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**The future of
the EMP in a
changing context
of transatlantic
and regional
relations**

*Roberto Aliboni
Yasar Qatarneh*



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Roberto Aliboni
Yasar Qatarneh

Roberto Aliboni is head of the Mediterranean and Middle East Programme at the International Affairs Institute in Rome.

Yasar Qatarneh is Director of the Regional Center for Conflict Prevention, The Jordan Institute of Diplomacy, in Amman.

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Preface

This Report assesses the impact of recent changes in US policies towards the Middle East and North Africa on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the most significant element in EU policy towards North Africa and the Middle East.

The Report is divided into two parts. The first, *The Future of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: The Impact of Changes in Transatlantic and Regional Relations*, includes an analytical overview and comparisons of the strategies, concepts and instruments deployed by the United States and the European Union towards the region. The second, *The Future of the EMP in a Changing Context: The European Union, the United States, and the Mediterranean Security Environment*, outlines various middle-term scenarios to assess the impact of various possible transatlantic developments on EU policy towards the Mediterranean and on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

The first part of the Report focuses on three themes: (a) The evolution of US and EU strategic conceptual frameworks after September 11; (b) The similarities and differences between each side's concepts and strategic instruments; (c) The broad interaction between the EU and the US after September 11 with regard to the two most important EU Mediterranean policies, namely the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the EMP. The section concludes that while there are similarities between American and European policies towards key areas in the Middle East and North Africa that suggest there are significant opportunities for cooperation, this has not happened because of the strong differences in strategic perspectives. However, a successful exit strategy from Iraq could contribute to narrowing the transatlantic gap, the absence of which will perpetuate the current stalemate. It is concluded that the similarities are important and should be used to create as many opportunities for functional cooperation and to thereby close the gap.

The second part of the Report reviews the triangular nature of Mediterranean relations – based on an interaction between the US, the EU and the Arab states – and suggests that in the long run Europe will have a more direct and greater security interest in the region, particularly the Western sub-region. Consequently, Europe is likely to play a greater role in managing the security challenges facing the region, either by sharing the burden with its transatlantic partner, or independently through the EMP. From the perspective of the Mediterranean, transatlantic competition is both a curse and a blessing: competition can decrease the efficiency of EMP aid, but conversely, if Europe and the US maintain an interest in the region, competition offers the Mediterranean states greater leverage to play off both sides and thereby extract greater benefits.

The policy recommendations put forward in this Report suggest that it is crucial that the EMP should encourage and enhance intra-regional institutional ties. The more regional capabilities to manage security challenges are developed, the less that regional stability will depend on extra-regional fluctuations in Europe or across the Atlantic. In broad strategic terms, for the Mediterranean states it is essential to engage in greater intra-regional cooperation in order to undermine the limitations imposed by the “US-EU-Arab triangle”. In this context, working within the EMP through a regional forum, in a coordinated manner, would increase the efficacy of Mediterranean security relations and make them less dependent on intra-EU and transatlantic politics.

Rome, 5th August 2005

I. The future of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: the Impact of Changes in Transatlantic and Regional Relations

Roberto Aliboni

1. Divisions among North Atlantic Nations after September 11

Transatlantic relations deteriorated sharply at the turn of the century. There were differences in the 1990s, particularly over the Balkan wars, but the early Clinton administration attenuated unilateral tendencies and relations were generally smooth. By contrast, the unilateral focus of the Bush administration has proved to be far stronger and resilient than that of the Clinton administration as well as steadier and more continuous. This has created an unprecedented transatlantic rift the consequences of which are being debated within the security community, some viewing it as an inevitable outcome of the end of the Cold War, and others as a deep crisis that will reshape what is inevitably and necessarily a durable bond.

The rift opened with the war in Iraq and the preventive war doctrine underpinning it. Most Europeans saw the Iraq war as unnecessary, and although they disapproved of the Saddam regime as much as the US, most opposed the preventive war doctrine and the strong unilateralism underlying it. Like most other nations, European states were primarily concerned with the challenge that US policy posed to international legality, although they were divided in their response: France emphasized the threat to international legality and the impact of the war on security; the UK, Spain and Italy, ideologically closer to the Bush administration or less committed to EU cooperative strategies than to more traditional national interest considerations, joined the US, as did some eastern European countries that see close ties with the US as the best protection against Russian power. Two years after the fall of the Saddam regime the rift is still there and has actually deepened. The focus of tensions is the broader Middle East and North Africa. While the impact of the division on national European foreign policies is clear, its effect on EU policies towards the Mediterranean is less so. This report focuses on the latter, particularly the impact of transatlantic and regional changes on the focal point of EU policy towards the Mediterranean, the European Mediterranean Partnership (EMP).

The report focuses on (a) the evolution of US and EU strategic conceptual frameworks after September 11; (b) the similarities and differences between European and American concepts and instruments; (c) the interaction between the EU and US after September 11 over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the EMP; (d) and the impact of transatlantic and regional changes on the future of the EMP.

2. US and EU Strategic Approaches toward the Middle East and North Africa

Despite many similarities, the concepts and instruments used by the US and the EU in relations with the Middle East and North Africa differ in meaning and orientation. US security strategy underwent a profound change under the Clinton administration with the end of the Cold War. This change was accentuated under the Bush administration not only because of the shift from Democratic to Republic governance, but primarily as a result of the 11 September 2001 attacks. They put an end to the illusion that the US was under no existential threats – a central assumption guiding US strategy in the ten preceding years. None of the challenges facing the Bush administration were new (weapons of mass destruction [WMD], international terrorism of all stripes, the possible “intersection” between WMD and terrorism, and rogue states), nor was the hostility of Islamist movements towards the West and the authoritarian regimes it supported new. However, the Clinton administration did not consider these problems as existential or as threats to American national security. The Bush administration criticised the Democrats for this posture from the start, and with the September 11 it came to view terrorism as a global existential threat. In doing so, the Bush administration restored the bipolar world and simplified the strategically fragmented post-Cold war world. In place of a difficult-to-understand and fragmented universe there was now a world structured by a battle between good and evil. The new enemy was elusive and asymmetrical but it was a direct enemy, and generated consensus more easily than the distant goals of preventing or managing more or less alien conflicts in a strategically fragmented world.¹ Terrorism was portrayed as a scourge bringing together national as well as transnational elements (Al Qaeda and ETA, the Lebanese Hizbollah and IRA, the Palestinian Hamas and the Chechens), but arising essentially from the Middle East and North Africa, an area enlarged to include Pakistan and Afghanistan. The so-called Greater Middle East became the focus of US national security concerns and part of its global strategy.

