest a similar change in perceptions and mentalities and can illustrate that the media, civil society and political parties are key actors in discussing the role of the military. The management of two air crashes, one on the Turkish Black Sea coast in 2003, where 62 Spanish soldiers died, and the other in Afghanistan in 2005, where 17 died²³ has led to calls for further transparency. Likewise, popular reaction to sending troops to post-Saddam Iraq²⁴, has furthered pressure on the military to be fully accountable to Spain's citizens. Finally, the scandal caused by General Jose Mena Aguado, after he proclaimed that the military might have to intervene if Catalonia gains more autonomy²⁵, suggests that Spanish society and political elites will no longer tolerate military interference in civilian affairs.

Recent developments confirm, to a certain extent, the culmination of the consolidation process. This process, which started in the late 1980s, witnessed the rapid and uncontested processes of professionalisation and modernisation of the army, the suspension of compulsory military service, a reduction in size of the Armed Forces, the opening up of the Armed Forces to women and the reorientation of the army towards new functions, particularly towards peace operations. These trends are reflected in a 2005 survey undertaken by the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research (*Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas-CIS*) devoted to the National Defence and Armed Forces²⁶. According to this survey, the Spanish public overwhelmingly supports (80%) the professionalisation of the army and the participation of women in combat. It also shows a significant lack of interest in and knowledge of military issues, which is coherent with the pacifist nature of Spanish society. For example, less than 35% of the Spanish public supports an increase in military expenditure, which, in fact, represents less than 1% of GDP. In addition, 80% of respondents affirmed that they would risk their lives in order to maintain peace, while only 42% would risk it for the motherland and 23% for religious belief. Nonetheless, a significant minority (31%) highlighted risks originating from other countries, 40% of them considering Morocco the main threat. Respondents felt that the main foci of Spanish instability were regional insecurity in the Maghreb as well as global conflicts in which the USA was involved.

These perceptions have been followed by the increasing deployment of Spanish troops outside its borders in observation, preventive, peacekeeping or humanitarian missions of multilateral nature (UN, NATO, EU) contributing to improve the Spaniards perception of their army. However, there has also been an armed incident between Spain and Morocco for the sovereignty of a minuscule islet in the vicinity of the Moroccan coast, which ended with USA mediation in July 2002. This incident vindicated those who argue that the army should keep its traditional role of protecting Spanish national integrity. Nevertheless with the rapid improvement of Hispano-Moroccan bilateral relations since the end of 2003, it is hard to imagine that such crises could take place in the immediate future.

Like its counterparts elsewhere, the Turkish military's mission is to maintain the republic's security, officially defined as "the protection and maintenance of the state's constitutional order, national presence, integrity, all political, social, cultural and economic interests on an international level, and contractual law against any kind of internal and foreign threat."²⁷ What is striking about this definition is the broad and complex character attributed to security.²⁸ It includes not only traditional national defence against external threats but also non-military objectives pertaining to economic, social, cultural and political goals.

The "guardianship role" of the military is also of concern, although no Turkish Constitution has openly proclaimed any such role for the military. However developments and certain provisions of Act No. 2945, on the National Security Council and the National Security Council General Secretariat, have acted together to assign significant and broad political powers to the National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*, henceforth in its Turkish

5.1.2 The Turkish case

²³ *El Mundo*, 16 August 2005.

²⁴ More than 60 demonstrations all around Spain took place on 15 February 2003 against the participation to the Iraqi war with more than two million people only in Madrid and Barcelona, *La Vanguardia*, 16 February 2003.

acronym, MGK) placing it on par with the executive branch.²⁹ Other laws, too, enshrine this national security concept in legislation on antiterrorism, public order, the media, political parties and rules on the internal regulation of the armed forces. Article 35 of the Military Internal Service Code assigns the military the task of safeguarding the Turkish territory and the Republic as defined by the Constitution. This Article has been invoked on each occasion when the military has intervened in politics. Governance through “emergency rule,” as the basic instrument of managing the Kurdish problem, has played a very large role in enhancing the political parameters of the military. The military bureaucracy’s autonomous intelligence and surveillance functions and jurisdiction over crimes against internal security and terrorism also reaffirm its position in Turkish politics and is reflected in its autonomy from parliamentary oversight in its budget and internal affairs.

Clearly, these definitions indicate that the Turkish General Staff is more than what its counterparts in other Western democracies are, including in Spain. As the German scholar Heinz Kramer writes, it is “not only a professional military organization but a core element of Turkey’s political system.”³⁰ The *de facto* and *de jure* position it enjoys in the political system places it in a situation that is “ideal for following a political agenda of its own,”³¹ even in the face of strong civilian resistance.

Since the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, six of the nation’s presidents have had military backgrounds. Furthermore, the Turkish military has intervened in government, in different modalities, four times, in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997, and directly shaped the constitutions of 1961 and 1981.

Turkey’s is the second-largest standing army in NATO after the United States. The armed forces consist of three forces, the (Land) Army, Navy and Air Force. The Gendarmerie, which is responsible to the civilian Ministry of Internal Affairs, but located within the military sector in terms of its training, appointment and promotion policies, police, and civilian intelligence services fall outside the armed services. Total land force personnel number about 400,000, while Navy personnel number 63,000 and Air Force personnel number about 53,000.

A key factor preventing Turkey’s potential accession into the European fold is the Turkish Armed Forces’ self-appointed guardianship role. It guards the tenets of the official ideology, of which secularism is the most important. The “guardianship role” requires that it retains primary responsibility for defining threats and formulating security policy in response to them. This is in conflict with the underlying implication of the EU’s entry criteria that the definition and development of defence and security policy should be under “the control of democratic authorities, and that the military should confine itself to implementing decisions made by those authorities.”³² Moreover, Turkey’s traditional notion of threats and security are considered to be too broadly defined, too much based on the protection of the state from external and internal threats.

Since the 1990s, the General Commander of the Gendarmerie (GCG) has expanded its scope and increased operational efficiency and effectiveness, through the addition of new units, such as traffic and aviation, criminology and internal security systems. Thus, in reality, the gendarmerie is authorized to not only perform duties in rural areas but also in cities, where the actual jurisdiction lies with the police. The existing division of responsibilities in Turkey contradicts those founding principles of the SSR agenda stipulating a clear and unambiguous delineation of the respective functions and responsibilities of civilian and military agents.

The unity of the army has recently suffered due to the advent of the Islam-sympathising government. The current chief of staff, General Özkök, is surrounded by a number of force commanders, with strong support from ‘young officers,’ who reportedly wish to be more assertive against the government.³³ Therefore, the main line of division within the military is between those former and active duty officers who consider the current Justice and Development Party government (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, henceforth referred to by its Turkish acronym, AKP) to be a “sinister assault against the secular republic,”³⁴ and other more ‘liberal’ generals led by General Özkök himself. These officers subscribe to democratic norms and are more willing to engage in civilian reforms designed to democratise civil-military relations.

The MGK is the body which sustains the military’s guardian role in the public policy arena. The determination of threats and the formulation and implementation of national security policies are confined to the MGK Secretariat, which coordinates with the General Staff and Foreign Ministry. Until the latest reform package of August 7, 2003, which amended

25 “Most future historians will note with satisfaction that when Spain, three decades after the death of Franco and the supplanting of his dictatorship by democracy, was told by the commander of the Spanish army that the military might intervene if Catalonia was to get more self-governing powers, Spain was mildly shaken but far from stirred. General Jose Mena Aguado will go down in history as an anachronism. The days of the military pronunciamiento are over. Spain is a confident and prosperous democracy inside the European Union, a cultural and economic powerhouse and an international citizen of standing. Its federal political system - despite tensions with the Basques and Catalans - must be accounted a success”. “Hostage to Catalonia,” *Financial Times*, January 30 2006.

26 Encuesta del CIS 2592, “La defensa nacional y las fuerzas armadas” (VI), 4 February 2005.

27 *White Paper - Defence 1998*, p.12; *Beyaz Kitap 2000 (White Paper-Defence 2000)*, p. 2, Part 3. White Papers are published by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) every two years. The pages of reference to the last White Book (2000) are from its web format in Turkish (The English version as not being available on the web)

28 Article 2A of the National Security Council Law which defines security as pertaining to political, social, cultural, economic interests, internal and external threats.

29 Before it was changed in 2003, Act No. 2945 assigned three important functions to the MGK’s secretariat, which enabled the MGK to function like the Council of Ministers. First, the secretary (a general) of the MGK had the authority to prepare the agenda of the meetings. Next, he was authorized to follow up and check the implementation of the decisions reached in the MGK meetings on behalf of the president, prime minister and the MGK. Finally, the secretary could present his suggestions on domestic and foreign policy to the council of ministers directly. See Gencer Özcan (2000) “Doksanlarda Türkiye’nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politikasında Askerî Yapının Artan Etkisi”, in S. Kut and G. Özcan (eds.), *En Uzun Onyıl* (Buke Yayınları: İstanbul,), pp. 70-74.

