

BRIEFS EuroMeSCo

Launching the Euro-Mediterranean Security and Defence Dialogue



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EuroMeSCo

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LAUNCHING THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE DIALOGUE*

Álvaro de Vasconcelos

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Introduction

The comments and recommendations that follow build on the findings of the EuroMeSCo working group on CFSP/ESDP and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.¹ The EuroMeSCo group is currently examining the likely implications of institutional reform and the expansion and adoption of the European Constitution for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. In addition to surveying the coverage of Mediterranean security-related issues in the European press, earlier on the group had focused on the way the Southern Mediterranean partners viewed the Europe's developing defence dimension in the context of EU foreign policy. An update of this research is being undertaken to assess whether the post-11 September environment and, more recently, the Iraq crisis have changed Southern perceptions of ESDP to any significant extent.

Prior to the launching of the Barcelona Process, there was already an ongoing dialogue on security and defence issues, which involved the 10-member Western European Union (WEU) and various southern Mediterranean countries. From 1992 until 2000, when the WEU was absorbed into the Union, this dialogue incrementally involved seven Southern Mediterranean partners.²

The security and defence dialogue remains a central objective, but it is one that the Barcelona Process has been unable to forge. The reasons for this failure are known, but should be re-stated as alternative meaningful and useful formats for a Euro-Mediterranean security and defence dialogue is sought. Until steps are taken to deal with the Middle East conflict – the main stumbling block for that dialogue – that generate real grounds for hope for a peaceful settlement, an EMP-wide security dialogue is unlikely to get off the ground. Also far from settled is the Iraq issue, another complicating factor. Paradoxically, while it provides for increased common ground within the EMP, the fact remains that its full impact on broader security in the Mediterranean is still unclear. A separate set of problems has to do with language and definitions, as there are conceptual differences both within Europe, the South and, broadly speaking, between one and the other. In the post-11 September environment, the various meanings of the words *security* are more blurred than they were before, and even greater confusion arises from the use of the term *defence*.

If there is to be a meaningful dialogue involving the same participants – albeit within a slightly different framework –, to attain the common aim of security through cooperation rather than confrontation, these difficulties must be fully recognised and addressed.

At the same time, it should be recognised that ESDP is an integral part of the common foreign policy of the European Union – a union of sovereign states – and thus, for better or worse, it will remain fundamentally different from the security and defence policy of a nation-state. The demand in the European Constitution for increased consistency across the whole range of EU policies, including foreign policy, and for more coherent EU policy instruments across the board, stresses

¹ See "European Defence. Perceptions vs. Realities", EuroMeSCo Working Paper 16, June 2002, and other papers in www.euromesco.net. See also the conclusions of the IEEI report on *A European Strategy for the Mediterranean*, Lumiar Paper 9, September 2002.

² Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania joined in the fall of 1992. Re-launched in 1994, the WEU dialogue was expanded to include Egypt (1994), Israel (1995), and Jordan (1998).

*Presented at the Senior Officials Meeting, Rome, October 2003.

the link between CFSP/ESDP and the set of principles and values that shape the European identity.

The case for the quick launch of an EU defence and security dialogue with the Mediterranean partners should focus on the fact that the latter is designed to ensure the full transparency of ESDP and, more importantly, to provide a framework for organising cooperation at a wider level, building on the strength of existing bilateral ties with the Mediterranean.

The issue of transparency is crucial given the anxieties caused among various southern Mediterranean countries by the European defence precursors within the WEU framework (Eurofor and Euromarfor). Although the 2001 EuroMeSCo survey on perceptions of ESDP concludes that such concerns have largely subsided and that ESDP is regarded in a generally positive light, transparency must remain a precondition for cooperation and is therefore a crucial element in the dialogue. All parties involved should be mindful of the overall objective of the exercise, which is to contribute to Euro-Mediterranean inclusion. In other words, the aim is to promote peace and security through increased convergence and integration.

