

# 40

## **Regional Crises and Europe: How the Middle East Conflict and Iraq War Affect the EMP**

*Isabel Schäfer  
Ferhad Ibrahim*

## Regional Crises and Europe: How the Middle East Conflict and Iraq War Affect the EMP

Isabel Schäfer  
Ferhad Ibrahim  
Freie Universität Berlin

January 2005



This report was produced with the financial assistance of the European Commission, under contract n° ME8/B74100/RELEX/2000/016-F1 - CRIS 2000/2121, within the framework of the EuroMeSCo Working Group II activities. The text is the sole responsibility of the authors and in no way reflects the official opinion of the Commission.

Introduction	05
I. A Changed International Context: The EMP as Inspiration	05
II. The Impact of the Middle East Conflict on the EMP	07
Political and Security Partnership: Between Acquis and Paralysis	
The Economic and Financial Partnership: Free Trade Without Free Politics?	
Impact on the Cultural and Social Partnership: Gaining Ground on Extremism	
Institutional/Internal Consequences	
Impact of the Middle East Conflict on the EU-US Relationship in the Mediterranean	
II. The Impact of the Iraq War on the Barcelona Process	12
“Barcelona Light“ for the Countries to the East of Jordan?	
Conclusion	14



## Introduction

The Middle East has been strongly affected by the War In Iraq and the constellation of regional powers to emerge from the conflict is still an open question. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) is not equipped to resolve political crises or conflict in the Mediterranean and Middle East, as it is essentially an economic instrument of European foreign policy. However, in light of the American “Wider Middle East Initiative” and the large amount of public attention accorded the Arab Human Development Report 2003, the EMP as a political concept gains new relevance. The core problems of the Arab world, as defined by the abovementioned report written by Arab experts, are the absence of democracy, education and the economic integration of women. The Barcelona Process was from the start based on the idea of promoting democratic reform through parallel political, economical and socio-cultural means and through the integration of the southern partners in the process. The aim is to support reforms on different levels from within the societies of the southern and eastern Mediterranean, rather than imposing the European model from the outside. Arab governments and populations view the “Wider Middle East Initiative” (WMEI) with great suspicion – particularly governments fearing a loss of authoritarian power and US penalties if they fail to implement reforms. By contrast, European policy is seen to be closer to the concerns of the region. Since the Iraq War, there has been a veritable explosion in the number of plans and initiatives for the Middle East. Why not stick with existing concepts and instruments such as the EMP, and invest in the improvement of their implementation?

The future of the EMP is an open question in light of the changed international context. On the one hand, the EMP is being rediscovered as a sophisticated model for cooperation with the region. On the other hand, its future as an institutional framework is not at all clear. What effects will EU enlargement have on the EMP? How will EMP fit within the Wider Europe - Neighbourhood Framework? What is its place in the “Strategic Partnership between the EU and the Mediterranean and the Middle East”? The Middle East conflict continually shows Europe to be a weak international player; it has hindered the EMP from the beginning, and led to the complete stagnation of the political basket. The Iraq war showed US foreign policy in a negative light, and made Europe seem a more credible actor. However, fulfilling expectations means that the EU must act united and must develop serious proposals. An intense new debate on unilateralism, multilateralism, the politics of force or the politics of peace is underway. Indirectly this discussion has also led to the rediscovery of the concepts underlying the EMP.

Indirectly, the Iraq war has led to an upgrading of the EMP concept. On the one hand, the crisis was a blow to Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), particularly before the war. Rarely have Europeans been so divided as at this time. Divisions escalated over how to respond to the regime of Saddam Hussein and US policy. On the other hand, Europeans were forced to react and a new debate about CFSP came to life. Different concepts are relevant in this context: The widest framework for the EU relations with its direct neighbours is the Neighbourhood Policy, followed by the EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East and, within this framework, the EMP.

EU enlargement is changing the balance within Europe, with implications for European foreign policy. The overarching Neighbourhood Policy is a possible new direction, although it is still unclear what role the Barcelona Process will play within this policy concept, or the impact of the latter on general EU foreign policy instruments. Will the EMP be transformed, disappear or become just a small sub-chapter of the Neighbourhood Policy? How capable of acting is the EU in the current situation? The internal, institutional aspects of CFSP have made it impossible to forge a coherent European foreign policy to date. Enlargement is a setback for the formulation of autonomous European responses to regional conflicts. Further, EU enlargement opens the question of the place of the Middle East in the future plans of the EU. The reform of the foreign policy instruments and the issue of the Mediterranean and the Middle East have shifted to the foreground, even as the EU debates its Constitutional text. Rather than a European choice, the shift is a response to the American Wider Middle East Initiative being debated since the spring of 2004. The WMEI, which aims to promote reform in the Middle East, took into consideration the central problems of the region as defined in the last Arab Human Development Report: the democracy, education and women’s rights deficits. By rediscovering and highlighting the importance of these issues, particularly the centrality of civil society as a reform target and actor, the American plans for the region seem to be inspired by EMP concepts. For a long time the US administration did not take seriously the innovative concept and first

## I. A Changed International Context: The EMP as Inspiration

achievements of the EMP; now that reform of the Arab world is on the agenda, a closer look is being taken at European proposals to promote good governance and respect for human rights, foster institution building and integrate civil society actors into reform processes. Some Arab voices have gone so far as to suggest that the WMEI is an American plot to put an end to the EMP. The American initiative, criticised by many Arab governments as intervening in their domestic affairs, was also hesitantly received by European heads of state during the G8 Summit in 8-10 June 2004 in Sea Island. European governments underlined that political, economic and social reforms are necessary but cannot be imposed from outside. As a result of the EU-US Summit of 26 June 2004, the Europeans succeeded in softening the US approach, in the sense that there was an agreement that reforms must be domestically driven. Finally, during the NATO summit of 28 June 2004 in Istanbul, Europe and the US drew nearer over cooperation in Iraq.

The EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East can be seen as a European response to the American approach. In December 2003 the European Council asked the Presidency and the High Representative for the CFSP, in cooperation with the EU Commission, to develop concrete proposals for a strategy towards the Middle East. The ensuing Interim Report<sup>1</sup> served as the basis for consultations with governments in the Mediterranean and Middle East. The final report<sup>2</sup> was adopted at the European Council in Brussels on 17-18 June 2004. The Strategic Partnership is based on the close relations between Europe and the region and the aim of greater co-ownership, and European engagement in a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As was proclaimed during the launching of the Barcelona Process, the Strategic Partnership is also launched in a "spirit of partnership." Although a general framework for the region, a differentiated country-by-country approach is necessary. The Strategic Partnership will build on existing structures such as the EMP and cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and work out frameworks for cooperation with countries for which there is no bilateral or regional framework, as in the case of Iraq. It is proposed that a broad concept of security should be adopted that addresses domestic concerns in the region (e.g. unemployment and economic underdevelopment). It is a long-term approach, the aims of which are to make progress towards democracy and respect for human rights in a pragmatic way. One of the main challenges is the lack of prospects for younger generations. Concretely, this means that the Neighbourhood Policy will constitute an overall framework for the relations of the EU with its neighbouring countries in the East and in the South. Within the framework there is an Eastern oriented and a more Southern oriented strand. Southern policy is based on the Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Finally, the EMP will constitute a sub-section of the Strategic Partnership, along with cooperation with the GCC and between the EU and the other countries in the region that are not part of these two frameworks (Mauritania, Libya, Yemen, Iran and Iraq). Another idea was that the Barcelona Process should be widened to include some of these countries, but has been abandoned for the time being. One of the achievements of the Strategic Partnership is that it was written in negotiation with the Arab countries – who nonetheless accuse the EU of not having consulted with them sufficiently. As regards the debate on priorities – the Middle East conflict or socio-economical development of the region – it is stated that "progress with the resolution of the conflict cannot be a precondition for confronting the urgent reform challenges facing our partners in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, nor vice versa."<sup>3</sup>

Finally, the Strategic Partnership is the result of a process of combining different proposals and integrating their core ideas. These proposals include the security partnership proposed by Javier Solana, Joschka Fischer's ideas as expostulated at the Security conference in Munich in February 2004, and the German-French and Danish-Canadian initiative. It is also the result of the demand of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Partners to develop a common and coherent European project for the region. The document approved by the European Council in June 2004 consists of a list of the different tools, instruments and agreements already in existence.

International changes since September 11, 2001 have not only provoked a revival of the EMP and of the third basket in particular, but also provoked debate about which actors are the right ones for the EU in the region. In addition to governments and civil societies, there has been an attempt to revive cooperation with institutional actors such as the League of the Arab States (LAS), the GCC or the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), in order to generate greater institutional regional integration and institutional counterparts for the EU. However, these institutions are unfortunately only symbolic actors, as they are politically divided and weak. There is also an opening of sorts, with

1. Interim Report on the EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East. In: Euromed Report, Issue No. 73, 23 March 2004.

2. Final Report on the EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East. In: Euromed Report, Issue No. 87, 23 June 2004.

3. Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council 17 and 18 June 2004. In: Euromed Report No. 77, 21 June 2004, p. 2.

the EU engaging with moderate Islamists as dialogue partners. It has been agreed that the EU can work with such groups if they reject violence and accept democracy. This is a change and is the result of the debate on the effects of cooperation with repressive regimes, which put Islamists under pressure, and has been found to be contra-productive and compromising for the EU.

Although the EU supports a stronger and more co-owned Barcelona Process and Wider Europe-Neighbourhood Policy, the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries are hesitating. From the southern point of view, the criticism is that European opinions that Arab societies are incapable of democratising themselves, and that living with repressive head of states and cooperating with them is necessary still predominate. The rapprochement between the EU and Libya is an example for this European attitude. The current situation presents a great opportunity for European foreign policy and relations with the Arab World. The development of a European alternative to the US approach is now on the agenda. This alternative has been much inspired by the EMP.

At first sight, it would appear that the Barcelona Process and the first basket in particular are stagnated because of the Middle East conflict. A closer look shows that this is not the case. There are many activities at many different levels. There is a tendency among observers to downplay the EMP. The Barcelona Process was never conceived to solve the Middle East conflict. It was conceived as a European global concept for the Mediterranean region and as a parallel and complementary process to the Middle East peace process. The single aim regarding the latter was to improve the general political climate in the region. However, it has become clear over the last nine years that the two processes are not as easily kept apart as was hoped in Barcelona in 1995. An oft-cited *acquis* of the EMP is the fact that Israel, the Palestinians and the Arab states involved in the conflict have participated in it from its inception. While official talks between the parties are often frozen or interrupted, informal talks and meetings have continued in the Euro-Mediterranean framework. It is a considerable achievement that Israelis, Palestinians, Syrians, Jordanians, Lebanese and Egyptians are considered as equal partners in the framework of the EMP. Although the conflict parties boycotted many of the official conferences of the 27 Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers – particularly Syria and Lebanon – in protest against Israeli policy, lower level cooperation can succeed. A further important *acquis* is the fact that the Palestinian Authority (PA) was treated formally within the EMP as an equal and fully accountable partner that can at least formally participate in almost all activities of the process like the other eleven Mediterranean partners. Diplomatically, the EU treated the PA as a quasi-sovereign state, and the EU would probably be the first to recognise an independent Palestinian state. Since the conference of Madrid in 1991, the EU has worked towards greater political and economic independence for the Palestinian territories. EMP also plays a role in these efforts. By pursuing this course, the EU tries to act as neutrally as possible, despite the differences of opinions on the Middle East conflict among EU Member states.

Nonetheless, the Middle East conflict does lead partly to a paralysis of the EMP, especially the “Political and Security Partnership”. The Charter for Peace and Stability, which should have been about peaceful conflict management and continued political dialogue, was never signed. The Arab States, especially Syria, continuously underline that cooperation in security matters is impossible as long as there is a “strategic unbalance” between Israel and its neighbouring countries, and that the Middle East conflict will remain unresolved as long as Israel does not give up its monopoly on nuclear weapons. For the same reason only few of the so-called “partnership building measures” have been implemented this far, and no major EMP meetings have been held on Arab soil, as Israel could not participate.

