# EuroMeSCo BRIEFS

SECURITY GOVERNANCE

THE DIFFICULT TASK OF SECURITY DEMOCRATISATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

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SECURITY GOVERNANCE:
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Introduction

Security governance and with it, security sector reform and the democratic oversight over the use of defence resources is an emerging issue in international politics that is promoted by various international actors. It is an issue that deals with democracy and accountability of the security sector and it bears, therefore, more upon internal conduct than on inter-state relations. In view of the sensitive nature of security and defence of Southern Mediterranean states, the convergence towards a common language on security governance will be a mid-to long-term objective for the Euro-Mediterranean community. Today, however, the time is ripe to explore various ways in which security governance can be conceptualised in the cross-cultural context of the Mediterranean. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) makes "democratising security" in its Human Development Report 2002 a key condition to human development. The European states in turn, together with the United States and Canada, have established through the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Membership Action Plan and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Code of Conduct important standards and reference points for the democratic oversight for the entire Euro-Atlantic area.

The driving force for security governance in countries of transition is increasingly centred in the international development community. Excessive and opaque spending of resources on defence is seen increasingly as a direct impediment to development and welfare. The security community is promoting security governance with the argument that excessive defence spending leads to regional destabilisation and that mismanagement of defence resources delays reform of the security sector.

The European Union (EU) as a civilian institution had in the past little incentive and authority to deal with politico-military matters. This is now changing with the operationalisation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). From a EU perspective, there are three motives for promoting security governance in the Mediterranean:

    1. Security governance is part of the overall effort of the EU to strengthen democratic political institutions in Partner countries;

    2. As a development actor, the EU has an interest in reducing the excessive use of defence resources by Partner states as a result of overspending and the bad management of the security sector;

    3. Security governance becomes an issue with the EU involvement of third parties in ESDP operations.[1] With the extension of the EU and NATO to cover most of Europe, more attention will be given to neighbouring regions of the EU that will remain outside the Schengen area.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partner states, in turn, may have little interest in security governance, as this would add new liabilities to an existing democratic deficit. The promotion of notions such as "civilian control" of armed forces and "democratic oversight" over defence spending would touch on political sensitivities and strengthen the arguments of Western interference in their internal affairs. North-South common interests exist, however, in the relationships between

security, development and legitimacy. These correlations could be used as a premise for a top-down approach on common language that could lead to the insertion of the concept of security governance into the Euro-Mediterranean framework. A bottom-up approach is necessary to address questions related to civil society, parliaments and expert groups, all actors that could help to advance the conceptual and practical dimensions of security governance.

Questions of definition

The notions of security and governance are today part of both the scholarly and public discourse. Security governance, however, is still in its formative stage. It reflects an emergent view of various communities that goes well beyond the classic understanding of civil-military relations.[2] The development, human rights and defence communities all have a common interest in security governance, albeit defined in their own language. The developmental argument sees bad governance in the security sector as an essential impediment to socio-economic development. The human rights or liberal school considers security governance as a prerequisite to the legitimacy of the state whereas the defence community regards excessive defence spending and bad management of the security sector a threat to national, regional and international security.

The concept of security has today evolved well beyond the traditional concept of national security and defence of territorial integrity and state sovereignty. Security must be understood today in its broad dimension that includes economic, social and environmental sectors. This broadening in meaning since the end of the Cold War has also led to a deepening of security concepts that emphasise societal and human security as much as global security.[3] Key factors influencing this development are globalisation, democratisation, the rise of non-state security actors and the weakening of the role of the state in international affairs and security. Accordingly, today's frameworks of analysis of security are required to account for a complex set of security interactions.[4] These developments do not mean that realism is dead. On the contrary, the realist revival and the valorisation of the use of force have been boosted by 11th September 2001.[5] Existential threats have re-emerged in the security policy rhetoric, especially in relation to the fight against international terrorism. What matters for the purpose of this paper is the fact that security today is:

- not an end point, but often part of a transition process towards sustainable development;
- driven by multiple actors other than the state, including NGOs and international organisations[6]
- increasingly accepted as a product of both domestic conduct and international context.