30 Heinz Kramer (2000) *A Changing Turkey*, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, p. 30.

31 *Ibid.*

32 Timothy Edmunds, Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster (1999) “Rethinking Civil-Military Relations and Democracy: Lessons from Central and Eastern Europe”, a working paper produced as part of The Transformation of Civil-Military relations in Comparative Context. Online address: <http://civil-military.dsd.kcl.ac.uk/>. Also see, Tanel Demirel (2005) “Lessons of Military Regimes and Democracy: The Turkish case in a Comparative Perspective”, *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol 31 (2), pp. 245-271. On TSK’s impact on Turkish politics and its ‘guardianship role,’ also see, Volkan Aytar (ed.) (2006) *Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector: Turkey and the World*, DCAF-TESEV Series in Security Sector Studies, İstanbul: TESEV Publications; Ümit Cizre (2002) *AP-Ordu İlişkileri*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları; Ahmet İnsel and Ali Bayramoğlu (eds.) (2002) *Bir Zümre, Bir Parti: Türkiye’de Ordu*, İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları.

33 Strategic Survey 2002/2003 (London: IISS), p., 139.

34 From the speech by commander of the 1. Army, General Çetin Doğan, on the occasion of his retirement. “Doğan: Saldırıları Sürüyor,” (Doğan: The Assaults Continue) *Radikal*, August 21, 2003.

35 *White Paper - Defence 1998*, p.12; *Beyaz Kitap 2000 (White Paper-Defence 2000)*, p.6.

36 Narcís Serra (1986) “La política española de defensa”, in Busquets, Julio (ed.), “El papel de las fuerzas armadas en la transición española”, *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, n. 36/86, p. 177.

Act 2945 on the National Security Council and the National Security Council General Secretariat of 1983, the Council of Ministers had been legally required to give 'priority consideration' to MGK decisions. In practice, the Council of Ministers has always carried out MGK's recommendations. Since then, the MGK has been reduced to an "advisory" body that has little effective influence over national policy. However, even after the August 2003 reform package, the Turkish Armed Forces are reluctant to relinquish their guardian role. Nor did the Turkish Armed Forces do so after the 1999 Helsinki Summit gave a green light to Turkey's candidacy for the EU. The Turkish Armed Forces continue to stress the geostrategic uniqueness of the country, which is underlined by the 'fear' that the EU has ulterior motives to weaken Turkey. In addition following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the general staff's position toward the fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria has become more conservative.

The violent war in the southeast, where the Turkish Armed Forces fight against the PKK (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan – Kurdistan Workers' Party*), and the growth of political Islam provide justification for the senior command's engagement in politics at both micro and macro levels. The implosion of internal security threats has encouraged the Turkish Armed Forces to tend towards more security, less democracy, and more vigilance/guardianship. As such, there has been an increase in laws pertaining to internal security, anti-terrorism, and the maintenance of public order. These laws criminalize certain political activities, constrain public debate, and expand military jurisdiction over civilians. However, at the same time, an impressive movement towards Europeanisation has dramatically increased the costs of 'more security'. This represents the window of opportunity for DCCAF.

One constant of the system, favouring the military, is the repeated emphasis on the 'specificity of the Turkish system', and its geostrategic location "directly in the middle of a region full of risks and challenges such as ultra-nationalism, religious fundamentalism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and ethnic conflicts which emerged following the Cold War period and intensified in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East."³⁵

Finally, the position of the Chief of the General Staff has similarly been a matter of controversy in terms of the incompatibility of that position with prevailing global principles of DCCAF: Since 1961, he has been responsible directly to the Prime Minister, rather than to the Minister of Defence, thus largely leaving the Minister of Defence redundant.

Spain is one of the European and Mediterranean countries that has undergone a fast political, economical and social transformation. Francoist Spain had an authoritarian and centralised regime, was still considered a developing country and was popularly associated with the predominance of 'backward morals'. However in 2006, Spain is set to become a net contributor to the EU, it has a modernised, democratic and decentralised political system and has put itself at the vanguard in matters such as civil rights for homosexuals and stem-cell research. Spain's SSR and DCCAF have to be understood in this framework as well.

Democratic Defence Institution Building

One of the most relevant milestones in DCCAF is Democratic Defence Institution Building. Under the Francoist regime, Spain had three different defence-related ministries, one for each force. In 1977, the then Minister of Defence, Gutiérrez Mellado, enacted a military reform which created a single Ministry of Defence and thus integrated the three forces of the army into a common structure, known as the Board of Chiefs of Staff (*Junta de Jefes de Estado Mayor-JUEM*). The 1977 reform had the deliberate goal of separating the political and military organisation and hence separating the military's leadership from the Government. However, it is worth noting that the relationship between the military command and the Minister for Defence was rather undefined at this stage.

The failure of the putsch in 1981 and the victory of the socialist party in 1982, with Narcís Serra becoming Minister of Defence, accelerated these reforms. The law approved in 1984, in line with the principles of Democratic Defence Institution Building, strengthened the President's authority and better defined his tasks and those of the Minister of Defence. It also clarified the relationship between the Government and the Armed Forces by creating the Major State of the Defence, whose main role was to improve the operability and common action of the armies³⁶. Since then there have only been isolated institutional changes, including the creation of the National Defence Council in 2005. All these changes have ensured that the military have become subordinate to civilian power and the need to improve the coordination structures.

5.2. Mapping key transformations relevant for DCCAF

5.2.1. The Spanish case

³⁷ National Defence Directive 1/2004, 30 December 2004.

³⁸ While during the first third of nineteenth Century the army could be described as somehow progressive, leading the social and political change, from the second third of that Century onwards a nationalist and conservative sector slowly began to grow in the army that braked this change leading to a legitimacy of a military ideology by which the Armed Forces had a kind of "suprapolitical nature" that made them repository and guarantor, "*dipositarias y garantes*", of some permanent values and allowed them to act autonomously to protect the political institutions (Alejandro Muñoz (1986) "Golpismo y terrorismo en la transición democrática española", in Busquets, J. (ed.), "El papel de las fuerzas armadas en la transición española", *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, n. 36/86, p. 25).

³⁹ Regular annual reports on Turkey since 1998 contained detailed analyses of the National Plan for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA), and the Accession Partnership Document.

National Security Policy Making

The legislative reforms outlined above have all clarified the role of each actor in Spanish national security policy-making, reinforced the role of the Government in this field, and confined the military structures to technical and advisory tasks.

Since 1980, the President of the Government has approved seven National Defence Directives, outlining the guiding principles of Spain's defence policy (in 1980, 1984, 1986, 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004). These directives have guided Spain towards full participation in Western security and defence organisations, moving from a traditional concept linking sovereignty to territory, with an almost exclusive focus on military aspects, to a broader concept of shared security and collective defence with its partners and allies, in which society as a whole must be involved³⁷.

Military institutions, such as the Defence Staff, remain responsible for coordinating the different forces and advising the government on military issues. The Chief of the Defence Staff, as well as other military and civil actors in the National Defence Council, act as the coordinating agents.

Control and Accountability

According to Alejandro Muñoz, the military's interference in political life, and, thus, public life during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Spain was frequent and abusive³⁸. Some elements in the military, and even in the civilian sphere, justified military intervention not only as a right, but also as an inexcusable duty in case nationalist and conservative values were in danger. Or put another way, military behaviour contradicted the principles of DCCAF. Since the recovery of democracy, successive Spanish governments have introduced several measures to ensure military accountability to the government and to the legislative body.

Institution building and legislative reforms relating to DCCAF are the main, if not entirely sufficient, instruments allowing civilians to exert full control over the military. Legal reforms have integrated the Parliament in the decision-making process of military deployment and, thus, increased accountability and transparency. However the military should not only be transparent and accountable to the Parliament but also to the whole society, and, in particular, civil society organisations, media and think-tanks. In this regard, the armed forces have made significant efforts in approaching Spanish citizens in their need to recruit new personnel. However, calls for more transparent, detailed and clarified information on issues military expenditure, particularly in relation to armament and military research, in the 1990s have remained unanswered.

More controversial is the control of information related to overseas military operations in which Spain is or has been involved. Since Spain has become an active country in the participation in missions, this issue is becoming relatively more significant. This has encouraged, to a certain extent, some of the main reforms of the 2005 Law.

5.2.2. The Turkish case

Since the 1999 EU Helsinki Summit decision to extend candidate status to Turkey, the possibility of EU accession has become a driving force for democratic reforms in the security sector and CMR. EU democratic reform requirements, however, have focused on CMR rather than on a broader change of the entire security sector. Indeed, the EU's regular progress reports³⁹ on Ankara's accession have prioritised the need for structural changes in the organisation of civil-military relations to enhance civilian control and to bring the institutional structure in line with EU standards. There are two reasons for this, one related to the "guardian" role of the Turkish military within the political system, the other based on the EU's "use of pre-conditionality" for Turkish accession.

Empowerment of Civil Society

Since there is a consensus that effective control of the military requires an enhanced capacity for control by civil society, media and the political class, the empowerment of the civil society as well as key political and economic actors is seen as the holistic approach to DCCAF. Turkish governments have enacted legislation serving that end, including comprehensive constitutional amendments in October 2001, and subsequent reform packages passed in 2002, to expand fundamental rights and freedoms and bring Turkey into line with EU requirements. Changes addressed three main categories: freedom of expression and other basic rights, broadcasting in the Kurdish language, and capital punishment. A third package of reforms, passed on August 3, 2002 and June 2003, went still further in easing restrictions

⁴⁰ The latest NSPD came in October 2005 without much radical change in content. Like the previous NSPD of 1997, it identifies Islamic activism and Kurdish separatism, in that order of priority, as the key security threats.

in these areas by abolishing anti-terrorism provisions that had authorized punishment for propaganda threatening the unity of state, and by establishing retrial rights for citizens whose court decisions have been overturned by the European Court of Human Rights.