The WEU Mediterranean dialogue has very modest results to show for its eight years of existence, a time when the security environment was less fraught with tension than it is today. This must be addressed, particularly the mismatch between expectations and results, so as to avoid repeating past mistakes. According to an observer who is close to the process, the main shortcomings of that dialogue were related to its multi-bilateral nature, uneven levels of representation, and its rather limited scope. It consisted mainly of exchanging information about WEU activities, and never moved towards actual cooperation. Proposals by southern members to enhance the scope of the dialogue, notably regarding the exchange of information and experiences to permit concrete cooperation activities in some fields, were not taken up.³ The essentially multi-bilateral nature of the WEU dialogue, central for cooperation with partners who are ready and able, was inadequately inserted into a multilateral framework. Thus, ESDP must make a fresh start and get on the right tack, learning from the WEU dialogue.

It is further recommended that a European security and defence dialogue should remain compatible with – but not subordinate to – the wider framework of the Barcelona Process, whose objectives remain fully valid. The ESDP dialogue should strive to strengthen its political and security chapter with this in mind. Synergy should be sought at all times.

It is useful to highlight the main conditions for a European security and defence dialogue to fulfil these aims. Taking a cue from the preparatory work for the Naples Ministerial Conference, and the recent initiatives of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the following questions should be given urgent consideration:

a. What are the links between the Partnership's objectives of inclusion and the ESDP defence and security dialogue and cooperation? What are the guiding principles that should be observed in order to ensure consistency?

b. What are the priority areas for security and defence

cooperation, and what new or existing tools to use to foster that cooperation?

c. What are the institutional arrangements through which the set aims can best be achieved?

Taking Perceptions into Account, and Addressing the Widest Possible Audience

It must be borne in mind that the South is no more of a uniform or homogenous reality than the EU when establishing an ESDP security and defence dialogue and cooperation with southern Mediterranean neighbours. Public opinion and concerns must be reckoned with and addressed. The attitudes of political elites and large sections of the public do not always coincide, and the audience of any regional dialogue is not just national administrations and security establishments. The discourse and, what is more, the actions of cooperation may be interpreted and judged by different constituencies according to radically different criteria. Maximising public credibility means making sure that what is said matches what is done, including for the ESDP security and defence dialogue.

In this light, it is important to bear in mind existing perceptions on the development of a European defence policy among southern publics and elites. From the findings of the 2001 EuroMeSCo survey, the following can be said:

a. There is a *generally positive attitude* towards the EU development of a defence policy *among ruling elites*. The initiative is seen as evidence of multilateralism and stability and as a way to balance the US presence in the Mediterranean, notably in the Middle East.

b. There are fears, however, in two of the countries surveyed, that ESDP will mean a new European capacity to assert its views in Middle Eastern affairs or to intervene in domestic crises, particularly in response to humanitarian disaster.

c. There is a general concern that ESDP may be developed to deal with 'threats' coming from the south, notably with migration. This is seen as the worst possible scenario.

d. Many are quite sceptical about the possibility of the European Union to become a significant actor on the field of hard security;

e. There is a generalised lack of information about European defence policy, and the absence of information generates suspicion.

For practical reasons, it was impossible to ascertain the attitude of Islamic sectors with any accuracy. Given the nature of the survey questionnaire, the views of current political elites, and, to a lesser degree, of the military and defence establishments predominate. In the few cases where it was possible to take the pulse of Islamic sectors, the conclusion is that the EU lacks a distinctive image, and is viewed together with the US as part of the hostile West. This is a very tentative conclusion

³ See Arnaud Jacomet, 'Le dialogue méditerranéen de l'UEO', in *The Future of the Euro-Mediterranean Security Dialogue*, WEU/ISS Occasional Paper 14. Available at www.iss-eu.org.

that needs to be qualified, particularly in light of the diversity of political forces with Islamic leanings, and the emergence of a distinct democratic trend among some such groups, most notably in Turkey. The preliminary results of the second survey now underway suggest that a more differentiated view of the West and even of the EU is taking shape. The permanent updating of the survey will hopefully create a clearer picture. Apart from the attitude of Islamic movements and their constituencies, preliminary results point to the conclusion that a less favourable environment for north-south security cooperation is developing because of the aftermath of the Iraq war and the collapse of the Middle East roadmap. The degradation of the 'dialogue environment' must be taken into consideration and addressed on its own merits. Public opinion polls taken in Europe and the South after the Iraq war and following the reversal of the peace process reveal two competing trends: on the one hand, there is a greater degree of convergence between European and Southern publics with respect to the Iraq war and the Palestinian question; on the other hand, the gap in threat perceptions has also grown deeper, and the north and the south are more fearful of one another.