Governance implies a legitimate domestic conduct of states within a normatively delineated environment. Its objective is to strengthen democratic political institutions. It thereby often clashes with the orthodox view of the primacy of state sovereignty. Governance implies fragmented authority, various actors and limited sovereignty. The OECD, one of the only inter-governmental organisations that have tackled the notion of security governance argues, that "security is an essential component of good governance and initiatives to ensure peace and sustainable development".

The most important principles of governance are:

- political accountability
- transparency
- legitimacy through democratic participation
- respect for human rights and rule of law, and
- efficiency in the use of public resources and the delivery of public services.

Governance also suggests a clear delineation within a government of responsibilities, especially as far as executive, legislative and the different levels of government are concerned. In this sense, security forces are not only accountable to the ruling government, but also to the parliament and the public at large. The Arab perspective on governance puts less emphasis on responsibility and more on social participation in decision-making. The UNDP Arab Human Development Report 2002 suggests that good governance will ensure "that political, social and economic priorities are based on broad consensus in society and that the voices of the poorest and most vulnerable are heard in decision-making over the allocation of development resources."[7]

Security Governance

The OECD defines security governance in terms of "transformation of security systems so that they are managed and operate in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance and contribute to a well-functioning security framework."[8] Security governance has a normative dimension and two closely related operational activities. The normative aspect rests on the governance principle of political accountability and transparency in the defence sector. The operational aspects deal with the democratic control of armed forces and security sector reform.

1. Norms, principles and "best practises"

Democratic governance of the security sector is today a political standard but not yet a universally recognised norm. Norms and principles can be introduced in a political process with the help of "codes of conduct", "best practice", special agreements, agreed statements or other top-down democracy promotional efforts. The security governance should, in addition to political accountability and transparency, encompass the following principles:

- Legitimacy through democratic participation,
- Political control of civil authorities over defence budgets, security forces and military judicial system,
- Involvement of political parties, and civil societies in formulations of defence doctrine.

2. Democratic control of armed forces

Democratic control of armed forces means promoting and facilitating the structuring of civil-military relations in accordance with fundamental democratic principles. It reflects the understanding that it strengthens the domestic setting and international security. It also confirms the

international principle of the primacy of the constitutional and civilian authority over the armed forces. The intra-state norms confine the use of the armed forces within a country to defence purposes against external threats. Components of democratic control of armed forces are:

- an adequate constitutional and legal framework;
- civilian leadership and civilian management of the defence sector;
- parliamentary oversight; and
- "public" involvement (parties, non-governmental organisations, media).

The operational side of the democratic control of armed forces should also include good practice in defence budgeting, planning and procurement. Oversight should not be mistaken for managing the defence sector. With transition towards demonstrable democratic control, the armed forces would gain legitimacy, both domestically and internationally.

3. Security Sector Reform (SSR)

The OECD defines the security sector as "encompassing" a) state institutions which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion (the armed forces, the police, paramilitary forces, the intelligence services and similar bodies); and b) Parliament, the Executive, the defence ministry).[9] A broad interpretation also includes organisations and institutions such as defence ministries, judiciary system and private security guards. According to Timothy Edmunds, SSR concerns 'the provision of security within the state in an effective and efficient manner, and in the framework of democratic civilian control'.[10]

It is important, especially for regions such as the Mediterranean, to present the notion of security sector reform in a holistic context, thus indicating that SSR is of essential politico-economic importance to a country and is not confined to questions of "military praetorianism and civil control over the armed forces."[11] The holistic approach also links security governance to conflict prevention and development. The international donor community is increasingly correlating international development assistance to security sector reform efforts.

The aspiration is for institutional reforms, but also for the change of conduct and behaviour as an expression of a changing political culture. All elements of the security forces should adhere to the fundamental principles of good governance in the security sector. Transparency, for instance, can be created through information exchange and "comprehensive and disciplined" public-sector management. Access to information should be possible to civilian authorities and civil society. Security sector reform should be construed in a way to enable governments to provide for security and stability within policy and budgetary constraints that are consistent with national development goals.