The strategic doctrine unveiled on 17 September 2002² stated that the US could not confront the new elusive terrorist enemy with deterrence or containment and that preventive military intervention was the way forward. The framework of this kind of intervention was deliberately and strongly unilateral (a strong post-Cold War political cross-party view, but particularly powerful among Republicans). The doctrine advocated the need for absolute military dominance to ensure national security. But as

1. In the 1990s, partly due to Samuel Huntington's theories about the “clash of civilizations”, there was already a trend towards bipolarity in the West. Islamist insurgencies and terrorism (especially in Algeria and Egypt) fostered the notion of a new Islam-West polarity. A NATO Secretary General emphasized this although Western governments rejected his view at the time.
2. The National Security Strategy (NSS) draws on the Defence Department Quadriennial Defence Review (QDR), unveiled three weeks after September 11, 2001, the January 2002 “axis of evil” State of the Union address, the June 2002 speeches at West Point and Fort Drum, National Security Presidential Directive 17 (NSPD-17), and Homeland Security Policy Directive 4 (HSPD-4).

preventive intervention and military dominance were insufficient to deal effectively with the military and political features of terrorism, a new and notable aim was introduced to the administration's global strategy: the structural political transformation of the Third World, particularly of the Arab-Muslim world. The view was that the transformation of the Arab-Muslim world was necessary because of the deep roots of Islamic terrorism in the backward social, economic and authoritarian political conditions prevailing in the region. The promotion of democracy in the Greater Middle East thus became the central security strategy of the US for the region. Although the doctrine advocated cooperation with other powers and countries fighting terrorism, it called for US leadership through *ad hoc* multinational coalitions rather than multilateral organisations. It assumed that interested powers would "acquiesce to management of the international system by a single hegemon like the United States because its impulses are relatively benign and because it stands for certain values that are shared by most states."³ The doctrine and its application have changed over time in response to reality. Democracy promotion was present in the 2002 document, but it was only in 2003 that a full democratisation agenda for the Greater Middle East was clearly defined. In sum, the doctrine of the Bush administration is that terrorism arising from the Greater Middle East is the key threat to national security; other threats, such as rogue states and WMD proliferation are significant, but are essentially functional to the major terrorist threat. The response to these threats and to terrorism in particular must be multi-pronged and includes the use of military force, even pre-emptively, any international cooperation that does not constrain US foreign policy aims, and the promotion of democracy to transform the political, cultural, economic and social context that gives rise to terrorism. The core of the doctrine is the democratisation of the Greater Middle East.

EU security strategy is fundamentally predicated on its *acquis communautaire*. There is a European strategy if the intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) succeed in making member states share principles, objectives and policies and in making them an irreversible part of the political identity and goals of member states. The EU Secretary General European Security Strategy endorsed by the Council in December 2003⁴ lists various "global challenges" and "key threats" that are similar to those referred to in the 2002 US strategic doctrine document.⁵ The European document posited the promotion of democracy and an "effective" multilateralism as the "best protection of our security is a world of well-governed democratic states [...] It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed [...] our security and prosperity increasingly depends on an effective multilateral system"⁶ The focus was on cooperative security and instruments and "constructive engagement" with third countries to pursue structural stability ("a situation characterised by sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures, and healthy social and environment conditions, with the capacity to manage change without resorting to violent conflict.")⁷ The aim of the EU is then to pursue structural stability, and long-term conflict prevention is the cornerstone of the European security strategy.

Although there are different views about EU military force,⁸ the EU is essentially regarded as a "civil power"⁹, which prefers cooperative instruments and security concepts to military force (which is part of a dark past). So although the EU has a military force, it is exclusively tasked with managing and preventing conflicts. Furthermore, it can only be used in accordance with international law under a UN mandate, or with the permission of regional security organisations. It is a force that is consistent with a cooperative security strategy. The EU 2003 strategic paper states that it is necessary to "develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention." Some have said that this shows the EU is willing to use force for purposes other than peace, as do the statements that "with the new threats the first line of defence will often be abroad", and that in "an era of globalisation distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand."¹⁰ However, these statements mean that the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and its forces must increase capabilities within a strengthened political and institutional framework to more effectively engage in international cooperation. So, while EU forces can intervene in Afghanistan within the framework of an appropriate international mandate and could intervene in a post-conflict Palestine, provided this happens within the limits of the cooperative use of force, they could not intervene in Iraq as the US did.¹¹ In sum, European security strategy focuses on structural stability and long-term conflict prevention. The European Security Strategy paper aims essentially to legitimise the management and prevention of conflict and the use of military force within a cooperative framework, including in distant and "robust" contexts. It underscores that "security is a precondition of development" in the short to mid-term, but that economic development, regional economic integration and other

3. *US Strategies for National Security: Winning the Peace in the 21st Century*, A Task Force Report of the Strategies for US National Security Program, by Larry Korb (Chairman of the Task Force), edited by Michael Kraig (Stanley Foundation, October 2003), p. 22.

4. *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December 2003.

5. Alyson J.K. Bailes, 2004, "US and EU Strategy Concepts. A Mirror for Partnership and Defence?", *The International Spectator*, 49 (1), pp. 19-33.

6. See the conceptual definitions provided in International Crisis Group, 2001, *EU Crisis Response Capability. Institutions and Processes of Conflict Prevention and Management*, ICG Issues Report 2, Brussels.

7. The definition is drawn from SWP-CPN, *Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building: A Practical Guide*, Berlin, December 2001.

8. Wolfgang Wessels, 2002, "The EU as a Global Actor: Concepts and Realities", in John Leech (ed.), *Whole and Free. NATO, EU Enlargement and Transatlantic Relations*, London: The Federal Trust/TEPSA, pp. 141-161.

9. François Duchêne, 1972, "Europe in World Peace", in R. Mayne (ed.), *Europe Tomorrow*, London: Fontana/Collins, pp. 32-49.

10. See Bailes, *op. cit.*, and Robert E. Hunter, 2004, "The US and the European Union. Bridging the Strategic Gap?", *The International Spectator*, Vol. 49, No. 1, pp. 35-50. See also: "The European Security Strategy. Towards a Muscular Foreign Policy?", *IJSS Strategic Comments*, Vol. 9, Issue 9, November 2003.

11. The situation is very different in NATO, where allied EU countries have taken various steps to make a military commitment beyond self-defence. They agreed to: limited global commitments in the strategic document endorsed by the North Atlantic Council of Washington DC in 1999; to consider the activation of Art V, to react collectively to the September 11 attacks; and to contribute to troop operations in Afghanistan. Indeed, NATO has the doctrinal means to promote a more global allied commitment, although the political conditions are not in place (the Europeans are not prepared to transform NATO into an instrument of global domination, and the Americans are unclear whether they wish to share dominance with the Europeans, or whether they no longer see NATO as an instrument of national security. See David S. Yost, 2005, "NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept", in NATO Defence College, *Security Strategies: NATO, the United States, and Europe*, NDC Occasional Papers No. 5, Rome. He argues that to deal with post-September 11 developments political will rather a rewritten 1999 Strategic Concept is what is necessary. On EU and NATO Strategic concepts in the 1990s see: Roberto Aliboni, 2002, "European Defence and the Mediterranean", in Alvaro de Vasconcelos (coordinator), *A European Strategic Concept for the Mediterranean*, Lumiar Papers, No. 9, Lisbon: Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, pp. 15-37.

12. Thomas Carothers, 2005, "A Better Way to Support Middle East Reform", *Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief*, No. 33; Tamara Cofman Wittes, Sarah E. Yerkes, 2004, "The Middle East Partnership Initiative: Progress, Problems and Prospects", Memo No. 15, Brookings Institution/Saban Center Middle East.

"structural stability" requirements are mid- to long-term preconditions for security. The EU strategy is also characterised by the importance of neighbouring regions, which explains the emergence of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the importance of the Mediterranean for EU security. The security challenges posed by this region, however, are not so much terrorism but regional conflicts, particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The European Security Strategy paper treats Islamist terrorism from an historical-political perspective that differs substantially from the quasi-metaphysical view of the US administration. It does not mention national terrorism and transnational terrorism is referred to almost trivially ("The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism"). Indeed, it implicitly criticises an overriding focus on terrorism ("the most practical way to tackle the often elusive new threats will sometimes be to deal with the older problems of regional conflict"), and states that the "resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe.