In the official discourse of the Arab Mediterranean partners, the Middle East conflict is used repeatedly as an excuse for the lack of democratisation and reform in general. Even the Maghrib States, which are far from Israel and the Palestinian territories, use the Palestinian question, which plays a strong symbolic role in the entire Arab world. However, the EMP has rendered possible informal talks between the conflict parties, and the regular meetings of the Senior Officials for political dialogue and the numerous meeting of ministers and officials have created some continuity. But this cannot counterbalance the fact that the Middle East conflict has a strongly negative effect on the EMP. As long as the conflict persists, regional political integration will not move forward, mistrust will continue to dominate the mindsets of the participants.

## II. The Impact of the Middle East Conflict on the EMP

### Political and Security Partnership: Between Acquis and Paralysis



The conflict hinders economic growth and heightens the terrorist threat. This means that the EU has no choice and must invest in its capacity to help negotiate a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

There was also a question as to whether the Iraq crisis was a priority rather than the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Bush Administration decided to deal with Saddam Hussein and only later with the other conflict. A year after the Iraq war, the Middle East conflict is still as far from being resolved. The political situation has worsened, with different Palestinian groups fighting one another. There is no direct relation between the two conflicts, but the positions of Israel and the Palestinian Authority to the Quartet Road Map have changed. As public attention turned to Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continued and the spiral of violence increased. The aggressive course adopted by the Sharon government was already in place following the outbreak of the second Intifada in September 2000. The next step in transgressing certain red lines came after September 11, 2001 when Israeli permanent controls and military force were used disproportionately in the Palestinian territories.<sup>4</sup> A further transgression was the targeted killing of activists and of Hamas leader Sheik Yassin in March 2004 and his successor Abdel Asis Rantisi a month later. While the Palestinians are determined to show their superior capacity for endurance they seek to internationalise the conflict. However, Bush's war on terror and his unilateral approach not only in Iraq but also with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had led into an impasse.

The Middle East conflict and Arab reform were on the agenda at the many recent international summits, from the G8 to EU-US Summit. The former unhappily remains a mental if not real obstacle to reform. The Palestinian question absorbs too much attention, sometimes to an obsessive degree as when Zionist plots are invented by Arab observers. This prevents many Arab societies and governments from focusing on the urgent question of development. The voices that propose to concentrate on their country's needs, problems and reforms are a minority.

## The Economic and Financial Partnership: Free Trade without Free Politics?

The impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the economic and financial partnership is mixed. On the one hand, all association agreements have been signed, with the exception of Syria's. This is a success for bilateral relations between the EU and the Mediterranean partner countries. The Association Agreement with Israel entered into force in June 2000.<sup>5</sup> The Interim Association Agreement with the Palestinian Authority was signed in February 1997<sup>6</sup>, but has never been implemented properly because of the strong dependence on the Israeli economy. In the long term, the Free Trade Zone will only function when the bilateral and the multilateral levels work harmoniously, and the southern Mediterranean partners conclude and implement intra-free trade agreements. The Agadir Group is the only serious attempt in this regard and is far from effective. One of the problems is that these kind of initiatives always start from the top and there is no follow up.

The lack of regional integration is partly related to the Middle East conflict, especially in the countries that are directly involved. Israel has the most developed economy in the region and could play the role of a motor for regional integration after the conflict is resolved. The hope that sub-regional economic cooperation between Israel and its neighbouring countries might promote better conditions for peace was disappointed. There has been some progress in certain sectors like energy or transport, but economic issues are generally an additional factor of conflict (the treatment of Palestinian workers in Israel or the water question are cases in point). The promotion of economic cooperation between the parties to the conflict may open political windows of opportunity. However, the focus cannot be on conferences and exchanges between experts; rather, the concrete improvement of the living conditions of the Palestinian population must become a reality. It should be made clearer that the EU provides financial funding only when terror is clearly rejected and the withdrawal of funding is a clear disadvantage.

Conditionality or the threat of economical sanctions is very problematic, as the debate on the suspension of the association agreement with Israel showed when the Sharon government started his aggressive course in the Palestinian territories and was criticised internationally for violating international law and human rights. The principle of political conditionality has not really been used to date for different political reasons. One is the need for a consensus among EU Member states on the effectiveness of this

4. Mansour, Camille : The impact of 11 September on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In : *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 2, Winter 2002, p.5-18.

5. It includes the creation of a Free Trade Zone between the EU and Israel, scientific and technological cooperation, as well as political dialogue. Suspension can be initiated unilaterally, especially in the case of violation of human rights and democratic principles.

6. The Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade and cooperation was signed in Brussels on 24 February 1997 between the European Community and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.



instrument. However, awareness is growing in most Mediterranean partner countries that the Middle East conflict can no longer serve as an eternal excuse for the absence of economic reforms. Facilitating custom procedures for foreign investors or reducing the number of pupils in a classroom has nothing to do with the Middle East conflict.

The central problems remain: too few exports, too little foreign investment, and not enough regional integration. The inherent conservatism of the administrations, economic actors and of the majority of societies hinders many economic reforms. The view that the state is in charge for all economic issues predominates. Finally, from the EU perspective, it is to be hoped that the implementation of the Neighbourhood Policy will push forward the implementation of the association agreements.

The overall objectives of the third basket – bringing together the societies of the Euro-Mediterranean partner countries to improve mutual knowledge and combat stereotypes – have been essayed through numerous programmes in different domains such as environment or cultural cooperation. The argument here is that cooperation in some fields indicates that this basket has gained relevance, more because of September 11, 2001 and less because of regional crises. One achievement is that cultural cooperation is considered an essential part of the relations between the 27 Euro-Mediterranean Partner countries. Programmes such as Euro-Med Heritage and Euro-Med Audiovisual count on the participation of actors from the countries involved in the Middle East conflict. However, even in the cultural field cooperation has become more difficult since the radicalisation of the situation in the Palestinian territories, the growing number of suicide attacks and the shift in Israeli policy. The Israeli army destroyed some cultural activities in the Palestinian territories funded by the EU, and Palestinian artists, intellectuals or journalists cannot travel easily to participate in cultural cooperation projects.