Currently existing norms and standards for security governance

The notion of security governance is new to the Barcelona Process. Security governance also has no formal standing on a universal level, but several regional cooperative arrangements have inserted good governance into their discourse on security cooperation. These organisations are the OSCE, Partnership for Peace (PfP), NATO, the EU and the Organisation of American States (OAS).

1. The OSCE

The OSCE adopted in 1994 the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. The Code was developed within the wider framework of security-related notions that include principles familiar to the Barcelona language (common security and indivisibility of security). The Code is a "soft" agreement as it is politically binding only and no legal application is required by member states.

The Code was made possible because of the nature of the OSCE. This allowed the development of multilateral commitments with intra-state norms. Located in the Sections VII and VIII of the Code are outlines detailing norms and procedures for the democratic control of armed forces. The Code deals with inter-state and intra-state norms. While reaffirming the principles of the UN Charter, as well as the sovereign rights of states, the Code portrays the "democratic political control of military, paramilitary and internal security forces as well as of intelligence services and the police to be an indispensable element of stability and security." The Code has assumed today the role of benchmarking for the memberships of NATO and the EU. Nevertheless, these provisions were innovative in the area of "regulation of security relations among states because they reflect the inclusion of (intrastate) rules related to 'good governance' into a politically binding international (interstate) document on peace and security".[12]

2. Partnership for Peace (PfP) Framework Agreements

PfP is the basis for security cooperation between NATO and individual Partner countries. Joint activities include defence planning and budgeting, military exercises and civil emergency operations. To join PfP, the participating states had to accept the following *acquis* on security governance:

- Facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;
- Ensuring democratic control of defence forces;
- Maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the OSCE;
- The development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed upon; an example is the development, over the longer term of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance

3. NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP)

MAP is the gateway to NATO membership. The requirements for candidates are very extensive and they reflect a wide spectrum of measures reflecting good governance in the security domain. These measures do not

only apply to the member countries but have also had a centrifugal effect towards countries beyond the membership area such as the Ukraine. The measures are the following commitments:

- To settle international disputes by peaceful means;

- To demonstrate commitments to the rule of law and human rights;

- To settle ethic disputes or external territorial disputes including irredentist claims or internal jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the OSCE principles and to pursue good neighbourly relations;

- To establish appropriate democratic and civilian control of their armed forces;

- To refrain from the threat of use in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;

- To contribute to the development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions and by promoting stability and well-being;

- To continue to fully support and be engaged in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace;

- To show a commitment to promoting stability and well-being by economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility.

4. The EU

The EU included extensive language on democracy and human rights into the 1993 Copenhagen criteria, that were established as reference requirements for EU membership. Drawing from these criteria, the EU also formulated requirements for countries in Southeast Europe, wishing to participate in the 1999 Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe. The Pact makes "democratisation and non-discrimination a fundamental preconditions to guaranteeing internal and external security". In addition this multilateral commitment, the EU has inserted a number of security governance commitments in bilateral arrangements with countries from Southeast Europe. The Stabilisation and Association Agreements of the EU with Macedonia and Albania, for instance, include measures pertaining to the security sector and requires improving access to justice and police practices, and official accountability before the law.

5. The Americas (OAS)

Most commitments of the Organisation of American States are on classic inter-state level confidence-building measures. But the Quebec Summit intra-state rules have been inserted into the Plan of Action, that was primarily dedicated to (inter-states) confidence-building measures. The plan requires the member states to:

Improve the transparency and accountability of defence and security institutions and promote greater understanding and cooperation among government agencies involved in security and defence issues, through such means as increased sharing of defence policy and doctrine papers, information and personnel exchanges, including,

where feasible, cooperation and training for participation in UN peace-keeping activities and to respond better to legitimate security and defence needs, by improving transparency of arms acquisitions in order to improve confidence and security in the Hemisphere. [13]

The Euro-Mediterranean region: A difficult turf for security governance

The Mediterranean is one of the most opaque regions as far as defence planning, budgeting, resource management, legislative process and oversight is concerned. The Barcelona acquis has basically no language concerning security governance. On a general level, the partners agreed in the Barcelona Declaration to "develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems". More specifically they commit to "refrain from developing military capacity beyond their legitimate defence requirements, at the same time reaffirming their resolve to achieve the same degree of security and mutual confidence with the lowest possible levels of troops and weaponry".