Without this, there will be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East." As regards the region as a whole, it states that "the European Union's interest requires a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners", an allusion to the EU policy of "constructive engagement" with the Third World and the Mediterranean through EMP. Europeans take the threat of transnational Islamic terrorism very seriously, but it is not seen as an absolute or existential threat to national security. Terrorism is seen as a product of unresolved international political problems and social national problems, and is linked with the issue of migration. Europeans posit the need for improved intelligence and police work, but argue that solving the underlying problems is the essence. The focus is less on Al Qaeda than on these underlying problems. The strategic response to terrorism is also different. On the surface the aims are the same: promoting democracy and socio-economic development. But while the US sees social and economic backwardness as a cause of terrorism, Europeans feel that unresolved political problems in the region are equally important. Further, the US makes a negative judgement of Middle Eastern culture and society when it correlates backwardness and terrorism, so that "democracy promotion" has an "imperialist" flavour. Efforts to dispel this image (distinguishing between terrorism and Islam as a religion, and stating that the intention is not to impose democracy from the outside) have not met with great success in the region. By contrast, European policy eschews such value judgements.

Summing up, for Europeans, the terrorist threat has become more important but is non-existential. For the EU the world is risky rather than threatening. Risks are widespread (the challenges are global) but fragmented, and they stem from regional political and economic government deficits, and although aware of the need to upgrade global governance capabilities, the EU tends to focus primarily on neighbouring areas. It emphasises cooperative security and effective multilateral institutions. Its broader aim is long-term conflict prevention, or helping the Third World to achieve structural stability by means of sustainable economic development with democracy and respect for human rights. Europeans agree that backward economic, social and political conditions in the Middle East and North Africa pose threats to security, but the view is not so much that socio-economic backwardness causes terrorism but more that it generates domestic instability with spill over effects in Europe. Further, Europeans share the view that the key is to resolve outstanding international political problems – most notably the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There is a European democracy promoting objective, but transitions to democracy are seen as long-term processes that can be stimulated by outsiders and never imposed. Europeans do not believe that military force can play a role in promoting democratisation.

3. US and EU democracy promotion: analogies and differences in concepts and instruments

Democratization is at the heart of both EU and US security strategies towards the Middle East and North Africa for different reasons and in different ways. American and European concepts and instruments to deal with the region also differ. US policy towards the region centres around the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) that aims to support Arab civil society groups since December 2002;¹² support for the work of the National Endowment for Democracy; the establishment of free trade arrangements – bilateral free trade areas established with Morocco, Jordan and Bahrain and the regional Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA); and the 2003 Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI), which aims to promote political reform in the region. Following a six-month long international debate, the June 2004 Sea Island G-8 Summit endorsed a significantly modified GMEI (renamed Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa, hereafter Partnership for Progress). The latter is managed through

a ministerial Forum for the Future and acts as an umbrella for various political, economic and cultural initiatives, the most politically significant of which is the Democracy Assistance Dialogue.¹³

European policy towards the Mediterranean is administered through the EMP since the 1995 Barcelona Conference.¹⁴ In brief, the EMP builds on various long-standing Mediterranean policies initiated in the 1970s, so it is older than the more recent 2003 US initiative. The scope of the two initiatives overlaps but does not coincide. While the EU concentrates on the Mediterranean – a strategic and geopolitical “area” that is largely foreign to Americans – the US focuses on a much broader area that includes the Mediterranean (North Africa and the Near East) as well as the Gulf and Central Asian countries up to Pakistan. Differences of longevity and scope aside, there are various common points: democracy promotion, the notions of “partnership” and “inclusion” are similar, as is the focus on security and political-economic reform. But there are also important differences, because the same concepts and instruments have different meanings, degrees of relevance, and functions. The result is that while the similarities would lead one to assume closer transatlantic cooperation and cross-fertilization, the underlying differences prevent this from happening. An attempt is made below to compare US and EU civilian and political cooperation with the Mediterranean and the Middle East so as to understand the possible interaction between them and to assess the impact of US policy and changes therein on the EMP.

Various strategic differences have generated tension in transatlantic relations over the Middle East and the Mediterranean even though both parties pursue the same goals and have similar policies. It is these differences that prevent cross-fertilization and a mutually reinforcing dynamic between the two strategies.

The *first* and most important similarity is the nexus established between security and democracy. Both the US and the EU believe that more democracy contributes to more secure inter-state relations at the regional and international levels.¹⁵ For the EU, the rule of law, respect for human rights and minorities, and democratic political institutions are the backbone of “structural stability”. The same is generally the case for the US, although the concept is perhaps less fully elaborated than it is in EU doctrine. The Clinton administration already focused on democracy promotion, although perhaps less systematically than the EU. Democracy promotion is central to the Bush Middle East policy as well, although the nexus between democracy and security is strictly linked to the global war on terror, a fundamental difference with the EU nexus between democracy and security. The US posits a deep-rooted relationship between terrorism and the absence of democracy and the prevalence of authoritarianism in the region. This is seen to be the root cause of socio-economic backwardness, which is, in turn, seen as the key generator of terrorism. Thus, the focus is on promoting change and reform by engaging with civil society and culture more than regimes and governments. This approach has been harshly criticised by governments, the general public and liberals, secular and religious groups in the target region. By contrast, EU democracy promotion policy essentially targets political regimes rather than seeking deep-rooted cultural and societal change. The essential difference is that the EU has a functional and institutional view of democratisation, while the US has a more value-laden vision.

The *second* point in common is the nexus between economic development, democracy and security. Both essentially endorse the Washington Consensus (The Barcelona process is based on the idea that strong liberalization gives way to foreign direct investment, speeds up technological progress, increases productivity and efficiency and export-led growth). For both parties, democracy is a fundamental element in the recipe, as freedom fosters economic development. However, while the US emphasizes liberalization and globalisation, Europeans place greater emphasis on regional and inter-regional integration. For the EU regional integration establishes a pattern of relations that fosters economic growth, helps promote democracy and peace as has been the case in the EU itself. Europeans posit a virtuous circle of economic development, democracy and peace that is best promoted by the EU model of densely institutionalised economic regional integration. Thus, the combination of bilateral Association Agreements in an inter-regional context contrasts with the US focus on bilateral free trade agreements in a global-WTO context; the strong official focus of the EMP contrasts with the civil society focus of the US promoted

3.1. Concepts

13. International Crisis Group, 2004, *The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative: Imperilled Birth*, Middle East/ North Africa Briefings, No. 14, Brussels/ Amman; Tamara Cofman Wittes, 2004, “Promoting Democracy in the Arab World. The Challenge of Joint Action”, *The International Spectator*, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 75-88.

14. Eric Philippart, 2003, *The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Unique Features, First Results and Future Challenges*, CEPS Working Paper No. 10, Brussels; F. Attinà, S. Stavridis (eds.), 2001, *The Barcelona process and Euro-Mediterranean Issues from Stuttgart to Marseille*, Milano: Giuffrè editore; A. Vasconcelos, G. Joffé (eds.), 2000, *The Barcelona Process. Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community*, London/Portland: Frank Cass.

15. While this nexus is clearly part and parcel of EU doctrine, when it comes to individual EU member states it largely depends on national perceptions, experience and knowledge of the region. For instance, French decision-makers – especially Middle East veterans – do not believe much in the “virtuous circle” theory. The closest US European ally, the UK, is as sceptical as France, although the Blair government (like any other “politically correct” EU government) does not openly challenge it.

Middle East Economic Summits (now Forum for the Future); the EU Regional and Economic Development Working Group approach to the Middle East peace process contrasts with the role of the US in that same process. US regional approaches have a global framework and aim to strengthen that framework, while the EU approach values regional frameworks as significant *per se* and balances the regional and global dimensions. This amounts to a significant strategic difference.