As the Italian presidency⁴ has stated, the primary target of the emerging ESDP defence and security dialogue should be to help forge a common view of security in the Mediterranean region, and build trust on the basis of an in-depth analysis of its current security concerns. In order to achieve this goal, a number of points should be borne in mind:

Establish a clear linkage between the ESDP dialogue and EU policies as a whole.

This is a crucial aspect, because the positive image of the EU stems from the values and principles it stands for and from the European model, including its promotion of sustainable development;

Preserve ESDP autonomy.

In order to ensure compatibility between the ESDP and NATO Mediterranean dialogues, which is facilitated by many of the interested parties being the same in both cases, the autonomy and the specificity of the ESDP dialogue must be maintained.

Take into account anti-Americanism and its negative implications.

NATO involvement in crisis management in North Africa and the Middle East should always take the hostility it might cause into account. NATO is largely seen as being dominated by the US and is therefore a 'surrogate' target for anti-US sentiment in the Arab world. To change public perceptions of NATO is therefore an important task, not least because this has a negative impact on the image of ESDP.

Contribute to effective multilateralism in the regional order.

This point relates to the actual resolution of conflicts and disputes in the region, namely the implementation of the two-state solution as a way out of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In order that this may come about, the active involvement of the EU, the EMP and also the United States is imperative.

The EU strategic concept is crucially important.

This concept, which is now being debated, will spell out the priority security concerns of the future defence policy of the EU, and to clarify the 'place' of the Mediterranean in that policy. The «threat assessment» it delineates will be crucial to the success of the ESDP-Mediterranean dialogue. The issue of migration and the possible role of ESDP in dealing with it is a source of considerable anxiety among Southern Mediterranean partners. It should be made clear that migration (as opposed to certain aspects of trafficking, for example) will remain firmly under the aegis of Justice and Home Affairs.

Take into account that public opinion matters, both in the North and the South, at all stages of the dialogue.

As noted above, Europe's 'interlocutors' are not only national administration, but also a much wider audience whose perceptions and expectations of the 'European model' are sometimes out of synch with those expressed around negotiating tables.

Priority Issues to be Addressed Through Dialogue and Cooperation

The concrete dialogue and security and defence cooperation plan must benchmark progress in responding to three main questions:

- a. Is there a security culture that is specific to the 'processes of inclusion' inherent in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership? And if so, should it serve as the compass for all security and defence initiatives?
- b. What kinds of initiatives are best suited to ensure transparency and information exchange, and to gradually develop a common language and common understanding of the security concepts and concerns?
- c. What kinds of initiatives that involve as many actors as possible could be undertaken in a relatively short time?

Concentrating on the Development of a Common Security Culture and Charting its Guiding Principles

The Barcelona Process is a North/South integration project that aims to guarantee security through inclusion. In other words, it aims to create an area of peace and security based on the principles of democracy, economic and social development and inclusiveness. It is modelled on the European experience of the last sixty years, where nationalism was rejected as a basis for security. At the core of the process of European integration lies an explicit rejection of power politics among member-states, and the conviction that differences among them should be resolved according to consensual norms. It is security by

the rule-of-law. The EMP has adopted a similar approach. The Barcelona Declaration calls for a comprehensive policy, in which security is just another component. The comprehensive approach makes a clear linkage between security, democratisation and economic development, affirming that the latter two are mutually reinforcing sides of the same coin.

