

Greece and Turkey

– Thanos Dokos –
– Fatih Tayfur -

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Sub-regional Co-operation within the Euro-Mediterranean Process : The Greek/Turkish/Cyprus Security Complex

THANOS DOKOS

Introduction

Among the several negative and highly destabilising developments of the past few years in the Eastern Mediterranean, 2002 witnessed two very interesting and positive events in that region: the decision of the EU to accept the Republic of Cyprus [and Malta] as a new member, and the submission of a plan by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan for the resolution of the Cyprus problem.

The objective of this paper is to assess the impact of these two developments on sub-regional co-operation in the Mediterranean. The emphasis will be on the multilateral dimension, in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), although a reference to the trilateral Greek-Turkish-Cypriot relationship can hardly be avoided for the simple reason that any sub-regional benefit from Cyprus' admission to the EU is conditional upon the resolution of the Cyprus conflict.

Regional Co-operation in the Mediterranean

The end of the Cold War has lifted many of the constraints on regional co-operation in the Mediterranean. Although there are several initiatives under way, most have made only limited progress. The relative lack of success in efforts for regional co-operation in the Mediterranean can be attributed to the following factors:

- The Arab-Israeli conflict (and to a much lesser extent other conflicts such as the Greek-Turkish one), which frustrates efforts to explore co-operative arrangements in the political, security (Confidence and Security Building Measures - CSBM - and arms control) and economic fields;
- The overlapping of some of the rivalries and conflicts in the region with out-of-region antagonisms and conflicts, complicating even more the efforts for conflict resolution and co-operation);
- The lack of homogeneity between the North and the South. This refers to the realm of shared values, in contrast to the case of the CSCE/OSCE, where states had strong historical and cultural links despite their ideological differences. It also refers to great differences in the level of economic, political and social development, the size of states and their military capabilities;
- The relative lack of south-south relations;
- The absence of territorial contiguity between the two shores of the Mediterranean (at least by land), although this can be seen as an advantage in some cases;
- Colonial memories in the south of the Mediterranean.¹

Of course, not all of the above factors weigh equally. For the purposes of this paper, we will concentrate on the first factor, regional conflicts, and more specifically on the Greek-Turkish rivalry and the Cyprus problem.

¹ Thanos Dokos, "Sub-Regional Cooperation in the Mediterranean: Current Issues and Future Prospects" in Andrew Cottey (ed.), *Subregional Cooperation in the New Europe*, Institute for East-West Studies, London, Macmillan Press, 1999.

Greek Foreign Policy and the Mediterranean

Post-Cold War global structures are in a state of flux. Analysts and policy makers in small and medium sized countries are attempting to identify and predict trends as well as to recommend policies of adjustment to emerging global patterns. The challenge for Greece, a medium-size, democratic, Western, free enterprise-oriented, strategically located and *status quo* country, is to safeguard its territorial integrity and economic prosperity and to protect its democratic system and values.

Greece is located at the crossroads of three continents (Europe, Asia and Africa).² It is an integral part of the Balkans (where it is the only country that is a member of both the European Union and NATO) and is also in close proximity to the Black Sea and the oil-rich regions of the Middle East and the Caucasus. The Aegean Sea is an important shipping route, connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean, and a major transit route for the transportation of energy products (especially after the construction and operation of pipelines from Central Asia and the Trans Caucasus). Furthermore, Greece's position in the Eastern Mediterranean enhances its strategic importance. The Mediterranean region constitutes a crucial area of contact (a "fault line") in what is described by many analysts as the emerging great division of the world: the North and the South.

Despite being a Mediterranean country, Greece's involvement in the region has been quite limited. Because of other foreign policy priorities (the perceived threat from Turkey since the mid-1970s, as well as Balkan instability in the 1990s), its participation in activities and initiatives in the context of the EMP has been less than active (notwithstanding the fact that Greece has been strongly pro-European since its accession to the EU and has become more actively involved in the internal and external evolution of the Union since the mid-1990s). In fact, because of Athens' "obsession" and concern with the perceived Turkish threat she has, on a number of occasions, vetoed financial assistance to Turkey in the context of Euro-Mediterranean co-operation. As a result, assistance to other Mediterranean countries was also blocked, leading to temporary tension in Greece's relations with those countries.

However, in the late 1990s and early twenty first century, in the context of North-South relations, Greece is slowly becoming more actively involved in the shaping of EU Mediterranean policy on the basis of its traditionally good relations with Arab countries and its recent – if belated – improvement in relations with Israel. In this context, Greece has played a minor role in the peace process by hosting meetings between Israelis and Palestinians during the early years of the Oslo Peace Process.

A brief reference to Greek perspectives on the EMP is useful. There is a consensus among Greek policy- and opinion-makers that the EMP (also known as the Barcelona Process) is a commendable and necessary initiative that has created the framework for the future development of a zone of shared peace, prosperity and stability in the Mediterranean. As such, this effort deserves to be strongly supported. However, it is clear that it has made very limited progress towards meeting these goals, although this assessment depends on whether one had high expectations or not. Pragmatic observers, who understand that such an ambitious project in a region of high turbulence and instability such as the Mediterranean would be faced with many obstacles and should only be

² According to a recent RAND Corporation study, Greek strategic space is wide, encompassing Europe, Eurasia, the Middle East and the Mediterranean, as well as transatlantic relations. At the broadest level, the complex of trends we call globalisation will also affect Greece. The contemporary strategic environment is characterized by a series of functional issues that cut across traditional geographic lines, leading to a greater degree of regional interdependence (although this is true more for the Mediterranean than for the Balkans). It is also argued that the development of new lines of communication for energy and other non-energy infrastructure projects are shaping the strategic environment around Greece. Ian Lesser, "Greece's New Strategic Environment," in Lesser *et. al.*, *Greece's New Geopolitics* (Santa Monica: RAND-Kokkalis Foundation, 2001), p. 2.

seen as a long-term exercise, expected this rather mediocre performance and were not disappointed.

Recognising that the security of Europe and of the (southern) Mediterranean are closely linked and that Europe has a number of vital interests in the Mediterranean, the Greek security elite perceives the security basket of the EMP as a general framework for various confidence-building measures. The objective is two-fold: (a) to stabilise the South (and in conjunction with the economic basket) contain and eventually resolve problems such as migration; and (b) to reduce misperceptions and promote a substantive dialogue and a better understanding between the two shores of the Mediterranean and eventually develop a common security culture.

Unfortunately, the economic dimension of the Barcelona Process has been accorded low priority by the Greek government, which considers the Balkans as the main region for investment and economic activity for Greece. The same is true of the private sector, which had little support from the government.³

Greek-Turkish relations have considerably improved since August 1999. Overall, the two countries are much better off today in terms of bilateral relations than they were two or three years ago. Having said that, it should be emphasised that there has been no progress so far in resolving, or even addressing, the fundamental differences between the two countries (probably intentionally in recognition of the extreme difficulty of the task).⁴ This incremental rapprochement had a very low cost as neither side had to give up its vital interests. The next phase, however, will be a more difficult and complicated undertaking. Progress on the more substantive issues touching the core of bilateral problems ("high-politics") will be neither automatic nor easy. Although both sides, with the encouragement of the EU, NATO and the US, have appeared willing to discuss various Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) and conflict resolution proposals, at least in principle, there remains strong "inertial" opposition.

In December 2002, in the EU summit meeting in Copenhagen, Cyprus was admitted to the EU. At the same time, negotiations between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots over the proposed Annan Plan for the resolution of the Cyprus problem continued. If both communities were to join the EU together, the benefits for Turkey would be obvious and significant: it would boost its relationship with the EU, enhance its international prestige as a producer (not consumer) of security, strengthen the *détente* process with Greece, challenge the (erroneous) perception/allegation that the EU is a Christian club and, in a very symbolic development, make Turkish an official language of the EU.