The *third* common nexus is that between international institutions and legality and democracy and peace. The “realist” or “Hobbesian” view is that the former can be ignored when promoting the latter. This is the logic of the security policy of the Bush administration (as exemplified by the war in Iraq), and stands in stark contrast with the position of the EU. Kagan expressed this difference as a conflict between Martian Americans and Venutian Europeans.¹⁶ For Kagan, Europeans are Venutians because they lack the power to be otherwise. But there is a more positive reason for the difference: a genuine commitment that results from the experience of the Second World War as well as of colonialism and other historical legacies. France and Germany insisted on international legality prior to the Iraq war not just because they did not want to be dwarfed by the US, but also because they genuinely believe in the need to preserve international legality. EU states – to varying degrees and certainly more obviously the founding states – have internalised the international and liberal cooperative thinking that is at the heart of European integration. The EU thus posits a much stronger nexus between international institutions and legality and democracy and peace than the US and other more traditional great and small powers do today.

3.2. Policies and Instruments

The US and the EU share similar policies and instruments to promote reform in the Mediterranean and the Middle East that are based on inducement and conditionality. Partnership is the most important positive inducement: it gives less powerful states enhanced international status and the benefits of political and security cooperation. Partnership is implemented through inclusion, consultation and dialogue. Consultation and dialogue, and inclusion in particular, are forms of positive conditionality, rewards earned when states comply with set conditions. There is also a negative conditionality that denies misbehaving states economic or political resources, although partnership tends to preclude the harshest forms of conditionality (sanctions, for instance) or coercion (military intervention). Both the US and the EU used carrots and sticks (in Central-Eastern Europe and the Balkans within the framework of the OSCE, NATO and the Partnership for Peace). However, the EU has a particularly elaborate system of carrots and sticks and the way in which such policies are applied differs, particularly in the case of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The US tends to act bilaterally while the EU tends to use collective frameworks (the most sophisticated being the EMP). Collective frameworks are much more conducive to promoting partnership, consultation, dialogue and inclusion than bilateral relations and therefore more effective. Collective endeavours such as the EMP are more congruous with the broad goal of administering long-term reform in less developed areas with a view to enhancing regional and international security. The US adopted a more collective approach with the Partnership for Progress and a Common Future for the Mediterranean and the Middle East. So in addition to promoting partnership and inclusion bilaterally, it now promotes these goals within a collective framework of governance similar to the EMP. So there are remarkable similarities, but convergence is hindered or attenuated by strategic differences and the impact that the latter have on concepts.

A key difference is the highly integrated character of the European agenda. In principle at least, the “holistic” nature of the EMP (which addresses political dialogue, migration, cultural cooperation, financial aid, among other elements) promotes greater efficiency and better governance, and is made possible because of the high degree of institutionalisation. Common institutions make it possible to establish linkages between different areas. The Partnership for Progress focuses on various issue areas, but operates in a weak institutional environment and in a less extensive and integrated way than the EMP. This is a notable difference. If the US were to institutionalise and integrate its approach the difference might be attenuated, but only if the strategic perspective underpinning it were also changed. Indeed, the different strategic and bases of EU and US policies means that the development and deployment of instruments remains very disparate. The intimate nature of EU cooperation affects the nature of the partnership and its instruments

16. Robert Kagan, 2003, *Of Paradise and Power: America vs. Europe in the New World Order*, Knopf.

in a way that cannot occur with the more traditional and “realist” US approach. The gap between the two may actually widen with the European Neighbourhood Policy and the principle of co-ownership.

The Southern EMP partners have always criticised the partnership for the absence of co-ownership. The EMP was “sold” as a joint venture among equals, but this never persuaded the Southern members. However, given its genuinely strategic cooperative inspiration, the EU has gradually recognized political inequality within the EMP and worked to overcome it in consultations with its partners. The cooperative logic of the EMP has allowed the introduction of the principle of co-ownership, so that decisions are adopted insofar as they are “owned” by the partners concerned. Co-ownership has risks and opportunities alike. Some decisions will be “owned” by all partners, but more often than not they will be partially owned by different sub-sets of countries. “Reinforced cooperation” to use EU institutional jargon will allow the latter to advance in areas that others have opted out of. Differentiation as posited by the ENP will be a key to render the EMP more politically significant and effective. But the ENP will also lead to a dilution of the regional focus of the EMP, in which case the latter would lose the single most important comparative advantage to US regional initiatives.¹⁷ In short, an instrument can work or not more effectively depending on the strategic perspective that underlies it. The instruments outlined here seem to work better within the EU cooperative framework than in the US “realist” context as they tend to generate stronger integration and socialization dynamics.

In light of the similarities and differences in strategies, concepts and instruments, and the fact that conceptual and instrumental convergence fails to translate into cooperation because of strategic differences, this section now assesses the impact on EU Mediterranean policy of the changes in US strategy under the Bush administration.

EU policy towards the Mediterranean centres on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the EMP. Both have been affected by the September 11 attacks and the changes they wrought on US security policy and in the Middle East and North Africa, although the impact has been particularly strong in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Following the failure of the Arafat-Barak talks organised by former President Clinton at Camp David, and after the start of the second Palestinian Al Aqsa insurgency, EU policy has been administered through the “Quartet” and in accordance with the Road Map together with the US.

Despite the joint framework, there are strong historical and day to day disagreements about policy and relevant international principles and the hierarchy of policy priorities in the context of the politics of the region. Europeans feel that any stable solution must meet conditions that ensure an acceptable and just settlement for mainstream Palestinians and Arabs, while for the US a stable peace is what the parties are able to negotiate; Europeans believe that the Palestinians are the weak party and require external support to ensure a balanced settlement, while the US envisions external support as a way to facilitate but not shape the details of any settlement; Europeans have rather detailed ideas about a final settlement, and although Americans have their views on this, their fundamental concern is that a settlement should reflect what the parties in conflict are able to agree to; Europeans are more sensitive than Americans to the international legal framework surrounding the conflict from its inception, and it is felt that the final settlement should respect that framework; both Americans and Europeans agree that settlements in the occupied territories are illegal, but Europeans feel that a settlement is contingent upon the dismantling of those settlements, while the US (particularly the current administration) has a more pragmatic, not to say partisan, position (President Bush stated that the Palestinians should understand that settlements around Jerusalem cannot be dismantled, a sign that the US is already signalling the nature of the final settlement). Attitudes towards the political leadership of the Palestinians also differ. The EU saw former President Arafat as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians, while the Bush administration regarded him as the main obstacle to resolving the conflict. Finally, a very significant divergence concerns the importance that each sides attributes to a solution as a means to stabilise the region as a whole. Europeans see the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the single greatest contribution to mitigating radicalisation and anti-Western feelings, while the US although committed to a settlement, has never made such a strong

4. EU Mediterranean Policy after September 11

17. There is a strong debate in the EU about how the ENP will work, particularly about the impact of differentiation and bilateralism on the regional dimension of the EMP. See: Roberto Aliboni, 2005, “Geopolitical implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy”, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 1-16; Raffaella A. Del Sarto, Tobias Schumacher, “From EMP to ENP: What’s at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean?”, *ibidem*, pp. 17-38; Erwan Lannon, Peter van Elsuwege, “The EU’s emerging Neighbourhood Policy and its potential impact on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership”, in P. G. Xuereb (ed.), *Euro-Med Integration and the “Ring of Friends”: the Mediterranean’s European Challenge-Vol. IV*, Malta: European Documentation and Research Centre/University of Malta; Nathalie Tocci, 2005, “Does the ENP Respond to the EU’s Post-Enlargement Challenges?”, *The International Spectator*, No. 1, pp. 21-32; see. pp. 25-26; Michael Emerson, Gergana Noutcheva, 2005, *From Barcelona Process to Neighbourhood Policy. Assessment and Open Issues*, CEPS Working Document No. 220, Brussels.

linkage between a settlement and regional stability. This scepticism is all the more pronounced with the Bush administration, which believes that democratisation is the solution and the path towards solving the conflict. The 2004 G-8 Sea Island Declaration gets around this difference by stating that while the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is crucial there is no reason not to promote democracy (including in Palestine) in the meantime. So the European view has been subtly outflanked and the disagreement remains unresolved.