Empowerment of Civilian Governments

Regarding the empowerment of civilian governments, however, the record is bleak. Building government's capacity to reset the civil-military balance depends on whether a government is politically secure, if not from the threat of a military intervention, then from the threat of military leaders publicly disrupting the effectiveness of civilian policies or challenging elected authorities. Since 2002, the present government has made significant strides in this direction; it has embraced the EU as a window of opportunity to gain a margin of safety against a crippling reaction from the livery of the military. However, since its latitude depends on strong performance in office, its frequent policy delivery slips causes the government to lose the margin of freedom necessary to resist the constraints imposed by the military.

Direct Approach to Establishing DCCAF

The August 2003 democracy package is, by Turkey's historic standards, a distinct legislative accomplishment aimed directly at curbing the army's influence in politics and establishing democratic civilian control over the armed forces. The package contained amendments to some articles of the 1983 Act on the National Security Council and the General Secretariat of the MGK - Turkey's so-called parallel government - converting it to an advisory body, and repealing the MGK's executive powers, which had overlapped or even superseded the executive branch. Moreover, new regulations governing the operations of the MGK Secretary General, made public on 8 January 2004, introduced the principle of 'transparency'.

The Eighth Package of constitutional amendments, which increased civilian oversight over the defence budget, was passed on 21st May 2004. Via this legislation, when the governmental decree authorizing the State Auditing Office to investigate the property holdings of the armed forces comes into force, parliament will have established somewhat fuller control over the military budget.

Reducing Secrecy in Security Policy

One of the first steps toward a more transparent security policy is the institution of greater participation in the preparation of Turkey's key national security document, the National Security Policy Document (NSPD),⁴⁰ which was deemed "the secret constitution" of the country. Before it was accepted in October 2005, the current Islam-sympathising AKP government tried to delay formulating the NSPD in accordance with EU-driven reforms, and consistent with changes in international security. However, the document was released in October 2005, in the midst of a nationalist crest which the government chose to ride rather than stem. Notwithstanding this government's particular concern to see an end to political Islamists being branded as an internal security threat, its policies have indicated an intention to civilianise and politicise security issues in a way rarely seen in the past.

Ending the Rivalry between Security Sector Units

In order to cope with the perceived Islamist threat, a new unit called the Western Study Group (*Batı Çalışma Grubu*, henceforth referred in its Turkish acronym, BÇG) was instituted within General Staff headquarters following the last military intervention on 28 February 1997. Its mission was to collect information about the political orientations of civil society groups, mayors, governors, government employees, political party cadres and media personalities. The establishment of this body, having clear 'intelligence' and 'police' duties within the General Staff, underscored the perennial problem of rivalry and the lack of trust among the organs of the security sector. This rivalry and lack of trust frequently result in army units taking over police functions, and subjecting civilian intelligence organizations to army control, usually through the appointment of former military officers to senior management positions.

Moreover a new organ called the 'Prime Ministerial Crisis Management Centre' was formed within the MGK secretariat, by government decree in January 1997, to observe and report on 'crises' caused by Islamic "reactionism" (*irtica*) and to formulate responses. As the centre was placed under the auspices of the MGK but named 'Prime Ministerial', its structure and function seemed somewhat ambiguous. In reality, the centre bypassed parliamentary control and, while nominally responsible to the Prime Minister, was actually only accountable to the MGK. In its March 2001 meeting, the MGK agreed, on the grounds of a BÇG-generated report, that the struggle against Islamic "reactionism" should be amplified. Although its activities seem to

41 White Paper 1998, p. 14.

42 Alejandro Muñoz (1986) "Golpismo y terrorismo en la transición democrática española", in Busquets, J. (ed.), "El papel de las fuerzas armadas en la transición española", *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, n. 36/86 p. 28.

43 During the period 84-86 several laws were passed which led to an important reduction of the army (22%), the navy and the air (with 8% approximately), among them the creation of a new military position, the so-called transitory reserve, similar to the retired military but with the same economic situation (Law 1985, 19 June). As far as higher commands were concerned, the rejuvenation took place with the passing of a law, in 1981, that suppressed the accession to higher ranks by antiquity and replaced it by value. In 1984 and in 1986 new laws were passed that only allowed accession to higher ranks by availability of vacancies. (Labatut, Bernard, *Renaissance d'une puissance? Politique de défense et réforme militaire dans l'Espagne démocratique*, Institut de Stratégie Comparée, collection Bibliothèque stratégique, 1993, Chapitre quatre, p.26)

44 Eisenhower offered Spain a bilateral agreement in 1953 after the 1949 European refusal to accept Spain as member of NATO. This agreement allowed the construction of a military base on Spanish territory (key to control of western Mediterranean) and gave to Spain, in exchange, military material worth 1,183 million dollars (Charles Powell (1995) "Las relaciones exteriores de España, 1898-1975", in Gillespie, Richard; Rodrigo, Fernando; Story, Jonathan (eds.), *Las relaciones exteriores de la España democrática*, Madrid: Alianza, p. 40.)

be minimized under the current government, it is clear that the BÇG was established with the realisation that both the National Intelligence Agency (*Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı-MİT*) and the Police Intelligence were responsible to the government (with MİT reporting directly to the Prime Minister, and the Police Intelligence to the Minister of Interior). It was felt that this situation meant that intelligence reporting on extreme Islamic activities was likely to be tempered by the more permissive attitude of civilian government. Therefore, the General Staff felt that it would be safer to establish the BÇG as its own intelligence arm targeting Islamic activity.

Publication of White Papers

The 1990s were the years when Turkey's post-Cold War internal security concerns turned to, what it considered as, subversive forces: Kurdish and Islamic identity politics. The Ministry of Defence's White Papers for 1998 and 2000, in a section titled "Principles of National Security Policy", specify the nature and sources of internal security threats as "threats to Turkey's unitary state quality" and to "the principle of secularism guaranteed in Articles 2 and 4 of the Constitution."⁴¹ The issue of secularism is defined as the independence of the state from religious rules and considered to be an "issue of great significance in terms of our internal security."⁴² The same concerns continue on until today.

5.3 Internal and external pressures for DCCAF

In order to understand the process of democratisation, and in turn military reform in Spain and Turkey, both domestic and international pressures have to be taken into account. When tracking progress in DCCAF, it can be argued that internal pressures were crucial in the Spanish case, whereas external pressures can be considered more important in Turkey's.

5.3.1 The Spanish Case

Internal Pressures

In the context of Spanish political transition, the military was perceived as a reactionary force that had doubts about the speed and goals of such a process. Some of the military fears related to the perceived consequences that the democratisation process could have on their own positions. Taking this broader picture into account, it is not surprising that the reform and control of the armed forces became a main priority for Spanish society in order to avoid a halt in the democratisation process.

However, a monolithic political picture of the army would be misleading. Even under the Francoist regime, there were some clandestine segments inside the military staff, asking for a democratic reform, particularly under the umbrella of the Democratic Military Union (*Unión Militar Democrática - UMD*). The UMD was established in 1972 and grew to have a membership of 300 in 1975, when many were arrested and put on trial. The UMD proposed several reforms that were undertaken by subsequent democratic governments. Some were related to DCCAF, such as the unification of the three ministries, a restriction in the scope of the military justice system or curbs on the military intelligence system, while others corresponded to the modernisation and professionalisation of the Armed Forces.

Simultaneously, an extreme right faction, popularly called "bunker", showed its reluctance to accept the supremacy of civil over military power. This faction, although it was a marginal minority had enough influence and resources to manipulate some segments of the Army⁴³ that had mainly respected democratic change but that, having been educated in a military ideology, still considered themselves as the 'rescuers of the motherland', which they saw as being threatened by terrorism, the creation of the Autonomies or the reform of the Army in itself.

After the failed putsch, the bunker lost influence in the Spanish Armed Forces. This was possible due to popular pressure and the reforms carried out by the then Minister of Defence, Narcís Serra, consisting of the reduction of personnel and particularly of higher commands which started in 1984 and was based on a strategy of early retirement favouring the promotion of younger officers⁴⁴. At the end of this long process, it can be argued that the Spanish Armed Forces became more aligned with the democratic character of the Spanish state and were committed to respecting the fundamental freedoms of its citizens.

Political parties were the main actors in Spanish political transition. Until 1981, the main political parties were the centre-right Union of the Democratic Centre (*Unión del Centro Democrático - UCD*) and the Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español - PSOE*). The Communist Party (*Partido Comunista de España - PCE*) and the rightist Popular Alliance (*Alianza Popular - AP*) were also significant at the national level. Several peripheral nationalist parties, such as Catalan and Basques parties, were also represented in Parliament. In 1982 the UCD virtually collapsed after the victory of the Socialist Party

45 In this sense, in 1976, the European Parliament presented the Fauré Report, which stated that the accession of Spain strictly depended on its political reform: the necessary recognition of the individual, political and trade union freedoms as well as the legalisation of the political parties and the amnesty of those people under political arrested or in exile. In June 1976 a series of reforms started, the most important being the legalisation of the political parties, the accession to the Council of Europe and the Spanish ratification of the European Convention of Human Rights.

46 The NATO negotiations led to an occupational professional army that led behind the institutional-honour army and hence, parallel to the reform of the Armed Forces we have seen above.