However, negotiations under the good offices of the UN Secretary-General failed to produce an agreement in early March 2003. Although it is unlikely that the UN will maintain the recent level of involvement, it is possible that the Cyprus negotiations will resume at some point in 2004. Much will depend on Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot efforts for a settlement in the Cyprus problem and the Turkish reaction to the accession of the Republic of Cyprus (the Greek-Cypriot part of the island) to the EU in advance of a settlement. It is probably safe to assume, however, that the two sides –

³ Despite the rather limited volume of Greek trade and investment in the Mediterranean South, bilateral activities with selected countries are not insignificant. More specifically, as a result both of historical ties as well as opportunities created by the association agreements, Greece has notable trade relations with Egypt, Israel, Algeria (although in this case the main product is natural gas), Cyprus (until very recently a non-EU Barcelona partner), Turkey (with a considerable increase in trade and investment since 1999, although this has more to do with the Greek-Turkish rapprochement) and, to a lesser extent, with Lebanon. The Association of Greek Industrialists regularly participates in workshops and conferences in the framework of Euro-Mediterranean activities and occasionally organizes such meetings itself.

⁴ In January and February 2000, Foreign Ministers Papandreou and Cem visited each other's capitals and signed a total of nine bilateral agreements on "low politics" or "low confrontation" issues. These agreements concerned tourism, culture, the environment, trade and commerce, multilateral cooperation (especially with regard to the Black Sea and Southeast Europe regions), organized crime, illegal immigration, drug trafficking and terrorism. These "low-politics" agreements are perceived by both countries as a very positive development and constitute a good basis for building a solid bilateral relationship.

Greece and Turkey -- will try to avoid a spill over of their rivalry into various Mediterranean co-operation *fora*.⁵

EU Enlargement and the UN Plan for the Resolution of the Cyprus Conflict

I will present my argument in a schematic way, using four facts and four hypotheses.

- ❖ **Fact 1:** Cyprus (for the moment only the Greek part) will join the EU in 2004.
- ❖ **Fact 2:** The door is open for admission of both Cypriot communities to the EU, once the Cyprus problem is resolved.
- ❖ **Fact 3:** Both Turkish Cypriots and Turkish settlers strongly support the Annan plan, but Turkey itself is divided. The new government, which enjoys significant popularity, supported the plan, with some changes, whereas the "old establishment" (military, diplomats, a number of politicians) supported Mr. Denktash's stance of rejection, and finally prevailed. (The debate inside Turkey on this and other major issues, as well as the country's "Islamodemocrat" experiment, could have wider repercussions for the region and indeed the whole Islamic world).
- ❖ **Fact 4:** There is little prospect of any further enlargement of the EU in the Mediterranean (with the possible exception of Turkey and, perhaps, a special relationship with Israel — conditional, of course, on the resolution of the Palestinian problem).

- ❖ **Hypothesis 1:** EU accession by several eastern and central European countries, to be followed, perhaps, by Bulgaria and Romania, will limit the ability of the Union to offer significant economic assistance to the southern Mediterranean countries, especially if combined with a continuing economic recession in the European economies. Furthermore, some of the new EU members are expected to have rather limited interest in the Mediterranean.
- ❖ **Hypothesis 2:** The Annan Plan, with some minor changes, will prove to be functional and viable, if given a chance.
- ❖ **Hypothesis 3:** A united Cyprus will contribute to regional stability and sub-regional co-operation between Greece, Cyprus and Turkey.
- ❖ **Hypothesis 4:** A united Cyprus, as a member of the EU, will have rather limited impact on sub-regional co-operation in the context of the EMP.

Taken together, these facts and hypotheses suggest the following implications for sub-regional stability and sub-regional co-operation in the Mediterranean:

1. A positive outcome in the UN-brokered negotiations over the Cyprus problem would greatly strengthen the image of the UN as a credible mediator, especially when there is political support from the great powers. The proposed plan provides for the deployment of a multinational force to guarantee the agreement and protect the security of both communities. The deployment of a multinational force would constitute an interesting model for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict;
2. Some of the provisions of the Annan plan concerning the federal structure of the State of Cypriot might be applied to post-war Iraq;

⁵ See, for example, Thanos Dokos, "How to Establish Mutual Military and Political Reliability," in M. Aydin & K. Yfantis (eds.), *Escaping from the Security Dilemma in NATO's Southeastern Flank*, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003). See also, Thanos Dokos & Panayotis Tsakonas, "Continuity and Change in Greek-Turkish Relations," in C. Kollias & G. Gulnuk-Senesen (eds.), *Greece and Turkey in the 21st Century: Conflict or Cooperation. The Political Economy Perspective* (forthcoming).

3. Whatever the outcome of the negotiations (assuming that they will re-start sometime in 2004 given Turkey's ongoing effort to secure a date for the beginning of EU accession negotiations), Cyprus will not return to the Cold War of the previous 29 or 40 years, depending on whether one takes 1974 or 1963 as the beginning of serious trouble in the island;
4. The impact of enlargement on Euro-Mediterranean perceptions will be largely psychological. The accession of two new Mediterranean members (Malta and Cyprus) will bring the EU geographically closer to the Middle East, thereby strengthening Europe's Mediterranean "consciousness." On the other hand, and perhaps of even weightier consequence, EU enlargement will shift the Union's centre of gravity further east in Europe and further away from the Mediterranean. However, the Mediterranean (and the Greater Middle East) will almost certainly continue to include a number of trouble spots and be the "source" of problems for and challenges to European security. Therefore, the EU will continue to be interested in the Mediterranean. The uncertainty relates to the nature of this European "interest". Will it be in the context of the EMP or in the form of containment of threats?
5. Cyprus could constitute a regional basis for closer financial co-operation with the region (a sub-regional EU financial centre?). It may look more familiar and "friendly" to countries in the Mashriq than Brussels and the same may be true of Malta and the Maghrib.

The Impact on Broader Sub-Regional Co-operation

Looking at the level of sub-regional co-operation, the region needs to be clearly defined. The initial members of the sub-regional security complex⁶ under discussion would include Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. If the island of Cyprus remains divided, no substantial improvement in Greek-Turkish relations and sub-regional co-operation should be expected. But even if a new effort to settle the Cyprus problem (perhaps by 2004) encourages greater co-operation among Greece, Cyprus (EU members) and Turkey (an EU candidate country), that is unlikely to have a broader impact on North-South co-operation in the Mediterranean, if only because Turkey, though a Muslim, developing country, is not a typical Southern Mediterranean country. Therefore, the EMP will not be a central factor in any sub-regional co-operation initiative.

Looking at current levels of sub-regional co-operation beyond the Athens-Ankara-Nicosia triangle (or, more accurately, quadrangle), Greece has excellent relations with Egypt and Jordan, improving relations with Turkey, and very good relations with Israel and Syria. Turkey has very close ties with Israel, good relations with Egypt, and improving relations with Syria (and Greece). But Egypt and Syria will not co-operate with Israel, Jordan is reluctant to do so publicly, and Lebanon is following Syria's lead. There are, therefore, various combinations of bilateral co-operation, but very little if any real sub-regional Co-operation.

Various schemes of variable geometry in sub-regional co-operation have been suggested. However, the involvement of Syria, Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon may become possible only after the resolution of the Palestinian problem. Unless the problem is solved, there cannot be any substantial co-operation.

Turkish-Israeli co-operation has been a favourite topic of debate and speculation in various parts of the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond. So far, this co-operation has been an additional obstacle to wider regional co-operation. Lately, both Israel and Turkey have been trying to downplay the significance of their co-operation. Israel has also been trying to upgrade its relations with Greece and Cyprus and, perhaps also with Egypt via this indirect route. Although some analysts have

⁶ Barry Buzan defines a 'regional security complex' – an empirical phenomenon with historical and geopolitical roots – as a group of states whose chief security concerns are so closely linked and interwoven that the problems of national security they are faced with cannot be examined separately, country by country. Buzan emphasises the interdependence created by competition and common interests, the elements of enmity and amity. Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear* (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1983), p. 190.

suggested that this system of bilateral relationships could be eventually transformed into a process of wider sub-regional co-operation, this is highly unlikely in the short-term and uncertain in the medium and long-term.