The creation of the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue of Cultures in Alexandria, which is the most important and most debated initiative taking place at the moment within the cultural basket, must be seen as a response to the changed international context since September 11, 2001. Even if the idea for this kind of initiative has been around for some time, following the example of the Europe-Asia-Foundation, cultural and religious dialogue has become an issue of high foreign policy since September 11, 2001. The need for and the urgency of intercultural dialogue is evident. The aim of the Lindh Foundation is to reach a deeper and improved relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims, change attitudes and gain ground on extremist ideas.

Finally, September 11, 2001 and the growing number of terrorist attacks worldwide from Casablanca to Madrid, the Iraq war, and the growing number of suicide attacks in Israel have also raised the profile of Islamist terrorism in the EMP. Once a point among many in the Barcelona Declaration with no real initiative or programme for cooperation or any real discussion on the definitions and origins of terrorism and how to deal with it, the situation is now changed. The issue of terrorism is on the international agenda and there is reflection on the third basket of the EMP and how its instruments can be used efficiently to deal with fundamentalist terrorism.

The third basket takes on board the main conclusions of the Arab Human Development Report. Some proposed measures are implemented, some not, and some await development. The TEMPUS MEDA programme, for instance, has been enlarged to the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries. Regional programmes for women, migration or cultural issues like the performing arts have never seen the light of day. The democracy and human rights programmes have met with difficulties. A continuous process of internal reform blocks the Euro-Med Civil Forum. If the EU underlines its own commitment and strength in democratisation capabilities, institution building, civil society promotion, educational matters, and in integrating women in contrast with the US, many more activities and long-term projects with a structuring effect would be possible.

The Middle East conflict reveals the differences in the foreign policy approaches of EU Member states. This has always been so. At the same time, the Europeanisation of EU foreign policy is taking place and the Middle East conflict has forced the EU to react and formulate common positions on various occasions. The Council of the EU

## Impact on the Cultural and Social Partnership: Gaining Ground on Extremism



and its services, the High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana and the Special Representative to the Middle East Peace Process Marc Otte mainly deal with the conflict. The EMP is often regarded as a EU Commission project, an example of best practice through an independent and relatively autonomous European foreign policy originating from Brussels rather than the different national foreign offices. The Common Strategy of the European Council of 19 June 2000 on the Mediterranean region can be seen as a contrary development, insofar as reaffirming the principles and objectives of the EMP and yet linking them more strongly with Middle East peace, the EMP seemed to have shifted partly from the domain of the Commission to the Council.

This evolution is also related to progress with the instruments and competences of the CFSP after the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam and the 2003 Treaty of Nice. While the Commission still handles the core parts of the EMP (the association agreements), EMP politics are partly in the hands of the Council. This is the case for Middle East conflict questions in the EMP. However, EU Commissioner Chris Patten, rather than the Council, dealt with the entire debate on the misuse of European funds by the Palestinian Authority – a highly political issue. EMP critics aside, it can be argued that it is a sophisticated European foreign policy initiative and a promising step towards a common European foreign policy emanating from Brussels and not from national headquarters.

The intra-European debacle in the context of the Iraq war was one of the biggest setbacks suffered by CFSP, but it also provoked an intense debate on the future of European foreign policy, especially towards the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Various concepts were debated, ranging from a “Europe of different speeds”, a “German-French Avant-garde”, to “Alliances à la carte”, a “Directory” of France, Germany and Great Britain, all possible decision centres for a 25 member EU. These kinds of concepts are criticised by the smaller and new member states and from the point of view of EU institutions they entail a relapse into the logic of nation states rather than ‘communitarisation’. At the same time, thanks to the Iraq war and the changes in US foreign policy there has been a new push for the Europeanisation of CFSP, particularly where the Arab world is concerned. CFSP has become a point of reference for the foreign policies of EU member states. The crisis in the Middle East has also led to progress in the approach of Brussels. On the one hand, the Security Strategy of Javier Solana offers an answer to newly defined threats, while the Wider Europe Neighbourhood Policy defines relations with neighbouring states after EU enlargement, and the Strategic Partnership between the EU and the Mediterranean and the Middle East as the basis for an overall approach to the region.

The Strategic Partnership is the European version of the GMEI. The EU thereby defines its relations to the Arab world on the basis of already existing agreements and frameworks of cooperation like the Barcelona Process and the agreements with the GCC, intensifying relations with all the countries of the region. The proposals for a new initiative for the Mediterranean and the Middle East announced by German Foreign Minister Fischer at the Security Conference in Munich in February 2004 were partly integrated into the strategic partnership. In European capitals it is agreed that the role of the EU in the Middle East should have a long-term perspective and follow EMP aims or at least take inspiration from them.

The EU today is still not equipped to react quickly and efficiently to political crisis or conflicts. The continuous reform of CFSP instruments and the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) should generate greater political weight. For the moment, the trump of the EU is its multilateral approach. This is also true where the Middle East conflict is concerned, in which numerous parties, states and nongovernmental actors are involved. The EU can prove its mediation skills and its potential for institution building with this conflict. It has the economic means to support the development of the region: positive conditionality rather than sanctions to motivate the parties in conflict. It can exert political and economic pressure, albeit in agreement with the Quartet members (the US, the UN and Russia). The EU has at least one advantage: its image in the Arab world is that of a weak but more neutral

actor. The US is often criticised in the Arab world for its partiality and support for Israel. Since the war in Iraq and Abu Ghraib in particular, the loss of trust in the US has become even stronger. Thus, Europe is in a good position to play the role of a qualified mediator in support of democratisation processes in the region. However, while Europe seems to be a more credible international player in the Arab world than the US, there is no reason for European vanity or moral superiority.

The consequences of EU enlargement on relations between the Middle East conflict and the EMP are unclear. As the Iraq crisis has shown, the new eastern Member States have somewhat different foreign policy priorities and this may cause a shift in the Middle Eastern policy of the EU. Relations between Poland and Israel are very intense, for example, and since Israel does not feel supported by the core European powers is looking for new strategic partners in the enlarged EU. As Israeli Ambassador in Warsaw David Peleg commented: "We hope that this access will cause a change in the attitudes within the EU towards Israel. If the relation of the EU to us would be as the Polish relations to Israel, this would be very good."<sup>7</sup> EU policy towards the Middle East conflict will remain as neutral as possible, but future declarations and actions may become even more general and thus weaker.