Over the last two years the EU has emphasised that there is a convergence with the US on a two state solution as per the Road Map, and kept rather quieter about the specifics of how to reach that outcome. The EU has appreciated the strong and explicit support that President Bush has given to the two-state goal, which has allowed for greater transatlantic convergence on the Palestinian issue (both the EU and the US have agreed that Sharon's decision to withdraw unilaterally from Gaza signals the beginning of a withdrawal from the West Bank as per the Road Map, although there is scepticism in Europe about the fate of the West Bank following the Gaza disengagement). Bush has also referred to the need for the territorial "contiguity" of the West Bank, which Europeans agree with (although other comments, such as that about Jerusalem have been less welcome). Generally, there has been greater Euro-American convergence on final objectives under the Bush administration and differences have been pushed backstage.

A reading of the Sea Island Declaration (a fine diplomatic job) suggests that there is also a transatlantic understanding about the Middle East region. In fact, fundamental differences remain, and what has happened is that the EU has made efforts to focus on consensual final aims and to underemphasise specific policy differences. Although Europeans do not believe in the new US strategy towards the region, they lack the power and means to oppose it. Adding Palestine to the already divisive issue of Iraq is seen as putting what is the top strategic security of the EU at risk: the stability of the transatlantic relationship. In this context, EU policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is converging with that of the US: the EU has included Hamas in its list of terrorist groups, supported President Mahmoud Abbas and the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, managed policy through a special envoy with a lower profile than that of Miguel Angel Moratinos. In short, EU policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been strongly influenced by changes in US policy.

The same cannot be said about the EMP. The latter has obviously been affected by transatlantic and global policies regarding terrorism, which is actually an important field of EMP security cooperation. However, the EU has responded only minimally to the US campaign to promote democracy and reform in the Greater Middle East and while EU documents refer to the need for EU-US cooperation, little has been done in that regard; instead, the EU has re-asserted the validity, autonomy and distinctive nature of its Mediterranean initiative. However, US democracy promotion presents a dilemma for the EMP. On the one hand, there is a desire to keep US and EU policies distinctly separate. US democracy promotion is based on a strategic vision that differs profoundly from the European, is seen by many to be mistaken and by others as a threat to the credibility of European policy if the latter takes any US approaches on board. On the other hand, the US has targeted the region – the Greater Middle East or Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) – that is strategically central, as the political and strategic problems that link the Mediterranean to the rest of the Middle East operate within that region (solving the conflicts of the Mediterranean means addressing the Gulf region too, for instance). So Europeans can either follow a lonely "correct" strategy that addresses the "wrong" region, or adopt the "wrong" strategy to deal with the "right" BMENA region. The third possibility is that the EU enlarges its policy to include the BMENA and enter into competition with the US, but rhetoric aside, the EU has no desire to compete with the US (although they are certainly divided about whether to cooperate with the US).

18. See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, *Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*, COM (2004) 104, 11 March 2003; and Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, *European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy Paper*, COM (2004) 373, 12 May 2004.

19. The "EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East" is published in the series *EuroMed Report*, Issue No. 78, 23 June 2004.

The EU adopted two new policies, the ENP¹⁸ and the EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East¹⁹ in this difficult context. In accordance with the European Security Strategy, the ENP is based on the view that while European security may require distant interventions, it is essentially based on a "well-governed" neighbourhood, and so aims to promote political and economic reforms in neighbouring countries. The ENP ignores the Greater Middle East and focuses on the circle of countries in the Southern Mediterranean (the countries in North Africa and the Levant) and in Eastern Europe. In this it differs radically from the Greater Middle East or BMENA strategy. By contrast, the EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the

Middle East is more akin to the BMENA strategy, outlining a European policy towards an enlarged Middle East. With it the EU says that like the US it has its own policy for the region although, in reality, it amalgamates a series of disparate pre-existing EU policies towards Iran, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and Yemen with the aim of extending them according to the principles guiding the EMP. It is unlikely that the EU will be able to implement this and the framework remains unclear.

In conclusion, the impact of US policy on EU Mediterranean policy seems limited, and as regards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the EU has chosen to de-emphasise existing differences and to focus on agreement on the two state solution to prevent the aggravation of existing transatlantic tensions. This convergence is important but not very politically significant. The EMP is seen as an alternative to the Greater Middle East policy of the US, and there is no search for cooperation or complementarities. The EMP allows the EU to remain aloof vis-à-vis US policy, limits possible damage, and focuses on a geopolitical area – the neighbourhood – that differs from the Greater Middle East, the Arab world or the Arab-Muslim world. It can become the source of a future European strategy towards the Greater Middle East that does not necessarily converge with the American. Generally, however, the EU has avoided responding to the American initiative by adopting an inward-looking approach. So the impact of US initiatives on EU Mediterranean policy is weak. There is weak convergence over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, an inward-looking approach where the EMP is concerned, and a new neighbourhood perspective that ignores the Middle East. So the EU prefers to isolate its policies from the US and limit damage than to engage in a transatlantic debate about how to deal with the Middle East.

EU and US long-term governance policies for the Mediterranean and the Middle East share similar objectives, concepts and instruments but differ due to very different strategic perspectives. Opportunities for cooperation and synergy are contingent upon a change in strategies, which is unlikely. Despite the Bush visit to Brussels, the US administration is not bent on changing first mandate concepts and goals.²⁰ The unchanging US strategy continues to divide the EU, which is consequently unable to come up with innovative and more cooperative transatlantic approaches. In the face of US unilateralism, the EU tends to retrench in its familiar Mediterranean/neighbourhood. Two years after the Iraq invasion it is possible to argue that the problem is less about strategic differences and European division and more about the inability of the US to find an Iraqi exit strategy. Were the US to find one, it would be supported by even the EU states that opposed the intervention, but this seems difficult at present. The war in Iraq was launched in the hope that it would unblock crises and conflict in the region; instead it has created a new and apparently intractable conflict to an already sadly long list of regional conflicts. Thus, the response of the EU is to limit damage and avoid further involvement. In addition, there is a political stalemate in Washington that prevents greater cooperation, with differences over Iraq weighing more than democratisation strategies as an obstacle to greater cooperation.

Whether cooperation is absent for strategic or political reasons, the fact that it does not exist weakens the ability of the US and the EU to implement a successful governance policy in the enlarged Middle East and North African region. The point here is that poor transatlantic cooperation is bound to have a negative impact on the EMP. Europeans should not delude themselves that US failures in the region will not affect their initiatives, particularly their political and security dimensions. Most recent EU documents on the EMP allude to the need to cooperate (technical and professional cooperation) with other international institutions and countries, including the United States.²¹ However, technical cooperation is insufficient. What is needed is a bold political initiative that triggers shifts in current US policy in Iraq and the Gulf or provides the administration with a way out of the current stalemate. Successful EU troika nuclear talks with Iran could, for instance, trigger a shift in Washington, and Turkish accession to the EU that frames Turkish interests in Iraqi Kurdistan and contributes to consolidate the Iraqi nation could help bring the US and the EU out of the current impasse.