Some Concluding Remarks

While a few analysts claim that a regional security complex is emerging, the great majority argues that the region is highly heterogeneous and multi-fragmented.⁷ At a minimum, two regional sub-systems can be identified: the Eastern Mediterranean (Mashriq), with predominantly “hard” security problems, and the Western Mediterranean (Maghrib), with “soft” security problems. Within each sub-system, one could identify other smaller sub-regional groupings.

Currently there is very limited interdependence in the region and this is not expected to change in the short and probably medium-term. “Fragmegration” (a term used by Stephen Calleya to describe integration in the North and fragmentation in the South) will continue to be the main characteristic of the Mediterranean region, as far as regional co-operation is concerned.⁸

Regarding Greek-Turkish relations, although it took the two countries decades to develop this highly adversarial relationship and one should be patient about a substantial improvement, the question has to be asked whether it is possible for Greece, Turkey and Cyprus to become a moving force for regional co-operation instead of a source of conflict. Although this author finds little reason for optimism, at least in the near future, this might be a realistic medium- to long-term objective.

Regarding the Cyprus problem, negotiations under the good offices of the UN Secretary-General failed to produce an agreement in early March 2003. In fact, negotiations have been discontinued, although the decision of Denktash to allow the free movement – under certain conditions — of people from the two communities created a new dynamic on the island with consequences that is still unclear. At the same time, there is pressure on Turkey to achieve progress on the Cyprus issue in view of the May 2004 accession of the island (even without a solution) and the December 2004 decision on whether to give Turkey a date for the beginning of accession negotiations.

Whatever the outcome of conflict resolution efforts, however, it is probably safe to assume that the two sides – Greece and Turkey — will try to avoid a spill over of their rivalry into various Mediterranean co-operation *fora*. In the context of sub-regional co-operation, the small size of Cyprus means an equally small impact (negative or positive) despite its key geographic position. More specifically, the Cyprus problem can impede sub-regional Co-operation efforts, because tension in Cyprus makes sub-regional co-operation becomes much more difficult, if not impossible. But a resolution of the problem only removes an obstacle; it does not push co-operation forward. In other words, resolution of the problem may be necessary but is hardly sufficient.

⁷ According to Roberto Menotti, “The Mediterranean region is not unitary, let alone cohesive. This is true from the political, economic and cultural points of view. The Mediterranean basin comprises a large number of national actors belonging to various sub-regional complexes, linked by a series of interacting rivalries, animosities and highly competitive relationships. Of course, alignments and alliances are also present and sometimes well established. In other words, the basin is practically a patchwork of sub-regional complexes showing little coherence”. Roberto Menotti, *NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative: Italian Positions, Interests, Perceptions, and the Implications for Italy-U.S. Relations*, Final Report, NATO Individual Research Fellowship 1997-1999, p. 25.

⁸ However, it should be kept in mind that the Mediterranean region is not a vacuum with regard to multilateral or bilateral commitments in the fields of arms control and CSBMs. Security regimes, either in operation or as agreed blueprints, cover various parts of the Mediterranean area. Fred Tanner, “The Euro-Mediterranean Security Partnership: Prospects for Conventional Arms Limitations and Confidence-Building”. EuroMeSCO Working Group on Confidence-Building, Conflict Prevention and Arms Control (Rome: July 1997), p. 12.

As a result of the current (eight Eastern and Central European countries) and perhaps future (Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Western Balkans) rounds of EU enlargement, the linkage and level of involvement of these new and prospective members of the EU to the EMP needs to be addressed. In addition to the institutionalised participation of some of them as full members of the EU, should there be an effort to include in the EMP other non-EU countries of the Balkans and the Black Sea region?⁹

Greece believes that the benefits for sub-regional co-operation through the opening of new channels of communication between these geographically neighbouring but geo-politically rather distant regions would be obvious and potentially significant. Furthermore, there are similarities, but also significant differences, between the Balkans/South East Europe (SEE) and the Mediterranean. Both regions are going through a very difficult and painful period of political, economic and social transition, trying to adapt to new global realities and to deal with the consequences of globalisation. In addition, there are lessons to be learned from recent conflicts in the Balkans. Although it has often been negative, the SEE countries' experience with crisis management and conflict resolution, post-conflict reconstruction and efforts for good governance could, under certain circumstances, be very useful for the Mediterranean countries, some of which are faced with similar problems and challenges. Of course, the sensitivities of these countries need to be taken into consideration; most of them consider (sub)regional co-operation with non-EU countries as an undesirable substitute for (eventual) EU membership.

A final word about the relevance of the EMP to relations in the South Eastern region of the Mediterranean: at least in the short-term, it appears to be rather limited. Because of the various problems and obstacles, the short- and medium-term focus should not be on grand schemes but rather on less controversial – and therefore more realistic and feasible – areas of co-operation: natural disasters, humanitarian assistance, and various forms of Track-II activities, including co-operation between NGOs, exchange of students and journalists, among others. Without significant progress in the Palestinian problem, co-operation will at best remain bilateral or trilateral, but not really multilateral/regional.

⁹ Indeed, the experience of BSEC (Black Sea Economics Cooperation) should be examined in the context of the Wider Europe concept.

The Turkey/Greece/Cyprus Security Complex and the EU Enlargement: Implications for the Euro-Mediterranean Relations

FATIH TAYFUR

Introduction

In the second half of the post-Cold war period, the relations between Turkey-Greece and "Cyprus" have become an ever more important issue in the agenda of the EU. An important reason for this development is the European Union (EU) decision to enlarge towards the Eastern Mediterranean and to incorporate "Cyprus" into its ranks. In this way, while "Cyprus" will become a state of the EU, the EU will become an Eastern Mediterranean actor proper. However, the enlargement towards Cyprus is not free from drawbacks because of the ongoing conflict between Turks and Greeks over the island and the Eastern Mediterranean region as a whole. Thus, the enlargement carries the risks of changing the established balance and further complicating relations between the Turks and Greeks in the region. Accordingly, the implications of the enlargement on the EU and EU Mediterranean policy, and on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process) in particular, have become important issues to examine. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to assess the impact that the Eastern Mediterranean enlargement of the EU will have on the EU and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) from the perspective of the Turks.

A "Historical" Review

A common response of the Turkish foreign policy elite to the linkage between Turkey-Greece-Cyprus relations and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership project is to say that the EMP has never had a visible impact on Turkish-Greek-Cypriot issues since its inception in 1995. Perhaps a major reason for this view of the Turkish foreign policy elite is that the EMP is perceived as being basically a project designed for the Western Mediterranean. Furthermore, neither the EMP nor the EU has developed a clear vision or policy towards the Eastern Mediterranean. However, some of the developments in the region and in Turkish-Greek-Cyprus relations in the same period have clearly influenced Turkish perceptions of the EMP.¹⁰

First of all, the Baku-Ceyhan oil and gas pipelines issue, about which the Turks are very sensitive because of its future political and economic benefits, is important for the Cyprus issue and EMP, because of the additional strategic importance of Baku-Ceyhan to the Eastern Mediterranean. The geographical location of Cyprus – only some 70 kilometres away from the Ceyhan oil pipeline terminal – gives island political authorities controlling power the activities in the vicinity of the Iskenderun Gulf in Southern Turkey. In other words, the transportation of Caspian oil and gas (energy) resources via Mediterranean, communication lines in the region (communication), some new wealth and power creating economic activities (probably in the domains of both production and finance), which are likely to be developed in the Eastern Mediterranean as derivatives of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, and providing a safe environment to all these activities (security) in the region will give Cypriot political authorities an important controlling power in the future.

In this context, Turkish policy-makers did not view the EU as an impartial and honest broker in the Mediterranean and this perception directly affected the Turkish vision of the Euro-Mediterranean

¹⁰ See M. Fatih Tayfur, "Turkish Perceptions of the Mediterranean" EuroMesCo Papers, No. 8, March 2000.