In the following, I will argue that the insertion of security governance into the region will be difficult to achieve in the short-term due both to a democratic and a security deficit. To begin with, in the Southern Mediterranean region there is a general resistance to political change. Bechir Chourou argued that the North African states - like most of the Arab region - appear intend(ed) on maintaining authoritarian rule for the "foreseeable future: whatever reforms that may have been adopted remain mostly formal." [14] In fact, in many Mediterranean countries, the security forces are an integrate part of the security problem of the region. These forces are often part of a leadership that has little accountability towards the public at large. The military forces in most Partner states play a key role in domestic security, in addition to their mandate on external defence. Many authoritarian regimes also rely on internal (civilian) security forces, police and paramilitary organisations for assuring domestic "law and order". In countries such as Egypt, military tribunals and military courts challenge judicial independence and impartiality. The defence spending of the Partner states has been on the increase over the last five years and are today between, on average, 5%-7% of their GDPs, well above the annual levels of defence spending recommended by the United Nations.

Furthermore, the Mediterranean region has a clear security deficit: a post-colonial sense of vulnerability is combined with regional and pan-regional power politics. Many of the Southern Mediterranean states face a whole array of new and destabilising security challenges such as international terrorism, crime, cross-border trafficking of drugs and persons. Finally, many states in the region are still in a state-formation process and the regimes hang on to centralist and authoritarian rule. In general terms, there is a widespread societal insecurity due to problems of identity, poverty, and governmental legitimacy. This is exacerbated by demands of competition with "socially cohesive, politically responsive, and administratively effective states" of the West. [15] The following paradigms represent formidable obstacles towards democratisation of the security sector in the region:

- Mix between regime security and state security: in the Mediterranean region, there is a thin line between regime security and state security and any threats to regimes or governments are also considered a threat to the state;

- The wide acceptance in the Mediterranean that democratisation represents a risk to stability;

- The obsession for stability and development at the cost of democracy;

- Political change is portrayed as a threat to stability;

- Regional security challenges, hot wars and 11th September 2001 act as fundamental impediments to the promotion of security governance.

Security governance will be able to take a foothold in the region once democratisation and political liberalisation is accepted as a complement to state-making in the region. For this to happen, the elites in the countries have to muster the political will for peaceful change, including in the much secluded area of security and defence.

What can be done?

In view of the controversial nature of security governance in the region, the most pragmatic approach is to circumscribe security governance issues in correlation with other common North-South concerns, such as international development and international legitimacy. There is a formal (top-down) and practical (bottom-up) way to advance the thorny issue of security governance in the region. On the formal side, security governance can find its entry into the language of Barcelona via the nexus of development and security on the one hand and the principle of democratic oversight over defence spending on the other. The practical aspect would find the least resistance in a stock-taking exercise on defence expenditure and parliamentary oversight. This could lead to the creation of terms of reference, inventories and compendia that could help to promote transparency and reduce information costs in this field. In this context, the Barcelona Process should add to the Partnership Building Measures the creation of a compendium of Defence Expenditures for the years 1996-2002, for instance.

1. Top down approach

The Barcelona Process could launch an institutional or top-down approach to security governance premised on common language on security governance. To begin with, any language on security governance needs first to reassert that:

- Security affairs in the region are and remain a national responsibility;

- Common security is built on common interests and common values; in this sense security is a public good of the entire region.

- The Euro-Mediterranean partnership could, as this has been done in the Organisation of American States (OAS) context, agree on a number of inter-state Confidence-Building Measures and then include some governance language in this context.

Furthermore, the following two linkages and correlation could be made:

- National and regional economic development are hampered by excessive and bloated security sectors;

- Democratisation cannot succeed without governance in the security sector.