Recent developments in US foreign policy in the Middle East have pushed the EU to respond and counterbalance certain initiatives. Even if the US is the first world power from a military, economical, technological and cultural point of view, it cannot impose its will on its allies. The margin for action is limited and cooperation with allies is necessary. The tendency towards militarisation and unilateral action may be mitigated by a EU foreign policy. The EU is under a lot of pressure given the tense situation caused by the consequences of enlargement and the external pressure caused by the need to react to a changing world.

The US and Europe have been active in the Middle East for decades. Traditionally, the US has had the key role in mediating the Middle East peace process; Europeans have played a secondary role, developing concepts, supporting diplomatic initiatives and providing financial support. EMP was initially not received with enthusiasm by the US, which feared that the Europeans would interfere in Middle East negotiations and contradict American initiatives in the Mediterranean. The US was kept out of the Barcelona Process explicitly and was not accepted as an observer so that it would be a genuinely multilateral European project. The EMP was criticised by US diplomats and watched carefully, but at the same time it was considered irrelevant and its aims and work were not known. This has changed since September 11, 2001 and the new interest of the Bush administration in the region. Indeed, it can be said that the EMP was a source of inspiration for the GMEI, since it highlights the importance of education and the participation of civil society in democratisation processes. At the same time, as an indirect consequence of the political situation in the Middle East, Europe and the US are working closer now in fighting terror and in justice and home affairs. Under the third pillar of the EU, member states have adopted a common definition of terrorism, a European arrest warrant, created Eurojust and strengthened Europol. These measures render the EU more credible as a partner in this realm. Judicial cooperation with the US has improved progressively.<sup>8</sup> However, the divergence between Europe and the US over world governance is growing. The difference is a function of the different historical and moral experience of the two since the end of the Second World War and consists of three major issues: the terrorist threat, the democratisation of the Arab world and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Pessimists predict that this divergence could destroy the structure of the 'Western world' in the near future.<sup>9</sup> However, at least where the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is concerned there has been some rapprochement within the framework of US-EU summits and the Quartet.

Conventional wisdom had it that only the US could play a role in mediation, with the EU guaranteeing the implementation of negotiated agreements. However, the failure of Camp David II showed that even the US couldn't do everything. The Palestinians felt they were negotiating with an Israeli-American delegation. The EU as a neutral mediator would be useful in this context, although this means complementing efforts as in the framework of the CFSP trans-Atlantic dialogue or the Quartet, and not competing. The European role in the Middle East conflict is still limited but it is growing. The diplomatic presence and initiatives of Javier Solana and Marc Otte illustrate this. Apart from the initiatives undertaken within the framework of CSFP, the Barcelona Process

## Impact of the Middle East Conflict on the EU-US Relationship in the Mediterranean

7. Reiter, Natalia: „Die verstehen uns“, In der neuen EU verlässt sich Israel auf Polen. In: Die Zeit, Nr. 12, S. 9.

8. Dubois, Dorine: The attacks of 11 September : EU-US cooperation against terrorism in the field of Justice and Home Affairs. In: European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol.7, no.3, Autumn 2002, p.317-335.

9. De Munk, Jean: La division de l'Occident. In: Revue nouvelle. Vol. 115, no. 9, September 2002, p.13-27.

## II. The Impact of the Iraq War on the Barcelona Process “Barcelona Light” for the Countries to the East of Jordan?

has become an important forum for the partners to discuss the Middle East conflict informally and discuss common positions before they become official. In 1999, for example, at the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers Conference, the Middle East conflict was discussed, creating the basis for the Berlin Declaration of 1999 when the EU in contrast with the US, agreed to the principle of a two-state-solution and the will to recognise a Palestinian State from the moment of its declaration. One of the central differences between the US and the European approach is the form and support for the Palestinians, with the EU largely supporting the Palestinian Authority from the outset along with Israel and thus trying to adopt a more balanced course.

The impact of the Iraq war on the Barcelona Process is indirect. Clearly, war constituted a great setback for CFSP, especially leading up to the war. The main effect was that it gave the impression of a complete absence of a common European policy. For Arab states and societies, only France and Germany acted credibly by rejecting military intervention and insisting on the necessity of a Security Council resolution. Iraq was interpreted as an urgent regional crisis that had to be solved quickly, while the more important Middle East conflict was ignored. Both conflicts provoke the rage of Arab populations against “the West”, especially the US. Thus, from the southern point of view, the EMP becomes more attractive. Europe gained much from the Iraq war in the sense of improving its image in the Arab world, as it is regarded as geographically and culturally closer and morally more credible than the US. Europe should not spoil this little credit surplus.

The Iraq war was an essential factor that led to the formulation of the EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, which aims to revive political dialogue between the EU and the Arab World. Where non-proliferation is concerned, the aim is to intensify dialogue within the political chapter of the Barcelona Process to implement relevant agreements and on the export/end use control policies. Instruments in the framework of the Barcelona Process might now be extended or copied for EU relations with Iraq, such as confidence building measures like notification of exercises or exchanges of military observers.

The EU has never had formal relations with Iraq. The long-term objective consists now to develop relations similar to those it has with most of Arab states. This means that the EU seeks to become the biggest trading partner and donor of development assistance. Until June 2004 the European Commission had already committed 305 million Euros for humanitarian aid and reconstruction.<sup>10</sup> In June 2004 the European Commission presented a proposal for a new framework for EU relations with Iraq.<sup>11</sup> The medium term objectives are: the development of a stable and democratic Iraq, the establishment of an open market economy and the economic and political integration of Iraq in the region and in the international system.