Partnership. In particular, the EU decision to start negotiations with "Cyprus" for full membership, and to exclude Turkey from the list of candidate countries during the EU Luxembourg summit in December 1997, strengthened the Turkish view that European interests clashed with vital Turkish interests and that the EU sided with Greece against Turkey in the Mediterranean. The Turks believed that the EU chose Greece as its strategic partner in the Eastern Mediterranean and was consequently sacrificing the friendship with Turkey, which had meant a lot to its security during the Cold War years. Accordingly, after the Luxembourg summit in 1997 the Turks suspended the political dialogue with the EU and let the Union go ahead as it deemed appropriate.

Moreover, in 1998, at the time of increasing debate over the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, the magnitude and significance of the Cyprus issue loomed suddenly on the Turkish agenda due to the deployment of the Russian S-300 missiles on the Island by the Greek Cypriot government. Further, in February 1999 the Turkish-Greek-Cyprus issue entered into a new phase after the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, the number one enemy of the Turks, was captured in possession of a Greek Cypriot passport, having received shelter in the Greek embassy in Kenya. This haven, given despite the proclamations of the Greek prime minister that Greece has no relations with PKK, was a serious blow to the already problematic relations between Greece and Turkey. The Turks, who had already experienced an all-out diplomatic war by Greece on Turkish interests in the EU and other international *fora*, were now convinced that the attitude of the Greek government was definitely unfriendly. This event, which followed the deployment of the S-300 missiles in South Cyprus in 1998, seriously affected the security perceptions of the Turkish foreign policy elite and increased the importance of the Eastern Mediterranean in its eyes. These developments also caused the Turkish foreign policy elite to think twice about the effectiveness of cooperation mechanisms in the Mediterranean, especially the EU Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which, after all, emphasises the importance of and the need for cooperation among European and non-European Mediterranean countries to promote stability and combat terrorism in the region. Not surprisingly, at the end of the day these developments negatively influenced the Turkish attitude towards the EU EMP project.

However, given the Turkish status as EU candidate, the political dialogue between Turkey and the EU restarted at the December 1999 Helsinki summit. In fact, events since the notorious Ocalan case in 1999 changed strained Turkish-Greek and Turkish-EU relations, and created a new atmosphere in the relations between the two countries, increasing hopes for the promotion of the EMP project in the Eastern Mediterranean. First, the commencement of negotiations between Turkey and Greece for cooperation in the fields of tourism, trade, drug trafficking, organised crime, environment and cultural relations accelerated the momentum and have led to a rapprochement in the relations between the two countries. Second, the EU decision to invite Turkey to be a candidate country and the Greek decision to withdraw its veto against Turkish membership at Helsinki in 1999 changed the course of Turkish foreign policy towards the EU, Greece, and the EMP in the early 2000s.

Turkish Perceptions of the EU Enlargement towards the Eastern Mediterranean

The EU enlargement towards "Cyprus" has been considered a contentious decision among different circles in Turkey and raised questions regarding the validity of basic norms emphasised strongly by the EU to accept new members. The recent decision to enlarge is seen as a political and diplomatic decision with little regard for international legality. First, it is argued that the decision to accept "Cyprus", a country whose constitution was violated and abolished by one of the constituent partners and thus was not in force after 1963, without an agreement about legitimate political authority and a constitution between the constitutional partners, was seen as a breach of international law and the international agreements that established the "Republic of Cyprus"¹¹, with limited sovereignty in 1960.¹² Second, both the 1974 Greek Cypriot coup that aimed at the

¹¹ See Füsün Arsava "Hukuksal Boyutuyla Kıbrıs Sorunu" *Kıbrıs Mektubu*, (Journal of Turkish Cypriot Cultural Association), Cilt 16, No.1, Ocak-Şubat (January-February) 2003, pp.29-32.

¹² See the 1960 Constitution of the "Republic of Cyprus" and its Annexes.

unification of the island with one of the guarantor powers (Greece), and the subsequent and immediate military intervention of another guarantor power (Turkey) to prevent the act of "unification with Greece", further complicated and generated a new political environment on the island. Since then, the constitutional partners (Turkish and Greek Cypriots) and the guarantor powers (Turkey, Greece and Britain), sometimes together with other international actors, have not been able to restore or recreate a legitimate political climate acceptable to all parties. Thus, according to the Turks, the EU decision to enlarge towards "Cyprus" also contradicts the EU principle of not accepting countries with political and border problems in the Union, and is not in conformity with the EU aim of creating a prosperous and peaceful European and Euro-Mediterranean area free from conflict and hard security issues.

On the other hand, there are groups in Turkey that view the EU enlargement towards Cyprus a crushing defeat for Turkey's Cyprus policy, and support resettlement on the Island on the basis of the EU accession process and/or the "Annan Plan".¹³ In a similar manner, Turkish big business circles have endorsed both the "Annan Plan" and the EU approach to the Cyprus issue. A prominent member of the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association, pointed out that "the EU's approach towards Cyprus cannot be evaluated on the basis of "winners or losers"; the aim is to reach a permanent solution on the Island, [...and...] [a]fter bringing the Cyprus issue to this point it is not possible to say that we are not able to solve the problem. Today, if a political risk is going to be taken [on the Cyprus issue], it is impossible to find a better timing and a better conjuncture".¹⁴ The basic concern of this or these kinds of arguments is to establish a strong link between the Turkish accession process to the EU and the solution of the Cyprus issue, irrespective of the Turkey's long-term considerations in the Greater Eastern Mediterranean region. They, in fact, envisage a radical change in Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus, in order to increase the prospects for an earlier date to start negotiations for accession to the EU, but at the same time clashing with one of the basic pillars of Turkey's EU policy, which, in fact, aiming at full membership in the EU only after establishing itself as Europe's major partner in the Eastern Mediterranean. Accordingly, this view is criticised on the ground that it is myopic, focused on immediate future, and does not take into account the long-term structural consequences¹⁵ of such a radical change in foreign policy before the prospects for and terms of full membership in the EU become visible. It is emphasised that "one may also do what seems to be the best from the perspective of conjuncture and yet pay a heavy price for it once history moves out of that particular conjuncture and we are once more faced with the long term structural realities"¹⁶.

In this context, it is pointed out that the Eastern Mediterranean enlargement of the EU may lead to the escalation of conflict and instability in the region.¹⁷ According to this view, in spite of the EU expectations that it would act as a catalyst to the solution of the Cyprus problem by integrating Greek Cypriots into the Union, the effects of enlargement on sub-regional relations are not certain. It is emphasised that the risk of a crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean will be high if "Cyprus's full membership in the Union is finalised and if Turks' and Turkish Cypriots' prospects for membership in the Union remains invisible. This, in turn, would weaken security and stability in the region. In

¹³ See Zeynel Lüle, "Üyelik Süreci Kopenhag'da Rayına Oturdu", *Görüş*, (Journal of the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association), Sayı 53, Ocak-Şubat 2003, ss. 14-19. See also various columnists in the Turkish national papers (e.g., Erdal Güven, *Radikal*; Cengiz Çandar, *Yeni Şafak*; İter Türkmen, *Hürriyet*; Cüneyt Ülsever, *Hürriyet*; etc.) since November 2002. On the other hand, in many circles in Turkey the Annan Document for Cyprus is identified with the EU's Cyprus Policy.

¹⁴ Muharrem Kayhan, Chair of the High Advisory Committee of TÜSİAD (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association), "Şimdi Soğukkanlı ve Hesaplı Olma Zamanı" *Görüş*, (Journal of the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association), Sayı 53, Ocak-Şubat 2003, ss.10-12.

¹⁵ See Eyüp Özveren "Geo-Strategic Significance of Cyprus: Long-Term Trends and Prospects, Perceptions, Vol. VII, No. 4, 2003, p.36.

¹⁶ Eyüp Özveren "Geo-Strategic Significance of Cyprus: Long-Term Trends and Prospects, Perceptions, Vol. VII, No. 4, 2003, p.36.