It is important to keep this in mind when discussing the launch of ESDP dialogue and cooperation. Like other Euro-Mediterranean initiatives, the latter must work towards the democratic inclusiveness espoused by the Barcelona Declaration. It must focus on creating a common vision of security and shared values and principles. A shared vision of security has become all the more important in the post-11 September environment, with the battle against terrorism promoting all-encompassing notions of security or a pervasive security-driven approach that has fatally blurred the distinction between domestic and foreign security. This is a particularly worrying trend in societies undergoing political transitions, as it can seriously hinder reform processes; but it is also a concern in old stable democracies, as it can alienate politically important social sectors. Defence and security policy cannot fly in the face of good governance or be sidelined from the consensus-driven process of democratic transition.

In response to post-11 September events, the Valencia Ministerial meeting made combating terrorism a priority in Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation. The approach behind the decision is exemplary, as a strong link was established between cooperation in the security field and enhanced cooperation in the realm of justice and human rights. It should therefore be a point of reference for future initiatives of this kind. If the fight against terrorism leads to a more general application of authoritarian measures – already the case in various countries – this would undermine the aim of the Barcelona Process of creating a vast area of democracy. The *tout-sécuritaire* trend is also manifest in Europe, and countering it is therefore a common endeavour.

The recognition that there is a security culture consistent with processes of inclusion such as the Barcelona Process, a goal that partners share, calls for the preparation of a document – a declaration that spells out the main underlying principles that should govern the security and defence dimension of the Barcelona Process – to ensure progress and contribute to the legitimacy and visibility of the EMP as a distinctive regional grouping⁴. The work and debates among EMP official and civil society groups in preparation for the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability should help with drafting of a *declaration on security culture* of this nature. While it would not be a binding document, it could offer a road map.

Translating Principles into Action

Defence and security measures should not be regarded as ends in themselves or as palliatives for lack of progress in other essential areas such as political convergence and economic and social inclusion; rather, they should be seen as yet another concrete way to implement the main goals of Barcelona, namely: contributing to political

reform, economic integration and, more importantly, better understanding between Euro-Mediterranean civil societies. Aside from contributing to the definition of a common security culture, concrete initiatives on transparency and confidence building should be pursued with the following objectives in mind:

- a. Creating a better understanding of the security concerns of the EU and the EMP member countries. The diversity of these security concerns should be fully and clearly understood and recognised.
- b. Providing information about European security and defence policy through regular briefings, fact-finding missions and seminars. Such activities are usually held in Europe, so every effort must be made to hold them in the Mediterranean.
- c. Taking the bilateral dimension into account. ESDP is still being forged and will consist of a mix between European and member states actions. In this context, member states should develop similar, parallel national security and defence policy activities.

Identifying Key Areas of Measurable Progress

Cooperation should focus on actions that are feasible and likely to produce encouraging results:

BUILD ON THE BOSNIA AND KOSOVO EXPERIENCE

Closer cooperation being developed between the EU and the UN on crisis management provides a useful example of coordination of participation in peacekeeping or peacemaking operations. A previous EuroMeSCo report⁵ suggested sub-Saharan Africa as a target region for coordinated crisis management and peacekeeping.

CIVIL PROTECTION

Civil protection as an ESDP task will likely become more prominent if the 'solidarity clause' in European Constitution is retained by the IGC. This is an increasingly important dimension of the EU policy and could therefore be taken up on a consistent basis by the ESDP Mediterranean cooperation and transposed to the EMP level. The EMP pilot-project on the mitigation of natural or man-made disasters, independently of its achievements so far, is an indication that the entity is prepared to accept civil protection cooperation.

TRAINING AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMMES

A civil-military training and an exchange programme under the heading 'Transition, Democracy, and Security' should be established, building on the existing network of cooperation between military establishments and civil society institutions across the Euro-Mediterranean region.

DEFENCE AGREEMENTS AND ARRANGEMENTS

Publishing defence and cooperation agreements, arrangements and understandings would introduce greater transparency. A Euromed Defence agreements database, including the actual texts of such agreements

⁴ See annex "Security as a Component of Comprehensive Policy" in page 8.

⁵ See EuroMeSCo Paper 16, June 2002. www.euromesco.net.

and arrangements, could be envisaged, as could their general Internet availability.