47 Some European countries, such as Italy or Great Britain, only guaranteed their support to EEC if Spain first became member of NATO (Powel, 1995:64).

48 Esther Barbé (1999) *La política europea de España*, Barcelona: Ariel.

49 See Eduard Soler i Lecha (2005) "Spain: unanimous support and popular indifference" (translated to German) en Giannakopoulos, Angelos; Maras, Konstadinos *Die Türkei-Debatte in Europa*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 77-85.

50 Essentially, there are four strictly institutional areas that have been targeted for reform: the position of the chief of general staff, the role of the National Security Council, the composition and jurisdiction of the State Security Courts, and emergency rule in the South-east.

with an absolute majority and allowed the AP to emerge as the main opposition force. All parties advocated DCCAF and, conscious of the complexity and sensitivity of the reforms involved, they agreed to adhere to these principles. However, given its absolute majority, the Socialist Party took the lead in this process after 1982. Subsequently, the Popular Party and the Catalan Nationalists called for the professionalisation of the army in the late 1990s, and thus replaced the Socialists as the main supporters of military reform. Finally, the new Spanish government elected in 2004 continues this trend.

Considerable segments of Spanish society, including some associative movements (pacifists and others), had been vocal in calling for such reforms, including the end to compulsory military service. In general terms, Spanish society welcomed all reforms introduced by democratic governments enhancing civilian control over the military. A good example being the last reforms introduced in 2005, which strengthened parliamentary control over defence issues. These measures, together with a deeper involvement of the Spanish army in international peace missions, have notably improved the acceptance of the military by broad segments of society.

External Pressures

The Spanish political transition, including SSR, was also monitored by external actors. In fact, the Francoist regime suffered from international, particularly European, ostracism caused by its collaboration with the Axis powers during World War II and the dictatorial nature of its political system. This obliged it to develop bilateral relations with Arab countries, Argentina and the Vatican. However, the most significant diplomatic move was the improvement of relations with the USA, thus being Spain's only international link with the Western defence system⁴⁵. Although defence agreements passed with the USA accelerated the modernisation of the Spanish Armed Forces, they did not have any significant influence on DCCAF.

Relations with European liberal democracies and with the European Community were much more complicated. In 1962, three years after Greece and Turkey's requests for association with the European Community, Madrid asked for full membership. In response, several Spanish exiles asked the European Community not to take any further step in their relationship with the Spanish government until democratic reforms were put in place. Just before Franco's death in 1975, Spain once again found itself in an uneasy position vis-à-vis the European states as a consequence of the execution of five ETA (*Euskadi Ta Askatasuna*) members and the process against the leaders of the *Comisiones Obreras* trade union. European ambassadors were withdrawn from Madrid and the renegotiation of the 1970 preferential agreement, signed with the European Community, came to a standstill.

Following the end of the dictatorship, both European countries and the EC institutions supported Spanish political transition. This implied the offer of the perspective of membership, for which negotiations started in 1979 after the endorsement of the democratic constitution. In parallel with EC negotiations, Madrid started negotiations to enter into NATO, which in contrast with the EC did not imply the fulfilment of any democratic precondition⁴⁶. While the EC asked for democratisation, implicitly requiring the submission of the military to civil power, NATO focused on the modernisation of the Armed Forces only⁴⁷. It is also worth noting that while the goal of EC membership was shared among all major political forces and society, NATO was a divisive issue that ended up going to a referendum in 1986. Only after NATO membership became an unofficial precondition for EC accession⁴⁸, did the socialist government support it.

In spite of the political character of EC accession, political issues, including DCCAF, were not included in the agenda of negotiations. Three main reasons lay behind this. The first relates to the fact that although the Mediterranean enlargement was based on political concerns, namely consolidating democracy in Southern Europe, no established political criteria, such as the Copenhagen criteria, measuring political reform then existed. Second, in spite of the 1981 putsch, Spanish transition progressed rapidly and internal pressures were enough to assure the positive end of this process. Third, opposition to Spanish and Portuguese accession, such as that from Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, were economic rather than political (e.g. impact on the Common Agriculture Policy).

In 1986 Spain finally became a member of the EC-12 and was soon perceived as an active partner in the European integration process⁴⁹. The successful Spanish presidency of the European Community in 1989 confirmed Spain's place within European structures as well as the fulfilment and maturity of its democratic transition. Since then, Madrid has declared itself open to subsequent accessions, including Turkey's, arguing that the positive effects of EC membership contributed to the Spanish political, economical and social modernisation and that this could also be the case for other applicants⁵⁰.

⁵¹ In addition to the first 3 provisions cited in footnote 3, this 'improper' influence is assumed to be exerted through the inability of civilian authorities to fully exercise their supervisory functions over the formulation of national security strategy and lack of full control over the defense budget.

⁵² European Commission, Turkey 2005 Progress Report Brussels, 9 November 2005, p., 14.

⁵³ In the Luxembourg Summit held on 12 December 1997, the EU turned down Turkey's application for full membership of the EU on the grounds of Turkey's tarnished record on fundamental rights, mostly incurred as a result of fighting a war to protect its internal security against Kurdish and Islamist groups. In the Helsinki European Council meeting of 10-11 December 1999, this decision was reversed as a consequence of a series of positive turns, including the rapprochement between Turkey and Greece after the August 17 earthquake in 1999 and Washington's decisive pressure on the EU. The Helsinki Summit called for opening accession negotiations with six countries, but decided that Turkey would benefit from a pre-accession strategy to support the same reforms as the other candidate countries. Negotiations with Turkey would not start until Ankara fulfilled the political conditions for accession explicitly framed at the Copenhagen European Council meeting in 1993 and embodied by the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997.

⁵⁴ Regular Report 2005, p. 14.
⁵⁵ See Muñoz (1986) *op cit.* p. 27.

5-3-2 The Turkish Case

Internal pressures

Contrary to the Spanish case, the main impetus for DCCAF in Turkey was not internal. The historically prominent “guardian” role of the Turkish Armed Forces has precluded civil society, political parties and its own officer cadres from exerting effective pressure towards democratic reform and readdressing the civil-military balance. Since the AKP's landslide election victory in 2002, entry into the EU has acted as the motivation behind the government's drive to curtail the Turkish Armed Forces' political prerogatives and tutelage. Without the government's commitment to EU integration, no change in the character and trajectories of civil-military relations in contemporary Turkey would have been possible.

The AKP's embrace of the EU, and thereby the settlement of the Cyprus question, and the implications of war in Iraq, have encouraged the public to start genuinely debating what constitutes Turkey's national security, who should take decisions on it, and what should be the linkage between democracy and security. Within this group of variables, the most significant of all is the imperative to meet the democratic reform requirements for entry into the EU. Although it presents itself inside the pro-EU camp, the main parliamentary opposition, the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* – CHP) seems to be uncritical of the impact of the Turkish Armed Forces on society and politics. CHP and other political parties seem to be unwilling to proceed with a DCCAF agenda, while the business community takes shifting and mostly unclear positions.

External pressures

Similar to Spain, NATO has not really played a democratizing role for Turkey's civil-military equation. The EU however, played a more positive role. Following the EU Helsinki Summit of 1999, when candidate status was extended to Turkey, both the ‘political criteria’ inscribed in the Accession Partnership Document (drawn up by the EU in 2000), and the Annual Reports have suggested the need to establish the principles of DCCAF⁵¹ in the organisation of civil-military relations. This, it was argued, would enhance civilian control, in line with EU standards. Progress has been made to align Turkey's laws with the EU through two major constitutional reforms, adopted in 2001 and 2004 and 8 legislative packages passed between February 2002 and July 2004. However, among the necessary structural areas of reform indicated by the EU, the position of the chief of general staff has still not been tackled - he still remains responsible to the Prime Minister rather than the Minister for Defence.

Ankara received the green light to start accession talks with the EU on October 3rd 2005. The 2005 Annual Report by the European Commission notes that, “since 2002, Turkey has made good progress in reforming civil-military relations... but the armed forces continue to exercise significant political influence”⁵² and it suggests that “Turkey should work towards greater accountability and transparency in the conduct of security affairs in line with member states’ ‘best practices.’”⁵³

DCCAF was originally formulated by Western agencies as a political precondition to be fulfilled by those post-communist countries in the enlargement zone of NATO and the EU. As part of the accession process, the European Commission has been assessing Turkey's progress based on the fulfilment of the political criteria set out in the Copenhagen European Council meeting of 1993.⁵⁴ The Copenhagen Criteria, as they are now known, requires the implementation of institutional stability, complete freedom of expression, entrenchment of human rights, respect and protection for minorities and an efficient market economy. Although civil-military relations are not explicitly referred to in the Criteria, the spirit of the document advocates that there should be a rethinking of the extent to which Turkey's military structure is independent of democratic control. Moreover, in the annual reports of the European Commission on Turkey, certain institutional areas of civil-military relations are specifically marked out as requiring reform. Perhaps, the clearest expression of the European Commission's view on this issue came in its most recent report published in November 2005: “Turkey should work towards greater accountability and transparency in the conduct of security affairs in line with Member States’ best practice. In particular, statements by the military should only concern the military, defence and security matters and should only be made under the authority of the government.”⁵⁵

It seems correct to suggest that in any country in the region, a strictly institutional diagnosis of the problems of civil-military equation and institutional reform as the remedy is necessary but not sufficient. Indeed over the last decade, the reach of the MGK in politics has extended over areas formally considered as the responsibility of civilian authority. This has been achieved by singling out Kurdish and Islamic issues as security priorities. Significantly, the MGK's expanded role has occurred in spite of the “external pressure” for institutional reform and any actual reform taking place.