¹⁷ See Salahi R. Sonyel, "The European Union's Mediterranean Policy and the Cyprus Imbroglio", *Perceptions*, Vol. VIII, No.4, pp.20-34.

other words, in this context, the EU solution of integrating Greek Cypriot state into the Union may not be catalytic but cataclysmic.¹⁸

Another view emphasises the geo-strategic significance of Cyprus for both Turkey and Greece.¹⁹ According to this view, Turkey's Cyprus policy is built upon a basic premise:²⁰ the significance of the island for Turkey's political, economic and military security, and the security and welfare of the 200.000 Turkish Cypriots living on the island. Accordingly, the issue of who would be the sovereign authority on the island becomes a crucial one for the Turks. This view stresses the point that Cyprus is located at the centre of that crucial geographical area where the wealth of Anatolia, the Middle East, the Caucasus and even Central Asia meets the Mediterranean Sea. Thus, by geographically controlling oil and trade routes, communication lines, and water resources and thereby the safe and free flow of wealth generated in the Greater Eastern Mediterranean region (Middle East, Anatolia, Caucasus, and Central Asia), Cyprus plays an important role in the distribution of wealth, power and sphere of influence, and in the allocation of rewards among regional and global actors in the Greater Eastern Mediterranean. Thus, Turkey, which controls the eastern most of the Eastern Mediterranean region by Mersin, Yumurtalık/Ceyhan and İskenderun Gulf coastal line, does not want to be challenged and vulnerable to any threat to its political, economic and military superiority and security from Cyprus, which is located just 70 kilometres away from its mainland. Similarly, despite the fact that its mainland is 1000 kilometres away from the Island of Cyprus, the Greeks have been stubbornly firm for centuries in their attempt to establish influence and control over the flow of wealth from the Greater Eastern Mediterranean region to the Mediterranean Sea by controlling Cyprus, and thus to get the lions' share of the direct and indirect rewards of the wealth generated in the region. From a historical, political economic, legal and security/stability perspective, the enlargement of the EU towards the Eastern Mediterranean region by integrating "Cyprus" disturbs the precarious but long-established balance of power between Greece and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean in place since the early twentieth century. The EU may disturb this balance because Turkey is not yet a member of the EU while Greece is, and the prospect of Turkish membership is not even clear. It is most likely that this development (the accession of "Cyprus" to the EU) is going to create an awkward situation in all fields in the Eastern Mediterranean, with an uncertain impact on all aspects of the Turkey-EU relations, not to mention the possible spill over effects on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

In fact the Turkish foreign policy elite's perceptions of "Turkey/Greece/Cyprus security complex" can only be understood properly if the issue is redefined as being one of Turkish perceptions of "security and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean". The Turks define this security complex as an "Eastern Mediterranean security complex", and Turkish strategic thinking by no means views security and stability in the region strictly within the confines of Greek-Turkish relations.²¹ The Eastern Mediterranean region is seen as a whole, in conjunction with its immediate neighbourhood, composed of the Middle East, Persian Gulf, the Balkans, the Black Sea and the Caucasus. According to the Turks, security and stability in the Turkey/Greece/Cyprus triangle is not separable from the security and stability of the Greater Eastern Mediterranean region (GEMED), which is seen as a turbulent region that is vulnerable to various actual and potential conflicts and external interventions. On the other hand, the Turks think that the vulnerable Eastern Mediterranean is the point where Europe meets Asia.²² Thus, while they accept that friendly relations between Turkey and Greece are of great importance for the future of Europe, they emphasise that both the success of enlargement and of the EMP process in particular, depends more on peace and stability in GEMED region as a whole. Thus according to the Turks a holistic approach to the Eastern Mediterranean is a necessity in order to assess the implications of the enlargement of the EU to the

¹⁸ See, Salahi R. Sonyel, "The European Union's Mediterranean Policy and the Cyprus Imbroglio", *Perceptions*, Vol. VIII, No.4, 2003, pp.32-34.

¹⁹ See M. Fatih Tayfur, "Akdeniz'de Bir Ada'nın Kalın Uçlu bir Kalemle Yazılmış Hikayesi: Kıbrıs" in O.Türel (ed.) "Akdenizde Bir Ada" Ankara: İmge, 2002, pp.13-51, M. Fatih Tayfur, "Kıbrıs Bir Ada mıdır?" *ODTÜLÜ*, Sayı: 28, Yaz 2002, pp. 40-42, and Eyüp Özveren "Geo-Strategic Significance of Cyprus: Long-Term Trends and Prospects, *Perceptions*, Vol. VII, No. 4, 2003, pp.35-50.

²⁰ M. Fatih Tayfur, "Kıbrıs Bir Ada mıdır?" *ODTÜLÜ*, Sayı: 28, Yaz 2002, pp. 40-42

²¹ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, April 2003.

²² Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, April 2003.

Eastern Mediterranean reliably and also to understand its implications for the EMP. After drawing attention to the necessity for a holistic approach to the GEMED, the Turkish foreign policy elite emphasises that neither the EU nor the USA have yet developed a clear-cut Mediterranean policy and neither can develop a long-lasting Mediterranean policy without taking Turkey into account.²³

A common understanding among the Turkish foreign policy elite is that the EU looks at the Mediterranean from a project-based "soft security" perspective and does not have a framework and comprehensive policy towards the Eastern Mediterranean.²⁴ They think that in the current period of large-scale historical change the world is following a new path and its signposts are essentially different from the narrow "project-based" approach of the EU. The lack of an in-depth analysis of the Eastern Mediterranean (or GEMED) in EU global policy is considered one of the major shortcomings of the EU as a global actor in the making. There is a strong belief among the Turkish foreign policy establishment that the EU can only become an effective global player by integrating the Mediterranean into Europe. Accordingly, it is believed that a Euro-Mediterranean area is likely to emerge in the next 20-25 years in the region, although under the current circumstances it will probably be no more than a Euro-Mediterranean "soft-security" and "free-trade" area.

The Regional Actors and the Balances

Turkey's borders are the longest in the turbulent Eastern Mediterranean, and according to the Turkish Foreign Office Turkey has been providing and "exporting" security, stability and peace to the GEMED (the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Black Sea and the Balkans) for decades.²⁵ It is emphasised that one of the most important instruments for providing peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean is the existing balance of power between Turkey and Greece, which was established by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, the Montreux Convention of 1936, and the 1959-1960 London and Zurich Agreements. These international agreements have compelled both Turkey and Greece to cooperate and have thus contributed to security and stability in the region. On the other hand, The Turks consider that Israel, another notable player in the region and in the Middle East conflict, is another organic actor in the Eastern Mediterranean that must be taken into account not only where the security and stability in the Middle East is concerned, but also where the "Turkish-Greek Eastern Mediterranean security complex" is concerned. This is because a change in the above mentioned existing balance of power between Turkey and Greece in the region would probably trigger changes in the contiguous balances in the Eastern Mediterranean as a whole (e.g. the Israel-Turkey-Greece strategic line) and the consequences and spill over effects are unpredictable.

In the midst of this complex scenario, the Turks strongly emphasise the urgent need to formulate a comprehensive EU framework for the Eastern Mediterranean, which would be complementary but also designed differently from the "project-based" and "soft security" outlook of the EMP. At this point, the EU needs an in-depth analysis of its alternatives in the Eastern Mediterranean. One alternative for the EU would be to relate its Eastern Mediterranean framework to full Turkish membership of the Union. Turkey's geographical location at the heartland of GEMED and its actual and future potential in the region (the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Black Sea and the Balkans) would offer the EU the opportunity to be transformed from a regional to a fully-fledged global actor. The Turks claim that without their support and contribution, the EU and the EMP cannot pursue an effective policy, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean.²⁶ Thus, obtaining Turkey's support is considered an invaluable asset for the future success of the EMP in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is argued that the EU cannot become a global player in the political and security

²³ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, April 2003.

²⁴ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, April 2003.

²⁵ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, April 2003.