In the context of the relationship between security and development, security governance language could be "nested" within the Barcelona Process by recognising the social costs deriving from excessive defence spending and establishing an explicit link between security and development. All these efforts at forging some common ground for common language on security governance could also draw from the 1995 Barcelona commitment "to refrain from developing military capacity beyond their legitimate defence requirements".

Also, the existing promotion of democratic reform in the region could make mention of reforms in the security sector. Common grounds on security governance would have to pay explicit attention to "local ownership" and regional as well as cultural contextualisation. The following language could be inserted into the Euro-Med context:

- The principles, policies and laws applied to the transformation process of the security sector must be part of the countries' history and political culture; and

- The transformation process should be carried out in continuous consultation within government and between government and civil and political society.

In addition to top-down language, the Barcelona Process could engage in a number of activities that over time could lead to an attitudinal change in the elite as security governance is concerned. These activities could be part of the First Chapter of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and include:

- Engage in a participatory appraisal process on security and an exchange of views on threat assessments and defence doctrines;

- Promotion of transparency in the defence expenditures;

- Promotion of PfP-type of activities (under a different label) in the Mediterranean. With ESDP, the EU can, through PfP programmes or separately promote civil-military relations and security cooperation in the context of seminars, exercises, training sessions and exchange of officers and officials from MODs.[16]

- The creation of Terms of References on Security Governance with the objective to submit it to the Barcelona Committee for further consideration. This initiative could draw from the example of the Stability Pact in Southeastern Europe, where an Academic Working Group (AWG) was mandated to work out a conceptual basis of security governance.

- Finally, particularly as the transparency of defence budgeting is concerned, work should be envisaged with the parliaments of the region. The guiding principle should be based on the thesis that parliament holds government accountable for the development and implementation of security and defence policy and the associated resources. Parliamentary cooperation could be strengthened with Euro-Med assistance programmes for parliamentarians, staffers and parliamentary infrastructures.[17]

All of these kinds of collaborative measures would need institutional frameworks. In the political realm, the Barcelona Committee would be the most appropriate forum: It would have to be enlarged on certain occasions to include experts on defence cooperation. In the military-political field, these subjects could be taken up by a network of defence academies in the region, possibly coordinated by the future European Defence College.

With regard to the parliamentary track, a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly would be a prerequisite for enabling a politically palatable cooperation on democratic oversight of defence budgeting and the security sector.

2. Bottom-up approach

The bottom-up approach on the promotion of security governance would result in the widening of the *marge de manœuvre* of civil society in security policy and expertise and capacity of national and international security. Future awareness building and civic, as well as, university education should concentrate more on security policies and peace. Education courses on security studies and peace should also be actively promoted to media and parliamentarians. Actors promoting democratic oversight of defence affairs are also, in addition to NGOs and research institutions, inter-parliamentary assemblies and organisations such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). Civil society or a foreign policy networks (such as EuroMesco) could create a Euro-Mediterranean Yearbook concentrating on information pertinent to the security sectors of the Euro-Mediterranean countries. Such a project could draw on similar efforts made by the SIPRI Yearbook, the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey or the Strategic Survey of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS).

3. Assistance and cooperation

Real progress in security governance cannot be achieved without political liberalisation. The West must balance its efforts of promoting economic and political reform with those pushing for security sector reform and democratic oversight of defence matters. Security governance in the Mediterranean should not come under the overall heading of "democracy-promotion", but rather under that for assistance to countries in their efforts to move towards a more effective and legitimate management of defence resources.

Governance in the security field should be positioned within the overall effort of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to reduce poverty and to use existing resources more effectively. This developmentalist approach can return to certain precedents that the international development community has developed under the leadership of the OECD and UNDP who have worked on these topics in recent years. The OECD recommends addressing security governance in "existing development assistance co-ordination forums and mechanisms". The EU as development actor will have to decide whether it wants to link progress in the sector of security governance to trade and assistance. This depends on the future importance of democracy-promotion and the use of conditionality in European policies towards the Southern Mediterranean region and the Near East.