⁵⁶ His sentence was later changed to life imprisonment because Turkey has since abolished capital punishment in its bid to EU membership.

However institutional reform is not enough without a change in perception and mentalities. Indeed, with EU-Turkey negotiations gaining intensity, the military's guardianship role is seen in a different light. The Turkish situation started to be seen as a paradox since the country is seeking membership in a bloc where militaries are unconditionally and democratically controlled by the civilian authority. Turkey's civil and bureaucratic cadres, as well as the general public, have been exposed to new perspectives on the meaning and importance of basic rights and freedoms, cultural rights, democratic control of armed forces and the rule of law. This must have contributed to new thinking on the part of the public about the role of self, other actors in the system and the country's position vis-à-vis the West. A new stage of political maturity, in turn, means more sustained calls for democracy.

Recently both Spain and Turkey have been affected by terrorist attacks of diverse nature. Some terrorist organisations have been domestic, fighting for independence of part of the territory (ETA/PKK) and thus representing an 'internal enemy'. In addition, both countries have been the target of international terrorist groups linked to *Al-Qaeda* (Istanbul 2003 and Madrid 2004). The presence of the terrorist threat is subject to political exploitation by those segments that would like to grant the Armed Forces a stronger role in politics. In this section, the impact of both domestic and international terrorist activities on DCCAF efforts will be addressed.

Domestic terrorism

ETA was created by young Basque nationalists in the late fifties to fight against the dictatorship and to achieve the independence of the Basque territory. Both during and after the collapse of the Francoist regime, the security forces, including the *Guardia Civil*, became one of the main targets of ETA's activities. Consequently, ETA terrorism was seen not only as a serious threat for the integrity of the nation but also as a direct menace to the lives of the security forces.

This situation strengthened the deep-rooted phenomenon of "*golpismo*," that is, the *coup d'état* mentality⁵⁷. This "*esprit de corps*" and demands by some sectors to take justice on their own hands went to its furthest consequences with, on the one hand, the creation of anti-terrorist paramilitary groups (Spanish Basque Battalion - *Batallón Vasco Español*; Antiterrorist Liberation Group - *Grupo Antiterrorista de Liberación* - GAL) and, on the other, the conspiracy leading to the failed 23 February 1981 putsch. In general terms, terrorism was regularly used by the military to justify their intervention into politics, during the first period of democratic transition, and particularly for the most reactionary sectors of the Armed Forces encompassed in what was popularly named the "bunker".

ETA was not the only terrorist group to commit murders in Spain. Although with far less importance, GRAPO (First of October Antifascist Resistance Groups - *Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre*), which entered the scene in 1975, gave further reason for the bunker to intervene. However, there was a major difference between ETA and GRAPO. While ETA enjoyed the support of a significant minority of the Basque people, GRAPO was a marginal group. Thus, it was ETA that inherited the role of the "internal enemy" for those fearing the dissolution of the Spanish state and those justifying military overview of political matters.

In 2006 ETA unilaterally declared a permanent ceasefire, and there are moves indicating that a peace process, leading to the dissolution of the organisation, could take place in the immediate future. Although this process could imply some political concessions, the military has, so far, left responsibility for the issue with the government and parliament. Military distance from this sensitive issue illustrates that there is a significant consolidation of the principles of DCCAF.

International terrorism

Under President of the Government José María Aznar's leadership, Spain became an unconditional supporter of the Bush administration with regard to its war against terrorism and the invasion of Iraq. Therefore, Osama Bin Laden, and Al-Qaeda, identified Spain as a target of their actions. Spanish interests were first targeted in the Casablanca bombing in May 2003, and later with the attacks in Madrid in March 2004, which killed 192 people just before March elections that brought the socialist party to power.

Spain is not the only EU country that has suffered from international terrorism in recent years. However, it is worth noting, that contrarily to the British reaction to the London bombings, Spain has not introduced any major legislative changes (with the exception of the control of explosives). Spain's political and social reaction to the bombings, with regard to the balance between civil rights and security, proved that DCCAF measures were not

5.4. The impact of domestic and international terrorism on DCCAF

5.4.1 The Spanish case

57 Béchir Chourou (2005) *Promoting Human Security: ethical, normative and educational frameworks in the Arab States*, Paris: UNESCO.

questioned and were, in fact, furthered. In this sense, an *ad hoc* committee was created to investigate the terrorist attacks, the effectiveness of the crisis management, and possible negligence by security and intelligence services.

5.4.2. The Turkish case

Domestic terrorism

In the Turkish case, domestic terrorism served as a powerful 'incentive' to continue with the 'securitization' of state and society, and thus legitimised the guardianship role of the Turkish Armed Forces. Since its inception, as the heir of a dismantling world empire, the Republic of Turkey tried to keep the congruity and social homogeneity of the country through a mixture of administrative/coercive fiat and mass political socialization. The fear of falling apart and being torn away by external and internal threats effectively translated into massive securitization of state and society and heavy handed measures to erase not only emerging and actual signs of insurgency but also most forms of political opposition.

The Turkish Armed Forces' role as the protector of the Republican regime was strengthened as it was also seen as the main guarantor of national unity and territorial congruity. In this context, political strife and factional violence were the main pretexts for the military interventions in 1971 and 1980. However, following the military coup in 1980, Turkey faced the separatist terrorism of the PKK. While the PKK was established in 1978, under the chairmanship of Abdullah (Apo) Öcalan, it has gained increasing visibility and strength since its first attacks against the Turkish Armed Forces in 1984. This initially Marxist-Leninist-inspired formation has since evolved towards an overtly Kurdish nationalist-separatist organization. Since 1997, extensive Turkish military operations seriously undermined the PKK's insurgent forces. However, the major blow to the organization was the capture of Öcalan in Nairobi, Kenya in February 1999, and his subsequent trial in Turkey where he was sentenced to death⁵⁷.

The fight between the PKK and the Turkish security forces has not only contributed to the increase in political and social power of the Turkish Armed Forces, but also effectively overshadowed the diverse and complex roots of the Kurdish issue by curbing social dialogue. Put another way, the fight has undermined the potential for democratic civilian politics and muted alternative voices. Hence, the presence of domestic terrorism worked very much against any DCCAF or SSR agenda in Turkey. Also it should be noted that the EU's prolonged reluctance to include the PKK in its 'list of terrorist organizations', until recently, has greatly contributed to the anti-EU feeling in Turkey.

International Terrorism

Turkey's experience with international terrorism dates back to the mid-to-late 1970s. During this period the Armenian terrorist group, ASALA (the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia), started its attacks against Turkish diplomatic personnel and civilians. Aiming to force the Republic of Turkey to acknowledge the "Armenian Genocide," ASALA continued its violent campaign until the mid-1980s. However, this failed campaign served only to lend popular support to the "official line" on the tragedy of 1915 in Turkey.

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, Turkey became one of the targets of Al-Qaeda's increasingly globalizing "Islamist" terrorism and its offshoots. Sharing the fate of Bali, London and Madrid, Istanbul was attacked by Al Qaeda-related terrorists. While the presence of international terrorism somewhat fortified the discourse and administrative/legislative practices of securitization in Turkey, its negative impact on the DCCAF and SSR has been far more limited compared with that of domestic terrorism.

6. Drawing lessons: comparison and contrast

In this section, the report will concentrate on comparing and contrasting the Spanish and Turkish cases in order to draw some general lessons for the larger neighbourhood. In order to better understand the national and international, social, political and cultural contexts that have shaped both the impetuses and obstacles for DCCAF, it will look into:

- (1) The specificities of the role of the Army in the two cases.
- (2) Internal impetus.
- (3) External impetus
- (4) Impact of terrorism.

The clarification of all these might be highly instructive for the Mediterranean as well as for European policy makers. However, the particularities involved in the two cases illustrates that no one-fits-all type model could easily be espoused in other situations.

6.1. Specificities of the Army's role:

It is important to note that the Army's role in Spain and Turkey have been shaped differently yet comparably partly explaining the particular bearing, impact and durability of their functions and powers. In Turkey, the "guardianship role" is crucial in understanding the role of the military that was shaped during the transformation from a multi-ethnic world empire to a Republican nation-state. Aiming to protect the country from external as well as internal threats, the Army championed a very paternalistic, and almost continuously unchallenged, attitude that had a deep impact on state and society. This, in turn, undermined the efforts towards DCCAF, and the more general context of SSR.

In Spain, however, while the Army had a similar historic role, particularly in the Francoist period, the political transition process of the 1970s, and more particularly the promulgation of the new constitution in 1978 has clearly undermined the Armed Forces' political leverage. In that sense, the failed putsch of 1981 symbolized a last effort by some reactionary factions within the Armed Forces to secure its political power. This failure accelerated the democratic transformation of the Armed Forces from an interventionist force into a constitutionally well defined agency serving the citizens and the government. In this sense the initial formulation of 1978, was finally implemented. To sum up, while in the Turkish case the Armed Forces' interventionist, authoritarian and paternalistic role has been continuous, in the Spanish case this role was effectively present since 1978.