²⁶ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, August 2001 and April 2003.

spheres because the globalisation of EU in these fields means becoming a major actor in the GEMED, and thus implies full Turkish EU membership.²⁷ Besides, it is emphasised that the would-be Eastern Mediterranean framework of the EU must also link up with ESDP and Euro-Atlantic relations.²⁸ Particularly since the recent developments in Iraq, the Turkish foreign policy elite believes that the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean regions have become ever more interdependent and the US is likely to remain the key player in the Eastern Mediterranean for the foreseeable future. The Turks say that if the EU remains indifferent or reluctant to develop an efficient and effective Eastern Mediterranean framework, it will remain a dwarf in the political and security domains in the GEMED. Accordingly, from the Turkish point of view it is not realistic to confine EU concerns to the recent enlargement process and its implications for the EMP to the issue of "Turkey-Greece-Cyprus security complex" because this only provides the EU with a narrow and probably a misleading perspective in the Greater Eastern Mediterranean (GEMED) region.

Another alternative for the EU in the Eastern Mediterranean is to cooperate with Greece and the Greek sector of Cyprus only, leaving Turkey outside the geographical boundaries of the EU. However, for the Turks it is not clear whether Greece (together with the Greek sector of Cyprus) has the capacity to provide security and stability in the region. Turkish strategic thinking emphasises that the Greeks, by themselves, do not have the necessary resources and power and thus are unable to provide security and stability in an area that is adjacent to Turkish territory and more than a 1000 kilometres away from its mainland.²⁹ In this regard, a segment of the foreign policy elite questions the Greek position in the Eastern Mediterranean and does not define Greece as an organic member of the Eastern Mediterranean.³⁰ It argues that Greece is a peripheral member that is 1000 kilometres away from the heartland of the Eastern Mediterranean, and in order to be upgraded to the status of "organic member" (or major player) in the region the Greeks have been struggling to control the Island of Cyprus for the last two centuries.³¹ On the other hand, it is argued that if the EU enlargement towards the Greek Cypriot state among other things aims to remove Turkey from the Eastern Mediterranean, this would be a divisive policy in the region. The foreign policy elite strongly emphasises that Turkey cannot be controlled through the Greek sector of Cyprus.³²

According to the Turkish foreign policy elite, the EU should pursue integration rather than a divisive policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, and should be meticulous enough in identifying its major and permanent partners in the region. Accordingly, rather than viewing Turkey from Cyprus, the EU should develop the vision and means and look at Cyprus and the Greater Eastern Mediterranean picture from Turkey.³³ A partial EU approach to the Eastern Mediterranean cannot be fruitful. For the Turks, the turbulent Eastern Mediterranean is a nerve centre in itself and is the spinal cord of the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Black Sea and the Balkans, (GEMED) and accordingly requires careful and gentle treatment.

The EU Enlargement, EMP and Security in the Mediterranean

Turkey is still indifferent to the Euro-Mediterranean Process for reasons outlined elsewhere.³⁴ In its present form, the Turkish foreign policy elite does not see any potential in the EMP for Turkey. The foreign policy elite has viewed the EMP as a fictitious institution and a phenomenon that has led nowhere to date. It is believed that as long as the Arab-Israeli conflict remains on the agenda one

²⁷ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, April 2003.

²⁸ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, April 2003.

²⁹ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, August 2001 and April 2003.

³⁰ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, April 2003.

³¹ See, also M. Fatih Tayfur, "Kıbrıs Bir Ada mıdır?" *ODTÜLÜ*, Sayı: 28, Yaz 2002, pp. 40-42.

³² Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, April 2003.

³³ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, April 2003.

³⁴ See, M. Fatih Tayfur, "Turkish Perceptions of the Mediterranean" EuroMesCo Papers, No. 8, March, 2000.

should not expect much from the EMP.³⁵ The Turkish Foreign Office thinks that the EMP is still useless and ineffective, and that the Europeans are unable to vitalize the project. They even claim that the Europeans themselves disown the project. They point out that none of the EU Mediterranean countries (Italy, France, Spain, Greece and Portugal) has yet become the engine of the Euro-Mediterranean project, and furthermore, that the newcomer Eastern European states are not interested in the EMP. Moreover, it is argued that the EMP does not seem willing to incorporate the Mediterranean Balkan States in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership because the Greeks have taken the leadership initiatives in the integration of the Balkan area and prefer to carry out their Balkan projects in bilateral contexts rather than through the EMP. In these circumstances the Turks claim that the EMP cannot go beyond the Euro-Arab dialogue. The Turks also argue that they attempted to contribute to the EMP in the post-Helsinki period after 1999 but the EU Commission, they say, was not supportive.³⁶ A major obstacle to the success of EMP is what the Turks see as the excessively bureaucratic attitude of the EU.

Looking at the political and security dimensions, the Turks emphasise the difficulties of establishing political cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean area, which is composed of states with different political and economic structures and backgrounds. From the Turkish point of view there has been no progress in the security chapter of the EMP since the inception of the Barcelona Declaration in 1995. In terms of the security issues in the EMP area, what interests Turkey most is deterring the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and in this regard, the Turks see enough potential for cooperation within the EMP if the EMP develops its own policy on WMD. According to Turks, another area of potential EMP cooperation is "search and rescue missions/operations" in the Mediterranean Sea. Another opportunity for a Turkish contribution to the EMP is the historical and cultural dimensions and instruments with which Turkey could help to deepen EMP in the Western Mediterranean. However, the Turks claim that although they are willing to use their "historical and cultural" ties to promote the EMP in North Africa the EU is not willing to let Turkey assume such a role in the Western Mediterranean.³⁷

As for the impact of Eastern Mediterranean enlargement and ESDP on EMP security issues, the Turks argue, first, that despite the EMP project, ESDP in its present form only tangentially touches upon a Mediterranean dimension and lacks strategic planning towards the GEMED.³⁸ Second, after the EU enlargement towards Eastern Mediterranean, "Cyprus" will become a member of ESDP, but as a result of the agreement reached between NATO and the EU, "Cyprus" will not be included in ESDP operations using NATO facilities and assets. Moreover, it is concluded that ESDP cannot be used against allied countries in the "Cyprus" issue. It seems most likely that as long as Turkey's full membership in the EU is not finalised, the Turks will not open further where EMP security is concerned towards full cooperation between NATO and ESDP. Thus, the Turkish foreign policy elite considers that the EU enlargement towards the Eastern Mediterranean by way of "Cyprus" is a restricted enlargement in the political and security fields.

It seems that the Turks too are not comfortable enough with the emerging – though restricted – EU security scheme in the Eastern Mediterranean. For the Turks, the pending questions are: "What kind of role will the ESDP play after the Iraq War? Will the EU/ESDP develop a pro-active security policy? Will the EU develop a core group in the ESDP, or will the ESDP develop a security structure similar to that of NATO?"³⁹ The Turks are concerned especially with the latter question because they think that an ESDP that is independent from NATO of which Turkey is not a member but Greece (plus Greek sector of Cyprus) is, would significantly change the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus for the Turks, a independent Turk-free (hard) security organisation with a capacity to intervene directly in regional conflicts would lead to disputes over spheres of

³⁵ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, August 2001 and April 2003.

³⁶ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, April 2003.

³⁷ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, August 2001.

³⁸ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, April 2003.

³⁹ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, April 2003.

influence in the GEMED and would effectively invalidate the recent settlement between NATO and the ESDP.

On the other hand, according to the Turks the main issue in the Eastern Mediterranean has been the Middle East conflict and it is only after a solution is found to the Arab-Israeli conflict that the EU will be able to play a significant role in the region through enlargement. According to the Turks this would compel both Turkey and the EU to cooperate in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Turks think that the accession of "Cyprus" to the EU by itself before a solution in the Middle East conflict will not invigorate the EMP.⁴⁰ In other words, EU enlargement towards "Cyprus" can only become instrumental for the EMP after a solution is found to the Middle East conflict. Accordingly, the Turkish Foreign Office considers the frequent visits of Mr. J. Solana to the Middle East a clear sign of this understanding in the EU. They think that it is only at that stage that "Cyprus" – albeit depending on the political developments on the Island – can play an active and a significant role in the EMP.