REVISITING WEU DIALOGUE COOPERATION PROPOSALS

Part of the *acquis* of the WEU dialogue consists of proposals put forth principally by southern countries to implement specific cooperation measures among WEU members. These include two-way information exchange, comparing experiences on issues such as crisis management, and concrete proposals for cooperation on land mines. In order to establish the common cooperation agenda, it might be useful to re-examine these proposals.

Barcelona Plus: Reconciling ESDP Dialogue with the Barcelona Process

When considering institutional arrangements for the ESDP dialogue, important to keep feasibility in mind and the best format to avoid the blockages and frustrations that have plagued the political and security dialogue within the EMP, the Barcelona Ministerial meetings should remain the overall framework for what should be a multi-layered web of relationships that encompasses all multilateral and multi-bilateral frameworks, the umbrella under which maximum synergies should be sought.

If this is to be the case, the Committee of the Senior Officials must continue to provide the general framework for the discussion, approval and implementation of security-related and other CBM, and for the work of political cooperation at the EMP level, taking into consideration and building on the inputs of the ESDP and other processes or dialogues as far as possible. On the European side, ESDP cooperation and dialogue should be conducted by the Political and Security Committee and, on the other, by representatives appointed by the Foreign and Defence Ministries.

In other words, ESDP Mediterranean defence and security cooperation and dialogue should constitute a component of the wider Euro-Mediterranean process. It should not be a new basket, but Basket One-and-a-Half of Barcelona, as the Fifth Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Valencia suggested. At the Valencia Ministerial in April 2002, ESDP was a topic on the agenda of the Barcelona Process. This was also the case in Crete, where ministers called on Senior Officials to launch an “effective dialogue on security matters, in particular the dialogue on ESDP, through the establishment of liaisons with the new structures developed by the Union”.

The Greek presidency organised a first informal PSC meeting with the representatives of southern Mediterranean partners, and a formal meeting between the Troika and representatives of the southern Mediterranean partners was organised by the Italian presidency in early October 2003. This combined format should remain essentially unchanged, provided

representatives of the southern partners’ Foreign and, ideally, Defence ministries are also directly involved;⁶ the Committee of Senior Officials should be briefed regularly by the PSC presidency.

The Barcelona Process combines the multilateral and the multi-bilateral framework typical of association agreements. The Wider Europe-Neighbourhood plan, which more clearly introduces the principle of differentiation, will likely contribute to strengthen the multi-bilateral character of the Barcelona Process. To keep a sensible mix of the multilateral and the bilateral dimensions is crucial, both to bolster the sense of ‘ownership’ that is now lacking and to achieve the long-term objectives of the Barcelona Process as a whole.

Ownership, balance, flexibility and mutual reinforcement are key elements to permit a synergy with other frameworks for political and security cooperation. Smaller groupings such as the Mediterranean Forum, the 5+5 and other differently constituted initiatives, could function as ‘coalitions of the willing and able’ for various projects or pilot initiatives.

This is essentially the same kind of model that has made integration in the European continent possible, by creating a strong synergy between the community process and a web of institutions such as NATO, the WEU, and the OSCE. In spite of its many difficulties, the Barcelona Process is the project – the vision, as the Americans would say – that binds different initiatives together and makes them part of a coherent whole. Any security and defence dialogue must facilitate and not place obstacles the way of that Process. I would say there is no other way forward.



⁶Although it is of course up to partner countries to choose their representatives, officials from Defence ministries should be involved as possible

Annex

Security as a Component of Comprehensive Policy

By Álvaro de Vasconcelos*

All the signatories of the Barcelona Declaration claim to support a comprehensive security concept. It is not clear, however, that they all share a common understanding of what that means. One must therefore ask the extent to which comprehensive security means the same thing for all the states concerned, and for the different national constituencies within them. Further, it is important to know, on the one hand, the extent to which the dominant role of the war on terrorism is generating conceptual ambiguity, and, on the other, contributing to mutual suspicion between North and South. What has been the contribution of post-11 September attitudes towards the adoption of a security perspective on issues that are really social or law and order related? These are fundamental questions for the future of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. In troubled times such as these, it is all the more important to clarify concepts, to ensure one understands what is at stake and to avoid dangerous oversimplifications.