Similarly, in the Turkish case, the National Security Council has acted, since 1961 and until the recent change in legislation in 2003, as a highly executive body, that acted, according to some analysts, as an alternative or parallel government of sorts. The National Defence Council in Spain was, however, shaped as a purely advisory body whose function was very narrowly and temporally defined.

In terms of controlling and overseeing the specific role of the Armed Forces, both countries experienced different transitions. Until recent changes in legislation in Turkey, the parliament and executive bodies had negligible roles in fulfilling their control and oversight functions. In the democratic period, the Spanish executive has continuously controlled the Armed Forces, while parliament's power to oversee and control have only recently been increased.

In terms of making the executive control effective, the powers and functions of the Ministries of Defence and their relations with the Armed Forces are of critical importance. Since 1961, as a divergent case from European standards, the Turkish Chief of the General Staff has only been directly responsible to the Prime Minister, thus effectively disempowering the role of the Minister of Defence. In Spain, however, the building of a strong Ministry of Defence, capable of controlling the Armed Forces, was a chief priority of the political transformation and reform processes.

In Turkey, the "guardianship" role, which tended towards protecting not only the country but also the regime, has effectively blurred the distinction between external defence and internal security, leaving both of them in the symbolic hands of the Turkish Armed Forces. The controversial case of the Gendarmerie and its position is a poignant example in this respect. While in Spain the discussion on the *Guardia Civil* is still ongoing, it does not translate into a similar blurring. The distinction between external defence and internal security is far clearer and well defined.

Differences between the particular locus of the Armed Forces in society and politics, as well as the way this locus is discussed and viewed in Spain and Turkey, exist. In Spain, there is a general consensus on the necessity for a reduced role for the 'new' Armed Forces. This, still, does not exclude open debates on some related issues, such as that on the military nature of the *Guardia Civil*. In Turkey, the role of the Armed Forces proves to be a far more controversial issue. The challenges to the role of the Armed Forces remain weak and are seen as direct challenges to the nature of the regime. Issues such as secularism, republicanism, the unity of the nation are highly entangled with discussions on the role of the Armed Forces.

In comparing the two examples of Spain and Turkey, certain lessons can, potentially, be drawn for the countries of the Mediterranean. Firstly, no single country's experience would be in anyway identically to the next one. Therefore, no general, one-size-fits-all prescription could be developed for all cases. The specificities of each case, including historical developments, the self image of the Armed Forces and others, should be acknowledged in formulating and implementing reform policies. These specificities should not however be used as an alibi for not proceeding with a DCCAF agenda, which is an indispensable component of the general democratization process. The Turkish case illustrates that historical specificities can slow down or hamper DCCAF progress, which in turn, harms the general transformation towards democratization.

6.2. Internal impetus for DCCAF

The Turkish and Spanish cases should also be compared and contrasted in terms of the weight of the internal impetus. Here, internal impetus should be scrutinized at three levels:

- (1) Impetus stemming from within the Armed Forces.
- (2) Those originating from the political arena, and, in particular, from political parties.
- (3) Those societal forces, social demands and public opinion.

On the eve of the Spanish democratic transition from within the Armed Forces, there was a small but vocal group of officers pressing for democratization and DCCAF. Another vocal minority, however, opposed change, while a silent majority went with the flow. The existence of such a pro-reform group helped advocates of the DCCAF agenda. Although the Turkish Armed Forces are not a homogeneous entity that resists change in its entirety, such an internal impetus remains far weaker and less visible in Turkey.

The major political parties in Spain, as well as peripheral nationalist parties, have supported and advanced the overall democratization process and thus incorporated DCCAF as one of its integral part. This sustained political will and general consensus on the main guidelines and direction of DCCAF significantly eased its smooth and full implementation. In Turkey, however, the main political parties accepted the specific guardianship role of the Armed Forces without criticism or challenge. Any party that challenged, either directly or indirectly, the role of the Armed Forces or the main tenets of the regime were targeted by the 'establishment'. Significant changes, however, took place in and after 2003 en route to DCCAF by the AKP government. The current may be symbolizing an internal impetus, whose policies were assisted by a favourable international atmosphere, including the EU harmonization process.

On a societal level, notwithstanding the few remnants of the Francoist mindset, there was a general social consensus supporting both democratization as well as a DCCAF agenda in Spain. Indeed, the democratization process accompanied the adoption of the principles of DCCAF. Demands for a larger domain for individual rights and liberties translated into social demands for the superiority of civilian forces over the military and even into demands for the professionalisation of the Armed Forces and stronger support for the involvement of Spanish troops in international peace missions. In Turkey, social demands for a DCCAF agenda remained weak. In some secularist circles, the role of the Armed Forces was even staunchly supported against various 'threatening' political and social forces, notable the so-called 'Islamists' and Kurdish nationalists.

Comparison of the internal impetus in the two cases seems to provide numerous useful lessons on how to design and implement a successful DCCAF agenda in the Mediterranean countries. In general, if significant internal impetus exists, the potential success of DCCAF will be a far easier and smoother process in a given country. More concretely, the existence of visible pro-reform voices within the Armed Forces may provide further grounds for political and social forces calling for democratization and DCCAF agenda to operate with. Thereby, a DCCAF agenda appears not as a civilian-versus-military cleavage issue, but may allow the formation of alliances between civilian and pro-democracy military circles. However, unprincipled alliances should not be sought in this respect. Stakeholders should aim to form lasting institutional democratic and civilian control mechanisms based on the civilian supremacy and democratic governance of the Security Sector.

Lastly, the existence of social and political consensus on the necessity for DCCAF may help avoid political exploitation of this agenda for sectional or narrow electoral and populist purposes. If both the ruling and opposing parties as well as social forces share the common goal of DCCAF, political leaders will face a conducive atmosphere for its implementation. Such a social consciousness is also highly important in terms of re-conceptualizing the Armed Forces not as an independent body, or a body only responsible to a political class, but a public agency serving the entire society regardless of ideological or social divisions.

6.3. External impetus for DCCAF

There have been two main external drives in Spain and Turkey, which have had different yet meaningfully comparable impacts on DCCAF processes in the two countries. While NATO played a "modernising" role, the EU has had a "democratising" impact.

NATO membership played a "modernising" role in both Turkey and Spain in the sense that technical infrastructures had to adapt to NATO standards, and also allowed military personnel to socialize in a more international atmosphere. NATO's "democratising" role, however, was highly limited. Turkey was admitted to NATO in 1952, mainly due to its troop support to the Korean War. In the cold war atmosphere, pro-western 'authoritarianism' was

preferable to pro-Soviet 'totalitarianism' and NATO did not insist on any democratic reforms that could incorporate a DCCAF or SSR agenda. In this context, the guardianship role of the Turkish Armed Forces remained unchallenged by its NATO allies, and in turn the Turkish Armed Forces continuously played its "geopolitical" card to underline the country's, and its own, role as a bulwark against the Communist bloc. Spain was admitted to NATO in 1982, when the current pro-SSR orientation was not completely in place. In this sense, the democratising impact of NATO was also limited in Spain. For both countries, then, NATO played a limited role in terms of insisting on an agenda of DCCAF and SSR when compared with the current PfP countries.

The EU, however, had a more "democratising" impact on both countries, although it had so in a more indirect manner on Spain than on Turkey. This may be explained in terms of the different temporal contexts within which the membership processes for the two countries proceeded. Compared with Spain, the political *acquis* was far more central in Turkey's continuing accession process, thus incorporating the need for more balanced Civil-Military Relations (CMR). Turkey was expected to align its CMR with EU standards, similar to "best practices" in member states. As discussed earlier, the internal impetus in Turkey was weaker and the DCCAF agenda was mainly pushed by the EU accession process. This request, however, was far less prominent during the Spanish accession process; DCCAF adoption in Spain was mainly shaped by internal dynamics rather than EU-related pressures. What lessons, then, could be drawn from the comparison and contrast of the experiences of Spain and Turkey in terms of external impetuses for the Mediterranean?

Firstly the EU seems to be far more equipped and geared for democratisation and DCCAF promotion in the region. Especially in the present period, as evidenced in Turkey's accession process, the EU's role has been positive in furthering the agenda of DCCAF. Since democratisation is not among the missions of NATO, and since NATO does not seem to develop any partnership program directly catering to the region, the EU may have more leverage in democratisation and DCCAF promotion. These different impacts should be taken into account while clarifying the functions of NATO's Mediterranean dialogue and other security initiatives in the region.

Secondly, as witnessed in Turkey's accession, the prospect of membership serves as a powerful tool for the advancement of a DCCAF agenda. Turkey went ahead with a set of impressive changes in legislation en route to DCCAF, in line with the prospect of EU membership. Although a similar positive impact was not experienced during the Spanish accession process, the EU has since incorporated democratisation and DCCAF promotion into its agenda. In the Mediterranean, however, where the prospect for membership does not exist, the EU may need to develop other rewarding mechanisms that could serve as external impetuses for countries to follow a pro-democratisation and DCCAF agenda. If clear goals and roadmaps are set out that include the reward mechanisms of conditionality, the political commitment inside those countries would be more powerful.

The Spanish and Turkish cases are also instructive in terms of the impact of terrorism on DCCAF. While differences exist, the presence of domestic terrorism contributed to the strengthening of the political role of the Armed Forces, who engaged the rhetoric of internal enemy, and worked against the agenda of democratisation and DCCAF. The EU, in this regard, needs to develop a comprehensive and unwavering policy of fighting against terrorism by simultaneously insisting that democratisation and DCCAF should nevertheless proceed.