According to the Turkish Foreign office, until now the EMP project has not been able to affect the Turkey-Greece-Cyprus relations.⁴¹ In fact, Turkish diplomats indicate that there is a tacit gentlemen's agreement between Turks and Greeks not to get involved in a quarrel in EMP *fora*. It is perhaps because, like the Turks, the Greeks have acknowledged that the EMP is concerned with the Arab-Israeli conflict, and is therefore not a proper forum to discuss Turkish-Greek disputes. However, the Turks argue that if there is no settlement in the Cyprus issue until the end-2004 and "Cyprus" becomes a full member, this is likely to affect Turkey-EU relations, although probably not the Turkey-EMP relations. In this case, it is argued that "Cyprus" will only be upgraded from "Southern partner" to the "EU member" status in the EMP. However, in case of progress in the Middle East Peace Process, which could increase the role of "Cyprus" in the EMP after the full membership, Turkey's cooperation with the Greek Cypriots in the EMP framework is not to be expected until full membership prospects for Turkey are visible.⁴²

According to the Turks, after the accession, the Greek sector of Cyprus might provide a window for the EU to the region, but "Cyprus" by itself is not comparable with Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean.⁴³ In order to have effective control over sea and air space in the Eastern Mediterranean, the EU/EMP needs Turkey's cooperation and assistance. Essentially, the Turks do not see the Greek sector of Cyprus as a rival. The Turks emphasise that without full membership prospects, they are unwilling to become a springboard for the EU in the GEMED. Indeed, in the short-term, the Turks do not so much worry about full membership for "Cyprus." At the same time, however, they emphasise that in the long run, especially after the completion of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, if Turkey remains out of the EU, the issues of sea and air space in the Eastern Mediterranean will bother Turkey and are likely to become problems similar to those in Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey.

The recent Eastern enlargement makes it clear that the EU is expanding into a large geography. The Turkish Foreign Office thinks that the Eastern Mediterranean region (and the Island of Cyprus) is a significant geography for the EU because it plays a key role in keeping oil transportation routes (sea lanes) and the Suez Canal open and under effective control.⁴⁴ The EU, on the other hand, is also keen on having control on arms smuggling, money laundering, illegal immigration, and other kinds of activities in the region. Thus, in terms of sea operations of the EU in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially by EUROMARFOR, the Island of Cyprus would definitely be significant. Accordingly, it is envisaged that, after full accession and in order to attract the attention of the EU to the region and the Island, the Greek Cypriots would probably propose "peace projects" in the region (e.g. in Iraq and in Palestine and the Middle East as a whole).⁴⁵ However, after a solution to

⁴⁰ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, April 2003.

⁴¹ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, April 2003.

⁴² Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, April 2003.

⁴³ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, April 2003.

⁴⁴ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, August 2001 and April 2003.

⁴⁵ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, April 2003.

the Arab-Israeli problem, if the EU/ESDP decides to send police forces to Palestine through the agency of "Cyprus" and if Turkey is excluded from this initiative, this would definitely bother Turkey. Similarly, any kind of EU intervention in regional issues without taking Turkey into consideration would bother Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean. For instance, if the Greeks attempt to violate the demilitarised status of the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea by integrating them into ESDP military operations in the future – when these have not managed in NATO operations for decades – this would lead to further problems between "Turkey-Greece and the EU" in the Aegean Sea.⁴⁶

Despite the recent agreement between NATO-Turkey and the ESDP, the Turkish Foreign Office does not trust the EU on this issue, and it says that the EU is known not to keep its words in its relations with Turkey.⁴⁷ In fact, there is a serious problem of trust regarding EU policies among the Turkish foreign policy elite. There has been a psychological barrier between Turkey and the EU that significantly affects the civilian and military foreign and defence policy bureaucracy in Turkey. The Turkish foreign policy elite is sensitive and has a number of EU-related stories in their baggage: the support and sympathy of the EU towards the PKK in the recent past, the shelter given by the Greek state to Ocalan, and the negative attitude of the EU towards Turkish defence and security concerns in the ESDP, and in Iraq before, during and after the Iraq war, and the acceptance of "Cyprus" into the EU without an acceptable political solution on the island. All this has contributed to the strong feeling of distrust among the Turkish foreign policy elite towards the EU.⁴⁸ Moreover, it is argued that during NATO-ESDP negotiations for cooperation, the EU bureaucrats/diplomats blackmailed Turkish diplomats telling them that they would block Turkey's full membership process if Turkey were to block ESDP-NATO negotiations.⁴⁹ The psychological barrier of the EU, on the other hand, is its unwillingness to accept the idea of full Turkish membership of the Union. Thus the EU is not flexible enough towards Turkey compared to its attitude to the other EU candidates in the past and present.⁵⁰

Bridging the EMP with the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Balkans

The EU enlargement process is about to reach the Black Sea coasts and accordingly, sooner or later, Europeans will include the Black Sea region at the top of their agenda. Especially after the full membership of Bulgaria and Romania, which is expected to occur in 2007, the Black Sea will become a much more important region for the EU. Like the "Euro-Mediterranean area" it is probable that a "Euro-Black Sea area" will become a reality.

However, compared to the Euro-Mediterranean area, the actors in the Black Sea region are somewhat different.⁵¹ In the Black Sea region today there are three principal non-EU actors, namely Russia, Turkey and Ukraine, towards which the EU does not feel like a free and a confident supervisor as it does towards the Mediterranean. In fact, the Turks see the Black Sea region as a natural area of interest for the EU.⁵² According to the Turkish foreign policy elite, in the foreseeable future the Black Sea region will definitely play an important role in European stability. This is primarily because the Black Sea is located at the heart of the Eurasian region, which stretches from

⁴⁶ The recent complaints of the Greek Foreign Minister about the "violations" of the "Greek airspace over the Aegean Sea" by the Turkish war planes to the EU, is seen a clear sign of Greece's attempts to convert the "Turkish-Greek problems" on the Aegean Sea into the "Turkish-EU problems".

⁴⁷ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, April 2003.

⁴⁸ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, August 2001 and April 2003.

⁴⁹ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, August 2001.

⁵⁰ See M. Fatih Tayfur, *Semiperipheral Development and Foreign Policy. The Cases of Greece and Spain*, (Chapters 3 and 5), Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003.

⁵¹ For a detailed discussion on the differences between the non-EU actors in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, see, M.Fatih Tayfur, "Turkish Perceptions of the Mediterranean" EuroMesCo Papers, No. 8, March, 2000, pp,13-14.

⁵² Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, April 2003.

the Balkans to the Caucasus and from there to Central Asia, and because it is an important region both for its oil and gas resources and their transportation to the European markets. The Black Sea region is also important for the EU because of Russia and Ukraine, two important regional countries that affect the security and stability of the EU.⁵³ Accordingly, it is expected by the Turks in the foreseeable future that the EU will not remain indifferent to the Black Sea (including the Caucasus and the Balkans) region.⁵⁴

Geographically, Turkey is located at the crossroads between the Black Sea (Russia, the Caucasus, the Balkans, and Central Asia) and the Mediterranean (Europe, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf). In other words Turkey is located both at the heart of the North-South and the East-West axis of this crucial geographical area between the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus if a synergy is going to be created between the EU, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea region, the Turks claim that Turkey, with its land mass and the Turkish Straits that bridging the Black Sea region, Caucasus and the Balkans to the Mediterranean, is the natural and the indispensable partner for the EU.⁵⁵ The existence of the Black Sea Cooperation Region (BSEC), an international institution which was initiated by Turkey in the early 1990s⁵⁶, is an invaluable asset for facilitating the contacts with the EMP and the BSEC countries and establishing permanent institutional links between the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Balkans in the future.