The experience of the Barcelona Process can serve as a basis for the development of relations with Iraq, particularly assistance for democratisation, human rights and rule of law, the creation of a regional framework and lending mechanisms by the European Investment Bank. Where the integration of civil society actors in the reconstruction process in Iraq is concerned, the Barcelona process is also valuable. As stated in the Framework for Engagement, EU missions will be asked to “launch informal dialogue with broader Iraqi civil society, including NGOs, religious groupings, trade unions, and nascent political parties”. Similar target groups have been active in the Barcelona Process. As in the case of the Palestinian territories the EU could also play a role supporting elections in Iraq, institution building, and mentoring police and civilian crises management.

Barcelona Process experiences are also useful where the Medium Term objective of creating a regional framework is concerned, given its experience with promoting cooperation in sectors such as energy, transport, environment, science and technology, education, dialogue of cultures and support for civil society. The aim is to promote regional cooperation between Iraq and its neighbours. “The EU could also consider ways in which Iraq can be associated with the EU dialogue with other partners in the region, particularly with those East of Jordan.”<sup>12</sup> In the long term a “Barcelona-Light” can be established for Iraq and the GCC countries<sup>13</sup>, perhaps even for Yemen and Iran. The current political situation puts such plans on the back burner, and the question remains about how to reintegrate Iran into the Arab world

10. Commission statement on the transfer of power in Iraq, IP/04/812, Brussels, 28 June 2004.

11. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: The European Union and Iraq, A Framework for Engagement. COM (2004) 417 final, Brussels 9.6.2004.

12. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: The European Union and Iraq, A Framework for Engagement. COM (2004) 417 final, Brussels 9.6.2004, p. 10.

13. Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi-Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

and when to integrate Turkey into the EU. A bilateral agreement between the EU and Iraq, following the example of the comprehensive association agreements concluded within the Barcelona Process, is not appropriate for the time being. Instead, a trade and cooperation agreement, similar to those in place with the GCC countries or with Yemen is more appropriate. Even this will be difficult to achieve over the next few years, given the unstable situation in Iraq and the negative experiences of the past with any regional economic or political cooperation system.

A more indirect consequence is that Libya, which is a potential future member of the EMP, is worried that it could become a target of US military force. Muammar al-Gaddafi has altered his political course recently, adopting a more moderate position. An observer to the EMP since its beginning, full membership is likely as the Gaddafi visit to Brussels would seem to indicate. The question remains, however, about whether the EU gives up certain principles too quickly, and what European interests in better relations with Libya are. Libya could play a motor role in the regional economic integration of the Maghrib members of the EMP. The uncertainty about the future of oil from Iraq has also generated debate in Europe about renewable energy and other energy providers, which explains the recent rapprochement between the EU and Libya.

Aside from the energy issue, the economic chapter of the EMP and the implementation of the Association Agreements were not directly affected. While some observers propose to create a Free Trade Zone between Iraq and its neighbours, following the example of the EMP, others suggest simply including Iraq in the EMP in the long term. Would this be in the interest of the other Arab Members of the EMP, or would it constitute a step backwards for the whole process? It was the Iraq war that indirectly put Barcelona Process in a privileged position. Compared with the difficulty of future challenges in Iraq and in the “countries east of Jordan”, EU relations with its Mediterranean neighbours are geographically, politically and economically closer, familiar, and more integrated. In the framework of the EMP, bilateral and regional relations have been intensified and strengthened over the last nine years, while relations between the EU and Iraq and other countries “east of Jordan” are still incipient.

Now, what role can the EU play in Iraq? The problem with the EU support for reconstruction is the same as for the other donors like the UN. There are projects and funding but the security situation is catastrophic. There is a growing gap between available instruments and the security situation. On the one hand, there are Western organisations that work in the highly protected “green zone” next to the former palaces of Saddam Hussein, and on the other, in the “red zone”, the daily life of the Iraqis is insecure as attempts are made to make progress with real political and social issues.<sup>14</sup> A new reflection process on European capabilities has come to life because of these experiences. But as the issue of the reintroduction of the death penalty by the newly established Iraqi government shows, Europe’s capabilities are limited.

Nevertheless, the American approach of transferring western, liberal models of democracy to Iraq does not work either, especially given the historical background of artificially founded and multi-ethnic states now falling apart. Western, liberal models do not pay attention to cultural identities, religion and tradition and provoke the resistance of the population. Since the Iraqis do not trust the US any more, Europe could play the role of a mediator with the UN, in order to foster a modernisation process in Iraq.

Because of the war in Iraq – experienced by the Arab neighbouring societies as an important caesura – a new widespread reflection is in place about the regime legitimacy. The issue of the democratisation and the related issues of education and the role of the civil society have become big topics. These are all part of EMP, but probably not visibly enough to a wider public and still not efficiently enough implemented. There is a growing awareness that Arab societies do not need or want reforms from outside but that they must come from within. However, opinions differ on the question of how to implement reforms from within. Some say that pressure from outside is necessary and other reject this completely.

A further consequence of the war in Iraq was a revival of the debate on the “clash of civilisations”, the rise of Islamist terrorist networks, the role of religion and the difficult and complex dialogue between “the West” and “the Arab world”. Crusade slogans, mostly pronounced by President Bush in response to Al Qaeda or radical groups in Iraq responsible for criminal acts like hijacking and murdering of foreigners, reheated the political atmosphere. There is indeed a growing gap between the Arab-Islamic world and “the West”, mainly the United States. The culturalisation of the so-

14. Analysis presented by Mary Kaldor at a Conference on European Security and Global Perspectives, organised by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Berlin, 18.5.2005.

called “Fight against Terrorism” has provoked a strong emotional response to the Iraq conflict and the Middle East conflict.

Finally, because of the pillage of the precious Iraqi cultural heritage during the war, the importance of cultural heritage has gained more attention in the international media and among the general public. This may have a spill over effect on cultural heritage protection in other countries of the region, and create more awareness. At least, this can be seen again as a positive validation of the cultural activities of the third basket of the EMP, such as the regional Euro-Med Heritage programme that works to protect the material and immaterial cultural heritage of the Mediterranean.