On the contrary in Spain and Turkey, international terrorism has not been a major obstacle. Potentially, however, there is a risk that international terrorism may fortify authoritarian measures and a culture of non-transparency. Some authoritarian regimes in the region may use the existence or threat of international terrorism as a legitimisation for cracking down on opponents, abridging civil rights and liberties and securitizing state and society. While the EU should underline its commitment to cooperate against and fight all sorts of terrorism, it also should provide the necessary complementary measures and policies to further the agenda of democratisation and DCCAF.

Lessons from the Spanish and Turkish cases may be instructive for the Mediterranean region as well, where problems with both domestic and international terrorism have been prominent, as seen in the Algerian crisis of the 1990s, or the recent bombings in Casablanca, Amman and Sharm el-Sheikh. As was the case in Spain and Turkey, the presence of terrorism may be exploited to slow down or even halt DCCAF and SSR measures. Thus, when the EU expresses its readiness in cooperating with the Mediterranean countries against terrorism, it simultaneously needs to underline the necessity to complement those with DCCAF and SSR efforts.

6.4. Impact of terrorism on DCCAF

58 *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe*, Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities, 15/09/2004, available from: www.cidob.org
 59 Accessible at URL: <http://www.rbas.undp.org/>
 60 Fred Tanner (2003) *Security Governance, the difficult task of Security Democratisation in the Mediterranean*. EuroMeSCo Brief, n.4.
 61 Hänggi and Tanner (2005) *op.cit.*
 62 Luethold (2004) *op. cit.*
 63 See, Chourou, 2005, *op. cit.*

7. Policy recommendations

This section is devoted to giving concrete policy recommendations to the EU and the rest of the EMP members, in order to improve the SSR record and specifically DCCAF in the Mediterranean area. These recommendations could also be applied to other countries participating in the ENP. Some of these proposals have a general character and imply a rethinking of the EU policies towards this region. Other proposals are much more concrete and focus on specific areas of cooperation. Both are essential to succeed in the process of SSR and DCCAF.

The study has attempted to show that the Spanish and Turkish cases had common elements but also important differences, which proved substantial enough for the report to extrapolate important policy recommendations. However, it is important to note that, from the very beginning, the lure of EU membership has been a catalyst for reform in both case studies. This carrot is currently not being offered to the Mediterranean countries. Thus, this significant difference should be taken into account when making recommendations. In short, the EU cannot demand the same reform efforts from its partners in comparison to its candidates.

The lessons drawn from the Turkish and Spanish case should be complemented with more global analysis, such as that provided by the 2005 OCDE paper entitled *Security System Reform and Governance*, Béchir Chourou's report on Human Security promotion in the Arab States⁵⁸ or the document *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe* presented to Javier Solana in 2004⁵⁹. As most of the Mediterranean countries are predominately Arab, it is also useful to take into consideration the United Nation Development Programme's (UNDP) Arab Human Development Reports⁶⁰. Finally the study will complement its analysis with studies on SSR and DCCAF in the Mediterranean. These should include Fred Tanner's work on security democratization in the Mediterranean⁶¹, Hänggi and Tanner's *Chaillot paper* on security sector governance in the EU's neighbourhood⁶² and Arnold Luethold's study on SSR in the Arab Middle East⁶³.

Before presenting any concrete recommendations, it is of paramount importance to highlight that any actor willing to promote DCCAF and SSR should understand that they can only be successful if two conditions are fulfilled. First, broader political reform towards democratization should be underway. Second, DCCAF is unlikely to succeed if the country is still embedded in a classical security paradigm. Consequently, actors willing to promote DCCAF should also contribute to the common understanding that regional conflicts can not be solved in the short term. Simultaneously, a comprehensive approach towards the links between security, political pluralism, economic growth, sustainable development and better human and cultural understanding is needed. As such, socio-economical disparities and/or ethnical-religious clashes would hinder SSR or DCCAF. In order to fight these as well as advance conflict resolution measures, the EU should be involved in the process in a positive manner. Among the policies that may be helpful in this regard, the strengthening of ESDP capabilities in conflict resolution as well as the EU's further promotion of regional and sub-regional integration should be considered.

In that sense the EU may have to rethink its 'function' in the larger neighbourhood if it were to follow such an agenda with positive promises. The EU is largely perceived as a soft power. In the past, the Union has been unwilling to develop significant hard power instruments, preferring to use it softer economic related tools. Consequently, one of the main goals of the EU has been the promotion of democracy and the respect for human rights at the global level but, more particularly, in its near vicinity. However, so far results have, in general, fallen short of initial expectations, including in the Mediterranean. Given the difficulties in applying negative conditionality, this explains, in part, the recent emphasis on promoting democracy through positive conditionality.

Thus, positive conditionality is one of the main principles lying behind the European Neighbourhood Policy. Therefore, given that SSR and DCCAF reform are most successful when viewed in the context of a broader democratisation process, it is important that the EU considers how the principle of positive conditionality be best implemented in the framework of the ENP. Put another way, the EU needs to make the incentives attractive enough for prospective countries to adhere to democratic principles.

A second general recommendation is the need for a horizontal approach towards the main challenges affecting the region, taking into consideration political, economical and social factors. This has been extensively debated within the EMP framework, but the ideas developed in 1995, including the idea that trade liberalisation produces development and development leads to security, need some updating.

A third and final general recommendation is centred on the urgency for deeper EU involvement in the open regional conflicts as a precondition for a change in the security paradigm. These include the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Western Sahara dispute and the

⁶⁴ Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism, Brussels, 28 November 2005, 15075/04 (Presse 328).

Cyprus issue. Difficult and costly as these efforts may be, member states should understand that no DCCAF progress is possible if the military in partner countries legitimise their role in politics through external threats.

Taking these three general recommendations into account, the report will now focus on more concrete policy proposals regarding DCCAF and SSR promotion in the southern and eastern Mediterranean. These can be grouped into five categories: conceptual work, coherence effort, effective conditionality, cooperative efforts and, finally, increasing transparency and providing information.

Conceptual work:

Both political actors and civil society in the EU and in the Mediterranean countries should familiarise and incorporate into their discourse the following four new concepts; SSR, DCCAF, human security and peace culture.

- ...✚ **Mainstreaming SSR and DCCAF in the EU's policies:** SSR and DCCAF are new terms in the international language on democracy promotion. While some recent documents, such as the European Security Strategy, have already incorporated SSR, most EU documents do not refer to these terms. This is the case for the Barcelona Declaration, the Association Agreements, the ENP strategy and most Action Plans. Thus, a concrete policy recommendation would be to incorporate SSR and DCCAF in all EU's policies dealing with political and security issues with third countries as well as in common projects, such as the Barcelona Process, from now on. References to these terms should not only appear in official documents but also be part of political and administrative discourse.
- ...✚ **Shifting security discourse towards the Concept of Human Security.** Since its incorporation in the UNDP report of 1994, the new concept of security based on the need to protect the citizen rather than the state has been widespread. The EU should further incorporate this concept in all policies towards the Mediterranean. In fact, promoting the concept of human security implicitly aims at protecting the citizen from military abuse and is, therefore, linked to DCCAF. Cooperation with UNESCO which is already involved in the promotion of human security in the Arab world may be particularly fruitful⁶⁴.
- ...✚ **Peace Culture:** Introducing peace culture in high school or even elementary school curricula would set the basis for a change in the security paradigm for coming generations. If regional conflicts are in the process of being solved these concepts can take root more easily. Thus, this should create future demand for the rationalisation of military presence in the political and social arena as well as enhancing the centrality of the citizens' rights. In the Mediterranean area, the Anna Lindh Foundation could play a prominent role in this effort.
- ...✚ **Promotion of Research and Advocacy:** All the above points may be integrated into a comprehensive policy of promoting more research on and diffusion of the security sector and its democratic oversight in the region, human security and peace culture. Universities, NGOs and think tanks working on related issues should be encouraged and supported to conduct research as well as advocacy activities and form networks.

Coherence:

EU foreign policy has been extensively criticised by its lack of coherence, which harms the Union's international leverage. Coherence is of paramount importance in optimising the efforts of the EU and to make it a credible and reliable partner in international affairs. Effective SSR and DCCAF promotion demands coherence at three different levels:

- ...✚ **Coherence within the EU's first community pillar and the second intergovernmental one.** DCCAF should be incorporated in all political, economical and, although just emerging, military instruments towards neighbour countries (MEDA, ENPI, EIDHR, ESDP missions, etc.). These instruments should be deployed coherently. That is to say, they should attempt to follow the same goal, avoid unnecessary overlaps and contradictions and develop a common language.
- ...✚ **Coherence between the EU and its member states' policies.** Member states should incorporate DCCAF in their national security strategies and other relevant documents. As such, the EU should establish a permanent coordination body on DCCAF to coordinate between the Delegations of the European Commissions, the Special Representatives, and the member states' military attachés. This is of particular contemporary relevance since member states are now more prepared to undertake military cooperation with third states.