The absence of transatlantic cooperation affects the success of the strategies and policies of both sides. It is already leading the EU to adopt an inward-looking approach towards the Mediterranean and its neighbourhood or backyard, and to turn a blind eye to various pertinent questions raised by the US BMENA policy. Europeans may have good reason to criticise US Greater Middle East and North African policy and wish to preserve EU autonomy but the issues raised by US policy need to be addressed.

5. Conclusions: The Impact of the US BMENA Strategy on the EMP

20. "President Addresses Nation, Discusses Iraq, War on Terror", Fort Bragg, North Carolina, June 28, 2005 (White House web site (accessed on July 1, 2005); see the very negative comments to the speech by the *Washington Post* ("Mr. Bush on Iraq", June 29, 2005) and the *New York Times* ("President's Bush Speech About Iraq", June 29, 2005).

21. Point 11 in the EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East states that the "EU will seek maximum coherence with the US, UN and other external actors."

EU policies may become politically irrelevant due to this inward-looking perspective, and further, it is open to question whether Europe's "more correct" democratisation policies are more likely to succeed than the US's "less correct" counterparts. The risk emerges as a result of the fact that EU policies are limited to its Arab neighbours when the political problems of the Mediterranean region involve a larger area that generally coincides with the US BMENA region, because although Europeans criticise the aggressive unilateral US approach to democracy promotion, people in the region are reacting (negatively and positively) to US policy and not to the more sophisticated, softer, and less demanding EU approach; and because the EU has toned down its position with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and emphasised its minimal strategic convergence with the US. While this is so for very understandable reasons, this stance is bound to weaken partnership-building within the EMP, erode its political credibility among the Arab Southern partners, and accentuate the tensions between the bilateral and regional as well as economic and political aspects of partnership within the ENP.

The EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East is as a response to the gap between the EU Mediterranean perspective and the broader, more politically relevant regional area targeted by the BMENA initiative. However, the Partnership is nothing but patchwork of very diverse EU relations with countries and regional organisations. The EU must urgently expand the EMP and/or ensure the uniform application of EU guidelines, practices and rules to the whole of the region. Neugart and Schumacher have proposed expansion by "concentric circles".²² How can the EU promote democracy more firmly without giving up on its cooperative culture? Talks on the Action Plans between economists and diplomats within the politically correct framework of co-ownership, inclusion and positive conditionality is insufficient to pressure Southern partners for change. It is necessary to take political and diplomatic steps that clarify and strengthen EU political goals. The Troika should be able and willing to intervene quickly and to impose conditions at short notice. In other words, the EU needs a high political and diplomatic profile and must not fear conflict and stormy period in relations with partners. This means strengthening CFSP, an increasingly difficult prospect in light of the debacle of the European Constitution (which is also bad news for any more effective policy towards the Palestinian question).²³

Democratisation efforts need to be workable as well as firmer. US policy to promote democracy has been criticised by Arabs and Europeans alike for being too intrusive, using force and coercion, lack of credibility due to double standards. The EU promotes democracy by consensual means (or by osmosis as Richard Youngs puts it).²⁴ But the EU is not without sins in Arab eyes, and the fact is that after ten years EU results are not much greater than those of the two year American vintage. Indeed, EU performance in the EMP has been unsatisfactory, so the EU cannot claim that it is doing better than the US in this regard.

Both parties confront the same question: how to promote reform in countries where "the absence of viable opposition movements with sustainable popular constituencies represents a persistent dilemma of democratic transformation"²⁵? Both appear to be concluding that a more flexible notion of democracy is necessary and that fostering pluralism and reform by accepting moderate religious groups is necessary. The EU and the US made the same mistake in this regard, and must reflect together to increase their effectiveness. This may be the place to begin working together.

22. Felix Neugart, Tobias Schumacher, 2004, "Thinking about the EU's Future Neighbourhood Policy in the Middle East: From the Barcelona Process to a Euro-Middle East Partnership", in C.-P. Hanelt, G. Luciani, F. Neugart (eds.), *Regime Change in Iraq*, Florence, RSCAS Press, pp. 169-92.

23. The European Constitution envisages a strengthening CFSP and its instruments considerably. See International Crisis Group, 2005, *EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited*, Europe Report No. 160.

24. Richard Youngs, 2005, *Ten Years of the Barcelona Process: A Model for Supporting Arab Reform?*, Working Paper No. 2, FRIDE: Madrid.

25. Amr Hamzawy, "The West and Moderate Islamism", *Bitterlemons-International.org*, Edition 20, Vol. 3, June 2, 2005.

When contemplating the future of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the most conservative assumption is that the EMP will continue to offer institutional means for multilateral cooperation in the Mediterranean. However, the EMP could equally fall apart in the near future, a not unlikely scenario given that, as many suggest, the organization no longer stands on firm ground despite its attempts to refocus its mission. Whichever the scenario, different types of interactions between the two main elements within EMP, the enlarged EU and the Southern Mediterranean States, are possible. The following examines the potential dynamics and how they are likely to affect relations between the partners. If the optimistic assumption that EMP will remain relevant is accepted, the following factors have to be considered, which have a major impact on the potential dynamics and relations between south and north.

A key factor is the nature of transatlantic relations. Will the EU follow the hegemon? Will it compete with greater foreign policy autonomy? Will it attempt to counterbalance the US? Or will the division of labour between the EU and the US continue to evolve? Whatever the answers, EMP will be affected by transatlantic relations because greater harmony would allow the EMP to enhance regional security in the Mediterranean more effectively and discord unnecessarily waste resources and produce a detrimental competition between European and American plans for the region;²⁶ and because competition could give regional states more leverage to receive more aid or better terms from one of the parties to address regional security problems.²⁷ This would increase the prominence of bilateral ties that would allow regional states to better play their political cards, and would weaken the EMP.

While the Mediterranean is important for the EU and the US, it is argued here that the security relevance of the Mediterranean is far greater for Europeans primarily for geographical reasons. The South Mediterranean states are Europe's backyard and ongoing immigration to Europe make the export of terrorism and security problems (including soft security issues like environmental and health problems) easier. The point here is that developments in the Southern Mediterranean are likely to remain permanent and serious security concerns for Europe, and the same cannot be predicted about the US (interest will fluctuate depending on the state of the global war on terrorism, something that is not the case of the Gulf region, where vested American interests are long-term and constant). Decreasing interest in the Mediterranean in the near future will pose a challenge for the EMP and is likely to shift the burden of investing in regional security to Europe. This highlights the importance of EU security capabilities. While the East Mediterranean (The Levant) is currently defined as part of the EMP, it is still an indispensable part of the US sphere of interest because of the more immediate and vital security threats it poses for the US. By contrast, North Africa poses more immediate and vital security threats for Europeans and could prove to be an area where the EU plays a more significant and independent role. Whether this happens within or outside the EMP framework depends on other developments. With the European Neighbourhood Policy initiated in March 2003, which gradually shifts the focus from the eastern borders of Europe to neighbours in the East and South, the EU has sought to overcome some of the problems encountered in the first ten years of the EMP.²⁸ But ENP does not substitute the EMP as it is designed to adjust and prolong EU Mediterranean policy. In light of past experience and the need for consistency ENP aims should be coherent with the EMP. The ENP establishes a framework for all EU "neighbourhood policies" and this means readjusting and harmonising existing partnership instruments, and the replacement of old programmes by the newly created European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).²⁹ The implementation of the ENP according to the logic of making relations more coherent should improve the EMP substantially.