## Conclusion

The Barcelona Process is a modest winner in the context of a worsening Israeli-Palestinian conflict and of crisis in Iraq. Both led to renewed debate of the Barcelona approach partly as a pattern for new policies, partly as a concept to be extended to other countries. The parallel approach of the three baskets should be maintained and intensified. Regional cooperation must be improved, and complement the Barcelona Process rather than undermine or replace it. It is necessary to reflect on how the EMP might be separated further from the Middle East peace process. From a southern perspective, the EMP is similar to US initiatives for the Arab world, but is much more appreciated because it proposes reform from within. The fact that it was negotiated and not imposed and that it is based on a sense of partnership are also positive. In the current situation, many Arab governments feel more comfortable with the Europeans than with the US. One reason for this is that Europeans are less demanding. The belief of the Arab partners that the EMP is a long-term advantage has been influenced positively by both regional conflicts. At the same time, the decision making process for Europeans becomes easier, in contrast with US policy in the region.

A more indirect consequence of developments in Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is that the EU seems to open for a dialogue with moderate Islamists. The dialogue with representatives of political Islam is necessary and unavoidable. By moderate Islamists are understood parties or persons like the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, who represents a reform policy and gather a political and social majority behind them. The dialogue between Europe and the Arab governments must be maintained, but it is even more important that the latter enter into a dialogue with their own societies. That is a task for Europe or ‘the West’: apply pressure to make this happen. Dialogue between Europe and Arab governments only gains the latter time.

The question is also whether this is a good moment to adopt global concepts for the region. It may be better to wait until the situation in Iraq has calmed down. The reactions of Europeans to the GMEI and at the G8 Summit were rather reticent. Does this signal a return to more pragmatic bilateral relations between single European countries or the EU and single countries in the Mediterranean and the Middle East? Or should the EU, despite its internal preoccupations, revise its relations with the Arab World and redefine its demands? The US has created more political difficulties for the region, particularly through its support for certain groups and states and by the war in Iraq. It should engage more in the democratisation processes and in anti-terrorist measures than in the use of military force. The US demand for renewed partnership with the EU, especially in the domain of the democratisation, institution building and education, became evident during the G8 meeting at Sea Island. Europe can respond in a sophisticated way to the Mediterranean and Middle East. The topics on the agenda are the relation between Islam and terrorism, the nature of Islamic networks like Al Qaeda and how to cope with them, different European and American strategies in the Mediterranean, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the reception of terrorist attacks in the Arab societies and in Europe, and finally, the future of the Euro-Mediterranean relations.

## Documents

- Common Strategy of the European Council of 19<sup>th</sup> June 2000 on the Mediterranean region, (2000/458/CFSP). In: Official Journal of the European Communities, 22.7.2000, L183/5-10.
- Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours. COM (2003) 104 final, Brussels 11.3.2003.
- Interim Report on an EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East. In: Euromed Report, Issue No. 73, 23 March 2004.
- Presidency Conclusions of the Euro-Mediterranean Mid-Term Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Dublin 5-6- May 2004. In: Euromed Report No. 76+, revised version, 28.5.2004.
- Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: The European Union and Iraq, A Framework for Engagement. COM (2004) 417 final, Brussels 9.6.2004.
- Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council 17 and 18 June 2004. In: Euromed Report, Issue No. 77, 21 June 2004.
- Final Report on the EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East. In: Euromed Report, Issue No. 87, 23 June 2004.
- Commission statement on the transfer of power in Iraq, IP/04/812, Brussels, 28 June 2004.

## References

- Allen, David/Pijpers, Alfred (ed.): European Foreign Policy-Making and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The Hague/Boston/Lancaster 1984: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Czempiel, Ernst-Otto: Weltpolitik im Umbruch: die Pax americana, der Terrorismus und die Zukunft der internationalen Beziehungen. München 2002: Beck.
- Dieckhoff, Alain: The European Union and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In: Hanelt, Christian-Peter/Neugart, Felix/Peitz, Matthias (ed.): Europe's Emerging Foreign Policy and the Middle Eastern Challenge. München/Gütersloh 2002, p. 147-160.
- Doran, Michael Scott : Palestine, Iraq, and American strategy. In : Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, no. 4, January/February 2003, p.19-33.
- Droz-Vincent, Philippe : Où va la politique étrangère américaine ? Afghanistan, Proche-Orient, Irak. In : Esprit No. 5, No. 284, Mai 2002, p.46-68.
- Dubois, Dorine : The attacks of 11 September : EU-US cooperation against terrorism in the field of Justice and Home Affairs. In: European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol.7, no.3, Autumn 2002, p.317-335.
- Gad, Emad: The EU and the Middle East: An Egyptian View. In: Perceptions, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. VIII, No. 2, June-August 2003, p.17-38.
- Gnesotto, Nicole : L'union européenne entre terrorisme et élargissement. In : Critique internationale, No.17, October 2002, p.6-15.
- Ibrahim, Ferhad: Die politischen Kräfte im Irak nach dem Regimewechsel. In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament, B 24-25, 10. Juni 2003, S. 45-55.
- Indyk, Martin : Back to the bazaar. In: Foreign Affairs, Vol.81, No. 1, January/February 2002, p.75-88.
- Klinkenberg, Michael F.: Die Rolle der EU im Nahost-Friedensprozess. Münster/Hamburg/London 2002.
- Mansour, Camille : The impact of 11 September on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2, Winter 2002, p.5-18.

- Moreau Defarges, Philippe : Unilatéralisme, multilatéralisme. In: Défense nationale, Year 58, No.3, March 2002, p.140-146.
- De Munk, Jean : La division de l'Occident. In : Revue nouvelle. Vol. 115, no. 9, September 2002, p.13-27.
- Neugart, Felix/Luciani, Giacomo : Towards a European Strategy for Iraq. CAP Policy Paper, Bertelsmann Foundation, March 2003.
- Nye, Joseph S.: Limits of American power. In: Political Science Quarterly, Vol.117, No. 4, Winter 2002/2003, p.545-559.
- Ortega, Martin: Some comments on the European Union's Mediterranean Policy. In: Perceptions, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. VIII, No. 2, June-August 2003, p. 89-110.
- Owen, Roger: State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East. 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition. London 2004: Routledge.
- Roberson, B.A. (ed.): The Middle East and Europe, the power deficit. New York 1998.
- Schäfer, Isabel: Die Europäische Union und der Nahostkonflikt. In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B20/2004, 10.5.2004, S. 46-54.
- Steinbach, Udo: Amerikas Scheitern im Irak. Demokratisierung als historischer Prozess. In: Internationale Politik, Year 59, Mai 2004, No.5, p.113-118.