Like the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey has also been a major contributor to security, peace and stability for decades in the Black Sea region. This region is particularly important for the Turks not only because of the BSEC but also because of the Turkish Straits (the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus). Accordingly, the Turks do not want the involvement of non-Black Sea countries and powers in the military and security issues of the region.⁵⁷ According to the Turks, risks emanating especially from the transportation of energy in the region have made cooperation necessary between the Black Sea littoral states in the field of security. Thus the establishment of the BLACKSEAFOR by Turkish initiative, which brought together for the first time in the region's history the Black Sea littoral states in 1998⁵⁸, was an initial answer to the need for regional security concerns.⁵⁹

However, it seems that although the BSEC project is institutionally completed and although significant steps have been taken in many domains, these have not yet reached the "take-off" stage. There is in fact a lack of an economically all-powerful member state(s) that could play the role of the economic engine in the region. There have been three candidates to fulfil this leadership role, namely, Turkey, Russia and Greece.⁶⁰ In the early 1990s, it was believed that Turkey had shown some potential but the Turks proved unable to play such a role after the mid-1990s. Russians too have been unable to fulfil this role because of the bad economic situation in their country. The Greeks, on the other hand, have been too small and have not been brilliant enough in economic potential and performance to carry out a regional economic engine role. Thus, it is predicted that at least until 2010 the potential for BSEC to become an economic force is a far-fetched goal.

Perhaps, the central question that must be answered at this juncture are: "has the EU developed (or will it ever) an Eastern Mediterranean and a Black Sea policy to deal with its immediate

⁵³ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, August 2001.

⁵⁴ At this juncture, Turkey will take into consideration the EU's possible involvement in the Azeri-Armenian conflict. Thus, the Turks think that similar to its involvement into the Turkish-Greek dispute after its long-lasting neutral policy until 1990, the EU may consider taking side with the Armenian claims against Azerbaijan and Turkey, especially if Turkey is still not a full member in the EU.

⁵⁵ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, August 2001 and April 2003.

⁵⁶ See M. Fatih Tayfur, "Turkish Perceptions of the Mediterranean" EuroMesCo Papers, No. 8, March, 2000, pp,11-14.

⁵⁷ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, August 2001 and April 2003.

⁵⁸ See, M. Fatih Tayfur, "Turkish Perceptions of the Mediterranean" EuroMesCo Papers, No. 8, March, 2000, p,12.

⁵⁹ Until now, the BLACKSEAFOR has been ratified by all the member state parliaments, except Ukraine.

⁶⁰ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, August 2001.

strategic concerns in the economic, political, security and social spheres?" The answer to this question seems to be negative, as it appears there is no overall policy that reflects an EU strategy that marries these regions in the foreseeable future. If the EU is to develop an articulate Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea policy, it should probably look at the GEMED as a whole. The Turks think that in the foreseeable future, integration of the Black Sea with Mediterranean Region is a fantastic idea. Yet the idea is impressive on paper and it can turn into a reality in the long run⁶¹ only if the EU takes relevant steps to that end. Accordingly, the Turks do not see a direct link between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean at the moment.

However, the Turks argue that the EMP-Black Sea area is detached mainly by the Turkish landmass.⁶² According to the Turks, the real meeting between Black Sea and the Euro-Mediterranean area can only happen when Turkey becomes a full EU member. It is emphasised that in that case the sea and air space of the EU would increase enormously from "north to south" and "east to west" in the region and this would provide the EU enormous controlling power and autonomy in a number of domains. As regards other regional actors, namely the Bulgarians and the Romanians, the Turks claim that in the future their contributions to this project would probably not transcend their limited resources and capabilities.

Conclusion

One can argue that in a period of wide global historical and structural change, which has unseated the building blocks of the existing international system, regional and non-regional parties in the Eastern Mediterranean have attempted to reshape the incoming new regional order and regional relations in their own favour. In this regard, the recent enlargement towards the Eastern Mediterranean of the EU is an important and interesting chapter of this story, and one that has further complicated the "Turkey-Greece-Cyprus security complex". Accordingly, one of the fundamental issues that the EU has to face with the enlargement towards the Eastern Mediterranean is that its policy disturbs the long-established precarious balance between Turkey and Greece. This is primarily because Greece is a member of the Union and Turkey is not and prospects for membership are not visible. Thus, the inclusion of the Greek Cypriot state in the EU will definitely change the existing balance in the Eastern Mediterranean at the expense of non-member Turkey. Another important challenge that the EU has to take into account in the post-Cold War Eastern Mediterranean is the political-economic environment of the region. This changed dramatically after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the disintegration of the Yugoslavia and after the wars in Iraq. Alongside these changes, the political-economic panorama in the Eastern Mediterranean (the heart of the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Black Sea, and the Balkans) has also changed and new challenges and opportunities have emerged for regional and non-regional actors. For instance, the Eastern Mediterranean has become a major terminal for the transportation of the energy resources from the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. On the other hand, new challenges emerged for the security of regional states after the wars in former Yugoslavia and Iraq. In other words, in the post-Cold War period the perceptions of all the actors in the Eastern Mediterranean region have been transformed dramatically and regional actors in particular have become very sensitive about any intervention that could affect either established balances or interests in and expectations regarding new challenges and opportunities. In this sense, the accession of "Cyprus" into the EU will not only change existing balances but also affect the allocation of new wealth and power among the actors in the Eastern Mediterranean. Accordingly, since Greece is already an EU member state, the membership of "Cyprus" (or, of "a Cyprus" effectively controlled by the Greeks) in the EU will definitely change not only the existing

⁶¹ Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, August 2001 and April 2003.

⁶² Interviews with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, April 2003.

balances but also the allocation of new wealth and power resources between the Turks and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Such a development is not easily acceptable for the Turks, who would be the losers in the Eastern Mediterranean at the end of the day. However, although Turkey is not a member in the EU, its geographical location and the actual and potential capabilities in producing and exporting security and stability (providing security to other actors and to various economic activities) and its potential in other domains are invaluable assets in the process of bargaining and make Turkey an indispensable actor that must not be ignored.

On the other hand, Turkish governments and the majority of the Turkish people have been trying to become a full member in the EU at least since the second half of the 1980s. In fact, historically membership in the European family is an integral part of the modernisation process of Turkey since the establishment of the Republic in 1923. The Republic was established after fighting against European powers and erected upon European values in spite of Europeans. This is an important precedent for the Turks and it is embedded in the nature of their relations with the Europeans. From that time on, Turks have identified Europe with modernisation and development. The philosophical foundations of the Turkish nation-state are those of the European enlightenment, reformation, industrial revolution and French revolution. Second, being placed in the geography of a European civilisational project and being in constant historical interaction with Europeans for centuries, makes it natural that Turkey should be included in European regional political and economic integration. Turkey was accepted as an "associate member" of the EU in the early 1960s and has been a candidate since 1999. Having legitimised and internalised the idea of Europeanisation, it is not surprising to see that the Turks are determined to realise their political and economic "self-satisfaction" and "self-actualisation" within the institutional structure of the EU. And when it comes to Turkish-Greek relations, membership will equalise Turkey's external standing with that of Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean region *vis-à-vis* the EU.

Turkey has been undertaking reforms in order to adapt its domestic structures to those of EU member states. Although the success of these domestic reforms is very important for Turkey to become a member in the Union, it would appear that the major issues of Turkey's accession are not domestic reforms but the country's external standing, which is clearly illustrated by the persistent overt and covert pressures on the Turks by the EU (and Greece) to give up their established policy especially towards "Cyprus" and the Aegean Sea. For the Turks, however, the major questions are still pending: Who gets what from the (re)allocation of resources in the (both old and new) Greater Eastern Mediterranean region in period of post-Cold War large scale structural and historical change? Accordingly, the Turks have been emphasising that they are ready to revise their Cyprus and Aegean policy only after their membership in the EU becomes a clear option and their status with the Greeks is balanced in the EU, but not before. It seems to me that this is the major issue in "Turkey-Greece-EU relations" and in the "Turkey-Greece-Cyprus security complex" in the context of embracing historical change. It is deeply rooted in the "who-gets-what" question. Therefore, it must be gently dealt with and solved with through even-handed approach by the EU in order to avoid unexpected and undesirable consequences when the building blocks of the new system are in place in the Eastern Mediterranean.

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