- ...❖ **Coherence between the EU and other international actors.** Taking into account the undisputed leverage of the US in the Mediterranean area, it would be prudent if the EU and the US shared a common understanding on the virtues of promoting DCCAF as part of a political reform agenda. Simultaneously, further steps could be made to synchronize efforts and coordinate initiatives with countries like Japan and Canada which have lately been working to develop Human Security policies and networks.
- ...❖ **Coherence among regional and multilateral initiatives.** DCCAF should be a shared goal not only in regional initiatives in which the EU or its member states play a leading role, such as the Barcelona Process, ENP and 5+5, but also in other regional or multilateral projects.

Effective conditionality:

The lure of membership has become one of the EU's most successful political instruments in promoting democratisation. The Turkish experience is a case in point in this respect. Nevertheless, exporting this model to other countries that are not eligible for accession implies the need to rethink the incentives offered and, thus, the need to adapt the method. This is, to a certain extent, the added value of the ENP compared to other cooperation frameworks. However, so far, the ENP has not produced any concrete results; the promise of sharing "all but institutions" is too abstract and cooperation in more attractive areas, like trade liberalisation of agricultural goods, is not foreseen in the ENP in the short and medium terms. In general terms, **more concretization is needed**. Drawing on the Turkish and Spanish SSR experiences, the ENP should be **adapted to the very specific nature of each policy and the situation of each country**. Again, more information about the evolution of the security sector in the Mediterranean is required.

In order to be really effective, the ENP Action Plans should detail the **incentives** that could be offered to each country according to the steps that country makes. This should take into account the specific situation of each country and, hence, adapt the 'carrots' to the country's main interests. If we look at the concrete case of DCCAF (as one of the many negotiation chapters), the incentives that could be given to a country that is leading a transformation of its security policies towards more democratisation could be:

- ...❖ **Involvement in CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy), ESDP and JHA (Justice and Home Affairs) policy-making**, particularly in those issues which are of the interest to the third country. The third country would be able to attend and participate in discussions but would be excluded from voting.
- ...❖ Take part in the **management and evaluation** of ESDP missions in which the country participates.
- ...❖ Participation in **exchange of information** channels in CFSP, ESDP and JHA related matters (intelligence, satellites, etc.)
- ...❖ Participation in the **European Defence Agency**.
- ...❖ Participation in **rapid reaction forces** and **civil crisis mechanisms**, which would imply the exchange of officials, common training, twinning and modernisation programs, and, in the long term, optimisation and saving of resources.
- ...❖ **Deployment of civil ESDP missions** in third countries on issues in which they are particularly interested including police reform and the removal of landmines.

Cooperative efforts:

In those cases where the third country does not seem to respond to incentives, the EU should take into account that opening some cooperation frameworks related to the security field could also be beneficial for DCCAF in the mid or long term. Some examples are:

- ...❖ **Offering know-how** without expecting anything in return. For instance, the EU or individual member states may offer expertise to officials on issues including how to create an effective ministry of defence, how to modernise and limit military justice or the penal system. Those member states that have recently experienced a democratic transition, the former communist countries and, to some extent, Greece, Portugal and Spain, may be better prepared to explain their experiences. Even Turkish officials may offer their expertise in this field.

65 TESEV and DCAF's *Almanac Turkey: Security Sector and Democratic Oversight* (2006) is a good example of documenting SSR and DCCAF related developments in Turkey that could perhaps serve as a model for the neighbourhood.

...✚ **Opening spaces where DCCAF may be debated.** This would include:

- Launching media programmes and building journalist expertise on DCCAF issues.
- Favouring political party and parliamentary cooperation through building civilian expertise on security matters, establishing contacts between parliamentary defence committees and using frameworks such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly.
- Promoting joint academic research in the whole Mediterranean area on these topics.
- Evaluating the possibility of establishing a military academy for the southern and eastern Mediterranean Armed Forces where DCCAF, human rights and human security could be incorporated in the curricula. Such a multi-national atmosphere would also allow younger generations to become accustomed to an international arena. This could be undertaken either under the current NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, ESDP or those promoted by individual member states, or better yet, in a cooperative effort of all.

Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Democratisation Simultaneously:

The EU needs to develop a comprehensive and unwavering policy of fighting terrorism by simultaneously insisting that democratisation and DCCAF should nevertheless proceed. Thus, when the EU expresses its readiness in cooperating with the Mediterranean countries against terrorism, it simultaneously needs to underline the necessity to complement those with DCCAF and SSR efforts. As also noted in the Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism, EMP members' "response must remain proportionate and solidly anchored within international and domestic legal frameworks that ensure respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms"⁶⁵. Since the fight against terrorism is usually used to justify authoritarian measures to crack down on most opponents, the EU's policy should be a balanced one, satisfying the needs for security provision with human rights protection.

Increasing transparency and providing information:

No effective DCCAF promotion policy can be designed and applied without the necessary information on military affairs in partner countries. The EU should rely on organised civil society and the academic *milieu* of third countries as to provide such information in a transparent manner. A concrete way by which this could effectively take place could be to:

- ...✚ **Finance research projects** aimed at finding out specific data pertinent to DCCAF in all Mediterranean partners⁶⁶. This could be extended to all Neighbourhood partners. An 'index' documenting and evaluating DCCAF and SSR related developments may serve as a comparative scale to measure progress in the neighbourhood.
- ...✚ Second, relying on these reports, the Commission should incorporate the progresses and shortcomings on DCCAF in **Country reports** drafted under the ENP. These would be the bases for establishing proper conditionality in the Action Plans, which should take into account that some progress can be achieved in the short term while others may need longer transitional periods. Progress in the issues that have been studied in the Turkish and the Spanish cases, including the analysis of the role of the Armed Forces in the political field, the dimensions of the army and process of modernisation, institution building, accountability and the scope of the military justice, should be detailed and tackled in these reports. These reports should not avoid emphasising resistance for change or deterioration in the situation in a particular country.
- ...✚ Third, a compilation of all this information could be published as a **yearbook** on DCCAF in the region. It should not overlap with existing initiatives and intend to merge efforts with centres or networks already involved such and similar work.
- ...✚ Fourth, a special unit within the European Commission should be in charge of **surveying** whether the conditionality applied for DCCAF promotion has been successful or not and should propose alternatives and state if longer transitional periods or extra aid is needed.
- ...✚ The EU could increase the available information about military expenditure as well as professionalisation and modernisation efforts of the Armed Forces in the EU and the Neighbourhood through the launching of a **pan-Euro Mediterranean Observatory**. This would allow specialists, analysts and the general public to compare countries' performance.

In order to realise these recommendations, the EU's financial instruments should incorporate these priorities. In terms of the new EU financial perspectives, the main instruments will be, effective from 2007, the European Neighbourhood Policy Instruments (ENPI) and the Thematic Programme on Democracy and Human Rights, which is foreseen in the Communication on *External Actions through Thematic Programmes under the Future Financial Perspectives 2007-2013*, with the main goal of continuing with the current European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Besides these two funds, member states additional contributions and CFSP-ESDP expenditure should also be taken into account and coherently applied.

The most important thing at the present moment is to make sure that in the current process of deciding on the expenditures distribution under the EU financial perspectives and the definition of the main activities to be financed by these instruments, DCCAF and SSR at large are fully incorporated. For instance, if a governance facility is created, a significant part of the funds displayed should be reserved for these purposes.

In order for the EU to get involved in long-lasting DCCAF promotion, countries that have had some meaningful experience in the process may be involved to provide guidance and consultancy. Spain and Turkey, already involved in a number of international initiatives, most chiefly under the 'Alliance of Civilisations' may be two countries that could share their relevant contribution with the neighbourhood to help them 'steer' towards a successful DCCAF agenda and policy. Jordan, the only Arab country involved in the Human Security Network could be incorporated in this 'steering group' that would ideally be open to all committed countries.

8. Conclusion

DCCAF should be thought of as indispensable, *sine qua non* component of a general democratisation process. Hence, if the EU intends to act as a global democracy-promotion actor, particularly in its immediate neighbourhood, it needs to incorporate DCCAF in its policy agenda as a long-term perspective. The EU will only be able to play a significant role in DCCAF promotion if it seeks to provide the appropriate 'incentives' either in the ENP, EMP, ESDP and other EU-led initiatives. The chances of success will greatly increase if first, the EU empowers domestic impetus for DCCAF in third countries, and second, if it is able to persuade partner governments on the suitability of advancing DCCAF. Finally, the EU should combine these more 'direct' policies with a broader contribution to achieve a more secure and stable regional environment in order to create the conditions favouring DCCAF and SSR.

This report has been devoted to the more 'military' component of SSR, namely DCCAF. However, SSR is a much broader challenge which should be addressed in its entirety. Thus, further research should be conducted, from accomplished and ongoing experiences on police and gendarmerie reform, the military justice system, the intelligence services and the penal and penitentiary system.

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Eduard Soler i Lecha
esoler@cidob.org

Débora Miralles i Solé
debora.miralles@infoeuropa.org

Ümit Cizre
Umit@bilkent.edu.tr

Volkan Aytar
volkan@tese.org.tr

10. **Authors' contact information**

Previous EuroMeSCo Publications

Noha Antar, *The Muslim Brotherhood's Success in the Legislative Elections in Egypt 2005: Reasons and Implications*, EuroMeSCo Paper 51, October 2006.

Dorothee Schmid, Fares Braizat, *The Adaptation of EU and US Democracy Promotion Programmes to the Local Political Context in Jordan and Palestine and their Relevance to Grand Geopolitical Designs*, EuroMeSCo Paper 50, October 2006.

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