1. Volker Perthes, *Germany and the EuroMediterranean Partnership: Gradually Becoming a Mediterranean State*, February 1998. (Available also in French).
2. May Chartouni-Dubarry, *Les processus de transition politique au Proche-Orient*, septembre 1998.
3. Alfred Tovias, *Israel and the Barcelona Process*, October 1998.
4. George Joffé, *Foreign Investment and the Rule of Law*, March 1999.
5. Azzam Mahjoub et Hafeedh Zaafrane, *La zone de libre-échange euro-méditerranéenne*, mars 1999.
6. Gema Martin Muñoz, *Réforme politique et changements sociaux : l'exemple des pays du Maghreb*, avril 1999.
7. Roberto Aliboni, *Building Blocks for the Euro-Med Charter on Peace and Stability*, January 2000. (Available also in French)
8. M. Fatih Tayfur, *Turkish Perceptions of the Mediterranean*, March 2000.
9. George Joffé, *International Implications of Domestic Security*, April 2000.
10. Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, *La politique de visas dans l'espace euro-méditerranéen*, avril 2000.
11. Elvira Sánchez Mateos, *The Antipersonnel Landmines Issue in the Mediterranean*, April 2000.
12. May Chartouni-Dubarry, *Complementarity between the European Union and the United States in the Middle East Peace Process: Implications for the EMP*, April 2000. (Available also in French)
13. Álvaro de Vasconcelos, *Intégration et coopération sous-régionale en Méditerranée*, avril 2000.
14. Ayman Abdel Nour, *Syrian Views of an Association Agreement with the European Union*, December 2001.
15. Ulrike Julia Reinhardt, *Civil Society Co-operation in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: From Declarations to Practice*, May 2002.
16. IEEI/CIDOB/GERM, *European Defence - Perceptions and Realities*, Working Group III First Year Report, June 2002.
17. IAI/AEI, *Security and Common Ground in the Euro-Med Partnership*, Working Group I First Year Report, June 2002.
18. MEDAC/JCSS, *Sub-Regional Cooperation within the EMP*, Working Group IV First Year Report, July 2002.
19. Erwan Lannon, *Parlements et société civile dans la sécurité euro-méditerranéenne*, novembre 2002.
20. Bichara Khader, *Eastern Enlargement and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: A Win-Win Game?*, February 2003.
21. Emily Landau and Tamar Malz, *Culture and Security Policy in Israel*, March 2003.
22. Luis Martinez, *La sécurité en Algérie et en Libye après le 11 septembre*, mai 2003.
23. Elvira Sánchez Mateos, *European Perceptions of Southern Countries' Security and Defence Issues - A Reflection on the European Press*, July 2003.
24. Niall Greene, *Corruption and the Challenge for Civil Society*, September 2003.

25. Ulrich Wurzel, *Why Investment in Civil Society is an Investment in Economic Development: The Case of the Southern Mediterranean*, October 2003.
26. Ludger Kühnhardt, *System-opening and Cooperative Transformation on the Greater Middle East. A New Trans-Atlantic Project and a Joint Euro-Atlantic-Arab Task*, November 2003.
27. Dorothee Schmid, *Linking Economic, Institutional and Political Reform: Conditionality within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, December 2003.
28. Thanos Dokos and Fatih Tayfur, *Greece and Turkey*, March 2004.
29. Volker Perthes (coord.), *Looking Ahead - Challenges for Middle East Politics and Research*, April 2004.
30. George Joffé, *Global Terrorism*, May 2004.
31. Roberto Aliboni, *Common Languages on Democracy in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, May 2004.
32. Erwan Lannon, *Le Traité constitutionnel et l'avenir de la politique méditerranéenne de l'UE élargie*, juin 2004.
33. Salah Abdul Shafi, *Civil Society and Political Elites in Palestine and the Role of International Donors: A Palestinian View*, July 2004.
34. Pedro Courela, *Civil Protection as a Euro-Mediterranean Project: the Case for Practical Co-operation*, August 2004.
35. Richard Gillespie, *The Sahara Conflict: Bilateralism or Sub-Regionalism?*, September 2004.
36. Dorothee Schmid, *Les institutions européennes dans le fonctionnement du PEM : de la répartition des compétences à la gestion dynamique du quotidien*, octobre 2004.
37. Hanaa Ebeid, *The Partnership in Southern Eyes: Reflections on the Discourse in the Egyptian Press*, October 2004.
38. Madalena Meyer-Resende, *The Impact of Eastern Enlargement on the Barcelona Process*, November 2004.
39. Betina Huber, *Governance, Civil Society and Security in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Lessons for a More Effective Partnership*, December 2004.

Ghassan Andoni, *The People-To-People Programmes. Peacemaking or Normalisation?*, January 2003.

Suhnaz Yilmaz, *The Role of Turkey in Euro-Mediterranean Security*, February 2003.

Philippe Moreau-Defarges, *Non-ingérence et souveraineté. La question de l'ingérence démocratique*, mars 2003.

Fred Tanner, Security Governance. *The Difficult Task of Security Democratisation in the Mediterranean*, May 2003.

Khalifa Chater, *Asymétrie et sécurité globale*, juin 2003.

Richard Gillespie & Richard Youngs, *Democracy and the EMP: European and Arab Perspectives*, December 2003.

Álvaro de Vasconcelos, *Launching the Euro-Mediterranean Security and Defence Dialogue*, January 2004.

Gamal Soltan, *Southern Mediterranean Perceptions and Proposals for Mediterranean Security*, February 2004.

Mustapha Benchenane, *Les Droits de l'Homme en Islam et en Occident*, mars 2004.

Ian Lesser, *The United States and Euro-Mediterranean Relations: Evolving Attitudes and Strategies*, July 2004.

Soli Özel, *Dancing to the End*, September 2004.