If the second scenario occurs and EMP disintegrates various other questions emerge: will the EU be a strong, coherent actor with a fully operational and tested ESDP, or will it be an actor focusing on the management of economic integration but unable to implement a common foreign and security policy and even less an independent security capability? On this scenario, a greater dichotomy between European socio-economic activity in the Mediterranean and US military-security activity in the region is likely to occur. In short, the nature of the interaction between the United States and the European Union will have a significant impact on their policies toward the Mediterranean, as well as on the ability of Southern Mediterranean states to take advantage of institutions like the EMP.

II. The Future of the EMP in a Changing Context: The European Union, the United States, and the Security Environment of the Mediterranean

Yasar Qatarnah

1. The Euro-Atlantic Community: Dichotomies of Interest?

26. Duplication is already apparent in EU economic and social programmes, and the US Middle East Initiative. Roberto Aliboni discussed this issue extensively in this report.

27. International relations literature identifies this type of state behaviour as "Tyranny of the Weak" Paradigm. For more on this see: David A. Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies", *World Politics*, vol. 31, no. 2, January 1979; Erling Bjøl, "The Power of the Weak", *Cooperation and Conflict*, No. 3, 1968; Robert O. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies", *Foreign Policy*, No.2, Spring 1971; Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1987.

28. For a comprehensive summary of the development of the geographic scope of ENP see: Michele Comelli, "The Challenges of the European Neighbourhood Policy", *The International Spectator*, No. 3, 2004, pp. 98-101. Also see Rosa Balfourand, Alessandro Rotta, "Beyond Enlargement: The European Neighbourhood Policy and Its Tools", *The International Spectator*, No. 1, 2005, pp. 7-20.

29. Michele Comelli, *ibid*, p. 103.

2. Alternative Perspectives in a Changing Environment

The second factor is the impact that security environment of the Mediterranean countries could have on the EMP. Developments in the broader Middle East are important for the future of the EMP, particularly the resolution of the Arab-Israeli and Iraqi conflicts, and the future of current efforts to democratise the region. The early EMP coincided with a period of progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process, which created expectations of greater regional cooperation on all fronts. A future EMP looks less positive. It is likely that regional conflicts will be resolved, some kind of Palestinian state will emerge, and the US occupation of Iraq will end. However, expectations of a peace dividend arising from comprehensive peace and stability in the Middle East should be treated with scepticism.³⁰ All Mediterranean countries face the ongoing challenge of political and economic liberalization, a multidimensional challenge, involving economic and political difficulties. While regimes are stable in some countries, the problems they face have clearly not been overcome and will not soon be resolved. Many of these challenges, including issues of development and reform, have been buried by Mediterranean states under the common cause of “liberating the occupied territories” and facing up to “foreign intervention.” The fall of Baghdad two years ago was symptomatic of the Arab condition. The Arab regimes are in deep crisis; most have missed the boat of globalisation; most suffer from a leadership vacuum; most are in no position to determine the Middle Eastern regional agenda, which is set by outsiders and the region’s non-Arab powers – Israel, Turkey and Iran.

I am not suggesting that the Arab-Israeli and the Iraqi conflicts are trivial, but there are problems that need to be addressed independently of “occupation.” The recent Arab Human Development Report for 2004 and its 2003 and 2002 predecessors have pointed to the “growing knowledge gap” between the Arab and developed countries. Oppressive regimes have shackled active minds and impeded the growth of knowledge in societies where “creativity, innovation and knowledge are the first victims of the suppression or the denial of freedoms.” Arab education is declining in quality and in terms of infrastructure for the dissemination of information-telephone lines or access to digital media. The general trend in the Arab countries “gravitates towards the lowest indicators in world standards.”³¹ All of the above contribute to the poor state of production in science and technology in the Arab countries.

Faced with such a failure, Arab regimes have sought scapegoats, perpetuating the long, lamentable tradition of blaming outsiders rather than looking long and hard at their own failure to achieve political, economic, and social objectives. The most frequent scapegoats have been Israel and the United States. Tragic as it has been, the Arab-Israel conflict has not been a major direct cause of the Arab deficit dilemma. Rather, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been a scapegoat phenomenon: the conflict provided incompetent Arab regimes with a convenient way to rally national support against an external enemy, diverting attention away from the regime failings.

The siege of the Palestinian leadership in the three years before Arafat’s death and the rapid disintegration of the Iraqi regime revealed the enormous discrepancy between the power of the modern Arab authoritarian state to pulverize its own civil society and its incapacity to defend itself against severe external pressure. There are many immensely powerful Arab regimes, but they rule with an iron fist weak states. Indeed, it is their oppressive rule that is one of the main causes of national weakness. As clearly explained in the focus of the Arab Development reports is on internal shortcomings and these, rather than external actors, are the main problem for Arab development. To assume that comprehensive peace will be a universal panacea is politically naïve and, indeed, strategically dangerous: if peace is achieved within a decade and no other improvements are made, a decade further down the line may see the bitter disenchantment of the south Mediterranean region with its governments, and perhaps less domestic stability than one might think.

Two scenarios need to be considered here. A pessimistic one would predict stalled reforms and weak states in the Mediterranean. An optimistic scenario would predict moderate economic and political reform success. Each scenario has different implications in terms of regional security threats and the future EMP. The first suggests that greater instability will generate greater negative spill over into Europe and greater concern in the US given the issue of terrorism. For regional states it will create a serious dilemma: governments in the region have a strong interest in maintaining both regional and domestic stability in order to stay in

30. See for example: Shimon Peres, *The New Middle East*, New York, Holt, 1993; Fischer, Stanley, Dani Rodrik, and Elias Tuma (eds.), *The Economics of Middle East Peace*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1993; Ben-Shahar, Haim, “Economic Cooperation in the Middle East: From Dream to Reality”, in Gideon Fishelson (ed.), *Economic Cooperation in the Middle East*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1989.

31. *Arab Human Development Report: Creating Opportunities for Future Generations*, New York, The United Nations, 2002; Nadir Farjani (ed.), *Arab Human Development Report: Building a Knowledge Society*, New York, The United Nations, 2003; Zahir Jamal and Rima Khalaf Hunaidi (eds.), *Arab Human Development Report: Freedom and Good Governance in Arab Countries*, San Francisco, Stanford University Press, 2005.

power. Opposition parties and political Islamists in particular threaten their power. If the Islamic challenge grows, then it will become even more complicated to use cooperation with the West (the EU or the US) to deal with it because open cooperation, especially on security issues, can create serious domestic legitimacy problems. This brings to the forefront an important issue, namely the common interest of EMP countries in combating terrorism, particularly in the southern shore. Anti-terrorism is very much the interest of state actors rather than ordinary people. As seen in some Mediterranean countries cooperation of this kind has actually amplified the growing gap between state and popular perceptions of security threats. In specific, after 9/11, the US was increasingly regarded as a powerful threat in its own right, most obviously expressed in opposition to the close linkage between the US and Israel and to US policy in Iraq, but also apparent in the general cultural antagonism towards the United States in many Arab states today. Arab public opinion easily securitised American threat to cultural referent objects.³² Many in the Arab world read the Cold War and post-Cold War history of the region as a sustained attempt by the West to prevent the emergence of any great Arab powers. Indeed, since the break up of the Ottoman Empire, the great powers preserved the fragmentation of the post-colonial state system in the Arab world, and prevented countries such as Egypt and Iraq from becoming the centres of new imperial aggregation.³³ For many, the war against Iraq in 2003 and the forgiving attitude of the US towards Israeli expansionism are merely the latest examples of this policy. The post 2001 era has therefore drawn the US into singularly complicated and contradictory patterns of enmity characteristic of the regional security dynamics.