In short, is there a particular security culture which the Partnership, given its nature as an integrative and co-operative process, aims to promote? Is it possible to build a consensus? In order to clarify the *nature* of the security culture that the EMP aims to promote, it is useful to look at the European integration process itself, and identify what comprehensive policy means in this context. We can then go on to analyse different interpretations of comprehensive security arising from the different security cultures across the EMP, be it in individual countries or in sub-regional groupings.

1. Security by Inclusion vs. Power Politics

The Barcelona Process is a North/South integration project that aims to promote security through inclusion. In other words, it aims to expand the area of peace and security to include the South, on the basis of the democratic and inclusive principles inherent in the European Union.

At the core of the process of European integration lies an explicit rejection of power politics in relations among member-states. The main characteristics of the security culture of a civilian power such as the EU are as follows:

- a. Nationalism is not a legitimate basis for security, given the catastrophic experience of extreme nationalism in Europe. In this sense – and also because the security of any of its parts affects the whole – European security culture is *supranational*.
- b. Differences between member-states are resolved according to jointly developed norms. This is security *by rule-of-law*.
- c. Peace is further guaranteed by the *democratic nature* of member-states. This is a form of *democratic security*.
- d. Policy is comprehensive or integrated. Economic integration, political convergence and security cooperation make conflict a lose-lose proposition by bringing to the fore an awareness of shared interests

and a common destiny. The Stability Pact for aspiring members is a primary example of this culture.

The principles of democratic inclusion are reflected in the Barcelona Declaration. The declared aims of the Partnership are that peace and security should be achieved through an integrated or comprehensive approach. This is, indeed, the principle inherent in all three EMP baskets, which should be interrelated and thereby make the Barcelona Process viable. The linkage between the three is not always as strong as it should be, however, and the three-pillar system of the EU is partly to blame for the lack of coherence between economic and political issues within the EMP.

Nonetheless, both the instruments of the Partnership and its long-term aims are clearly framed by a comprehensive political concept. The question remains, however, whether the interpretation of the concept is actually common to all. Seven years after the signature of the Barcelona Declaration, this is still unclear.

2. The Dilemma of a Comprehensive Security Concept

It is obvious that «comprehensive» or «integrated» security does not mean the same thing to people from different cultures that have different views on security. All may declare their allegiance to an integrated concept that ensures security in all arenas, and yet be speaking of entirely disparate things. For some it may signify that democratic inclusion is the only way to attain a durable peace; for others it may mirror the view that most threats are domestic and of a political or economic nature. In this case, the concept may subsume that fear of internal enemies and mistrust of civil society activism; but it can also reflect the view that economic development rather than political reform is the best way to combat instability – a view which is the exact reverse of the experience of the EU. More often than not, however, it means the involvement of the armed forces in internal order. This view of security is not really *comprehensive* but rather *all-embracing*. This inherent ambiguity, and the abuse to which it is prone – particularly through the blurring of the distinction between domestic and foreign challenges and the military and civilian realms – is a serious obstacle to democratisation.

The elasticity of the word “security” and its abuse means that some people even place culture at the heart of the concept. This is clearly the view of radical Islamic forces or of Europeans and North Americans who accept the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis. This view of security can properly be termed ‘identity based security’, which mirrors the concept of ‘identity-based politics’.

3. The Dangers of a post-11 September “Total Security” Concept

The dangers of an all-embracing security concept have become particularly evident since September 11, 2001 for three main reasons:

- a. The tendency to conflate internal and external security has been reinforced in the North, so that defence polices have taken over areas that, traditionally, have been the preserve of home affairs. Whilst this may not constitute a serious threat to fundamental freedoms and rights in consolidated democracies, it is certainly not the case in fragile democracies, transitional regimes or authoritarian contexts. Furthermore,

*Presented at the Senior Officials Meeting, Copenhagen, November 2002.

whatever the circumstances, guarantees of fundamental rights and freedoms protected by the rule of law are weakened. This becomes all the more dangerous where armed forces may become involved in internal security because the relationship between the military and justice is not the same as that between the latter and police forces, which are directly subordinated to the judiciary.