Notes:

[1] ESDP—as a distinct subject of discussion and exchange of information— was introduced into the Barcelona Process at the Valencia Summit (April 2002). The Feira European Council Summit extended the countries involved in EU military and civilian crisis management to "other interested states"; a formula that could prove most relevant to Barcelona Partner states.

[2] Anthony Foster, Forster, Anthony, *New Civil-Military Relations and its Research Agendas*, DCAF, August 2002, http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/Working_Papers/83.pdf

[3] See, for instance, Buzan, Barry, Waever, Ole and de Wilde, Jaap, *Security: A New Framework of Analysis*, London: Lynne Rienner, 1998.

[4] Barry Buzan, op.cit. p. 34.

[5] See, for instance, John J. Mearsheimer, *The tragedy of great power politics*, W.W.Norton: New York, 2001.

[6] The OECD, for instance provides the following security definition: Security "is increasingly viewed as an all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being. Underpinning this broader understanding is a recognition that security of people and the security of states are mutually reinforcing." OECD, 2001, p.38.

[7] Arab Human Development Report 2002, UNDP, 2002, p. 105.

[8] Informal DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, *Security Issues and Development Co-operation: A conceptual framework enhancing policy coherence*, OECD, DCD (2000) 4/Rev2, p.5.

[9] Informal DAC Task Force, op. cit. 8.

[10] Informal DAC Task Force, op. cit. 8.

[11] Timothy Edmunds, "Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation," *DCAF Working Paper*, p.2.

[12] Heiner Hänggi, "Accountability, Transparency, and the Military", Unpublished mimeo, April 2001, p. 5.

[13] Plan of Action, Summit of the Americas, 2001. http://www.americascanada.org/eventsummit/declarations/menu-e.asp

[14] Bechir Chourou, "The Challenge of Democracy in North Africa", in Richard Gillespie and Richard Young (eds.), *The European Union and Democracy Promotion*, London: Frank Cass, 2001, p. 18.

[15] Mohammed Ayoob, "State Making, State Breaking, and State failure," in Chester Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson (eds.) *Turbulent Peace*, United States Institute for Peace, Washington D.C., 2001, p. 131.

[16] See Fred Tanner, "Joint Actions for Peace-building in the Mediterranean," *The International Spectator*, Volume XXXIIV No. 4 (October-December 1999).

[17] For the topic of parliamentary control, see Hans Born, "Representative Democracy and the Role of Parliament: An Inventory of Democracy Assistance Programmes," *DCAF Working Paper*, October 2002.

Conclusion

Security governance is a long-term process that should go hand-in-hand with socio-political transformation of Mediterranean countries over the next ten-to-fifteen years. It should not be a 'stand-alone' process and it would have to use both top-down and bottom-up approaches that would clearly be entrenched in the triangular relationship between security, development and democratisation. It is important to sensitise the various actors in the Euro-Med region to the importance of security governance and to the need to forge a coherent and comprehensive policy towards the governance deficit in the security sectors of the region. To achieve this objective, various actors within government (defence, development), international development agencies and NGOs will have to learn to work more closely with each other, both in Europe and in the South.

The time to make a claim for security governance in the Mediterranean region may never be ripe, but a case for building common ground for a common language should be made now. Such initiatives risk, however, appearing as another Western agenda in the region, attempting to transfer Western values to the South. Its chances for success depend on the political subtlety of the initiatives so that they would allow various countries to position security governance in their historical, political and cultural context. The best chances to find a palatable pathway to some language on security governance will be by stressing common North-South concerns, such as international development and international legitimacy.

The security and defence sectors in the South are the sanctuary of the militaries and the EU will have to find the appropriate format of cooperation, if it wants to claim a share of the military-political cooperation that is already underway in NATO's Mediterranean Partnership.

With the development of a common ground for a common language on security governance, the opportunity would arise to engage the Partnership in a Code of Conduct that clarifies general principles of governance and security. The most appropriate locus for such an exercise would be in the currently dormant Charter for Peace and Security in the Mediterranean. The preparatory work could be done in an academic expert group that could draft a compendium on security governance with terms of references for the democratic oversight of the defence expenses and the democratic control of the armed forces.