Accordingly, a shift from a non zero-sum to a zero-sum paradigm has occurred in Arab attitudes towards the US war on terrorism and Iraq.³⁴ This shift has created a widening gap between Arab publics and their governments. For ordinary people, the advocates of the non zero-sum approach have failed to translate their views and perceptions into realities and thus failed to gain political ground. The absence of an electoral and democratic system does not alleviate this enmity, as people cannot express their discontent. Discontent remains unexpressed and the state of enmity between regimes and public has increased. During the Cold War Arab governments managed to contain pan-Arab ideology (a major threat to their legitimacy at the time), and external weakness compounded by internal failure will not be an easy challenge to overcome for current Arab states. In the post 2001 context, therefore, elites have become insecure and domestic threats have become a major preoccupation. Whatever the outcome, post-2001 global, regional, and domestic realities have changed the Arab security order and political landscape, perhaps permanently. Popular discontent with the US occupation of Iraq, territorial disputes in Palestine, and liberalising moves in some of the states has added to the security costs of the Arab state system. In other words, events since 2001 have reinforced and increased the cross linkages between the domestic, inter-state, and global levels of the Arab security order, and thus increased the enmity between the Arab state and the citizenry. As regards the Mediterranean, a new security (dis)order in the region (note that the EMP is based on the assumption that the security of the Mediterranean is the security of Europe), could undermine the security aspect of the EMP and even lead to its demise.

The second, positive scenario suggests that there will be less of a negative spill over from the South to the North. Political development and relatively well distributed economic benefits are likely to decrease the appeal of radicalism and the incentive to emigrate. For the same reasons, however, a more contained regional security system could emerge, with less intense interaction with the West, particularly if regional states go ahead with greater political and economic liberalization, as they are less likely to fight each other and will find it easier to cooperate.³⁵ An additional factor needs to be considered when trying to imagine the security environment of the Mediterranean countries and their impact on the future of the EMP: the role of the regional organizations³⁶ in managing regional security. There is no meaningful regional framework to deal with security problems at present, and a new forum is needed to develop greater regional cooperation if a common interest develops. If governing elites across the region find that they all face a common sub-national or transnational threat to their survival, then they will find it easier to use such a forum to deal with the challenge. For external actors like EMP, which wish to promote regional stability, it is important to nurture such intra-regional institutional links. The more regional institutional capacity the more self-contained but stable the Mediterranean regional security sub-system will be.

32. For a recent study on Arab perceptions of the West in general and the United States in particular, see the PEW Global Attitude Project. See also: Mustafa Hamarneh, *Revisiting the Arab Street: Research from Within*, Center for Strategic Studies, Amman, 2005.

33. The traditional political form is one or more empires centred around cores in the Nile, Mesopotamia, or Persia. For more see: Ian Lustick, "The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political Backwardness in Historical Perspective", *International Organization*, Vol.51, No. 4, Autumn 1997, pp. 653-683.

34. Rejection of involvement in this war reasserted itself in the Arab public sphere. It was realized that only resistance to American policies would meet their demands and deliver the Iraqis independence. At least, effective resistance is raising the cost of US occupation. Meanwhile, threatening Israelis with violence on their own territory lays the political foundations for separating Israelis and Palestinians, and contributes to an independent Palestinian state. For more on Zero and Non Zero-sum games see: Martin Shubik, *Games for Society, Business and War: Towards a Theory of Gaming*, New York, Wiley, 1964; James Charlesworth (ed.), *Contemporary Political Analysis*, New York, Free Press, 1967; James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, New York, Addison Wesley Longman, 2001.

35. This pattern of behaviour is based on the notion of democratic peace, which holds that democracies never or almost never go to war with one another. Despite criticism, the democratic peace theory has grown in prominence in the last two decades and has become influential in the Western policy world. See: Brown, Michael E., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, *Debating the Democratic Peace*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1996; Doyle, Michael W., *Ways of War and Peace*, New York, W.W. Norton, 1997; Gowa, Joanne, *Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999; Huth, Paul K., et al., *The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge University Press, 2003.

36. This applies whether they are inter-Arab organizations or regional organizations that include non-Arab countries (Israel, Turkey, and Iran).

3. The Changing Nature of Security: Back to the Same Old “Threats”

Another important factor that could affect the interaction between both sides of the Mediterranean is the nature of security threats. The reasonable assumption is that current security threats will continue to be relevant: the threat of global terrorism is unlikely to disappear given its illusive nature and the fact that it feeds upon other problems that are not likely to be resolved soon, such as the regional conflicts in Palestine and Iraq and the widening North-South gap, and the associated threats of failed states that can become heavens for terrorists, as well as the threat of proliferation of WMD. These threats, which came to the forefront with the September 2001 attacks, have clearly increased the relevance for Europeans, of the Middle East in general, and particularly the South Mediterranean. So the EMP is likely to remain relevant for Euro-Mediterranean countries in the near future.

However, other threats could emerge in Europe. The Mediterranean has always been of interest to Europe but the major conceptual shift southward (the Barcelona Process) only occurred after the demise of the Soviet threat. Most policy-makers and scholars argue that the EU does not face any serious continental threat but it should be borne in mind that more traditional threats may reappear in the future. These could come in the form of a nationalistic Russia disenchanted with economic liberalization and more dangerous because of its incomplete democratic institutions, or in the form of a rise of nationalism in Germany and other countries following crises within the European Union (the recent vote on the European constitution). While this is not likely it is important to take such scenarios into account.

If traditional European threats were to re-emerge, Southern Mediterranean security threats would be pushed into the background. This would have implications for the investment in regional cooperation and EMP. In other words, if the nature of Euro-Med cooperation is such that it encourages the creation of independent regional capabilities to manage crises and deal with threats, then events in Europe are likely to be less important. If, on the other hand, cooperation develops only bilaterally and naturally creates greater dependence on extra-regional initiatives, then the impact of events in Europe may be more severe.

4. Conclusion

The main point made in this paper is that when discussing the future of the EMP it is necessary to examine the triangular relationships and interactions between the United States, the European Union and the Mediterranean states. In the long run, it is easier to predict that Europe will have a greater direct security interest in the region, particularly its western part. Consequently, Europe is likely to play a greater role in helping to manage the region's security challenges, either by sharing the burden within its transatlantic ally or independently through the EMP. From the region's perspective, transatlantic competition is both a curse and a blessing. On the one hand, competition decreases the efficiency of aid through EMP, but on the other, if Europe and the US maintain an interest in the region, competition offers opportunities for Mediterranean states to manipulate transatlantic fractures to extract greater benefits.

In terms of policy recommendations, it is very important for EMP to encourage and enhance intra-regional institutional ties. The more regional capabilities are developed to manage security problems, the less the future of regional stability will depend on extra-regional fluctuations, within Europe or across the Atlantic. For the Mediterranean states, in broad strategic terms, it is important to explore greater regional cooperation to undermine the strong impact of triangular relations as described in this paper. In other words, negotiating with the EMP through a regional forum, in a coordinated manner, will increase the Mediterranean states' leverage and their sense of being equal partners in a security dialogue.

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Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais
Largo de São Sebastião, 8
Paço do Lumiar
1600-762 Lisboa - Portugal
E-mail: mednet@mail.telepac.pt