- b. The fact that the Bush administration sees terrorism as the overriding threat shaping the whole international security agenda has allowed some states to justify their strategies in similar terms. This is having a devastating effect on state policies in societies that face terrorist activities and in states where Islamic political forces are excluded from the political process. This is because such approaches are used to justify repressive strategies and, in some cases, to reinforce authoritarian practices.
- c. Migration and refugee issues are increasingly regarded as security problems. Although the European Commission has expressed its opposition to this all-embracing view of security, many EU member states not only fail to criticise this tendency but even promote its application. Indeed, migration is listed as a security risk in almost all strategic concepts in vogue. This serves not only to legitimate the anti-immigration rhetoric of European far-right political parties and movements, but also contributes significantly to Southern perceptions of the triumph of the theory of the 'clash of civilisations' in Europe.
- d. Increasing habituation to the use of violence and terror perpetrated against civilians, and the tendency to disregard the rules of warfare and international humanitarian law are some of the most worrying aspects of the new post - 11 September security environment. This has a profound impact on the countries of the Mediterranean, and generally represents a major regression in attitudes towards the use of force in international and domestic affairs.

The EU continues to be a civilian power that has failed to adopt significant defence and international security responsibilities. It continues to be viewed as a soft-security actor for whom inclusion is the primary instrument to ensure peace and security. To date, its new defence policy has not generated adverse reactions in the Mediterranean and, in some instances, has even raised hopes that the European Union will take on a more active and decisive role on the world. In the future, however, internal security policy – Justice and Home Affairs issues and in particular policies towards immigration and Europe's own Islamic communities – will decisively affect the image of the EU as an international actor. It may be the case that the EU will not become an effective problem-solver in the Middle East, for example, but there are hopes that it may be a beacon of the values that paved the way for peaceful and prosperous European integration.⁷

4. An Integrated and Transparent Security Concept

The EMP security model could become an example that counters an international tendency to revert to 'identity-based' security concepts. It provides a unique opportunity for a joint North-South clarification of the principles governing an unambiguous comprehensive policy. This, however, requires a prior exercise in conceptual clarification. Failing this, the EMP may survive by exploiting its own ambiguities but, eventually, mutual suspicions and tensions amongst governments and civil societies will increase and, ultimately, this will adversely affect relations between states. To avoid this scenario, the following principles should be used to shape a common concept of security:



- a. "Security" must be restricted to issues that involve the use of force. Integrated or comprehensive policies must make a clear linkage between security, democratisation and economic development, and between the latter two concepts as mutually reinforcing sides of the same coin.
- b. Special efforts should be made to integrate the different pillars of the Barcelona Process. This implies the reform of EMP institutions, as well as progress in developing a coherent EU foreign policy, so as to ensure overall coherence between the pillars.
- c. Comprehensive partnership measures that involve the different EMP baskets must be launched. These must be based on the explicit principles of "open co-ordination" as in the EU.
- d. All internal security issues, including anti-terrorism measures, must be strictly linked to co-operation over the realms of justice and fundamental rights and freedoms.
- e. Migration must be separated from security.
- f. Immigration policy must consider fully economic and human dimensions, and focus on combating illegal trafficking in immigrants.
- g. Measures to ensure transparency must be adopted where there is no clear-cut distinction between internal and external security. A starting point would be comparative analysis of national legislation in these domains.
- h. The EU must clarify the aims of its overall defence policy, particularly with respect to the Mediterranean, in order to ensure mutual trust and efficiency.
- i. The role of civil society should be reinforced as a vital element to generate mutual trust and to ensure good governance within a comprehensive security policy.

In conclusion, I think that we should replace the concept of comprehensive security with a comprehensive policy concept, which integrates all the principles and tools of the EMP, including a vision of cooperative security.

⁷See "EuroMeSCo Defence. Perceptions vs Realities", EuroMeSCo Working Paper 16, June 2002.

EuroMeSCo Papers

- 1 Volker Perthes, *Germany and the EuroMediterranean Partnership: Gradually Becoming a Mediterranean State*, February 1998. (Available also in French)
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