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Q & A with Arab League Secretary-General, Amr Musa - as published in Asharq Al-Awsat.

By Sawsan Abu-Husain, in Cairo.

14 January 2009

Why are there no efforts to establish a more wide-ranging truce, especially taking into account the humanitarian situation [in Gaza]?

Excerpt from Washington Post interview with Israeli Foreign Minister, Tipzi Livni. Conducted by Lally Weymouth.

According to Livni, the conflict in Gaza is not about Israelis fighting against Palestinians, but a case in which Israel represents the region's moderates, including the Palestinian Authority.  

10 January 2009

Interview with Dr. Tobias Schumacher, conducted by Catherine Cornet for publication on www.babelmed.net, the Mediterranean cultural website. The views expressed do not reflect the views of EuroMeSCo or the EuroMeSCo secretariat.

10 July 2008

Roberto Aliboni’s paper talks about the Moratinos’ project, which included a proposal regulating freedom of movement. How feasible is it for the Mediterranean Union project to consider immigration not only as a threat?

None of this remained in the Union for the Mediterranean project. The latest communication does not even consider immigration, although Sarkozy himself spoke about the subject as if it was a threat for Europe. Overall, the omission is not surprising given that immigration is increasingly moving towards the first pillar and is an issue on its way to being communitarized. In my view, what is remarkable since Toulon 2007, when Sarkozy mentioned the Mediterranean Union for the first time, is that Spain has kept a very low profile. The Germans were forced to defend the Barcelona Process, when they were originally not even in favour of the framework and are not even known for having a “Mediterranean agenda”. The Spaniards did not react - probably because Zapatero could not afford any deterioration of Spanish-French collaboration at a time when parliamentary elections were on the horizon. Overall, Spain seems to have altogether dropped its Mediterranean policy and opted to instead focus its efforts mainly on Morocco. Certainly, the Germans will not forget this ambiguous position adopted by the Spaniards…

One of your final suggestion is to have “an even-handed approach in the process”. How is equality feasible between the North and South/East shores of the Mediterranean?

One answer to that: let the Southern partners finally assume their responsibilities. If they did this, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership would surely change. For the moment they are mere receivers. Inducing a greater responsibility would allow the Partnership to become a real joint project and imply that the Southern partners would also have to assume financing responsibilities. But they are not willing to take on that responsibility, and refer to their status as developing countries to justify this. Not yet at least. Keep in mind that Algeria, Israel and Turkey, for instance, are all well-developed and either already operate well-functioning market economies or are resource-rich. Why do we not ask them to shoulder their responsibilities?

The second problem is that you cannot ask third countries to intervene in EU domains, as this would create a legal problem. This matter touches upon the question of the co-presidency and the joint secretariat. However, I wonder how it will be possible to take into account both the Barcelona acquis and the acquis communautaire in this process.

A whole chapter is dedicated to the Israeli perspectives. Shimon Perez called Sarkozy to tell him that the Mediterranean Union was “very important”. Could, as it was thought of Barcelona, the Mediterranean arena be a good platform for peace talks between Israel and Palestine?

In principle, any initiative that could contribute towards a fair process is welcome and this has been mentioned on various occasions. The Union for the Mediterranean does not however have that potential at all. It is purely project-oriented, business-oriented and based on low politics.

The US would never allow, in particular in the context of the quartet, someone who competes with their own influence and agenda. Are they scared of the proposal?

No. It would be good if they were, but they are not at all. Americans are not pushing the Peace Process, and it is therefore a time when in principle the EU has a window of opportunity to get involved. But because of our alternative visions, and also our internal divisions, we are not acting. We could have nurtured a serious debate on the role of Europe in the region. But for now it is just an academic debate, and is not being taken seriously.

Since it was first mentioned, the Union has been considered as a way to say a “polite no” to Turkish accession. Do you also read the project in that sense?

Yes, it was actually read as a Turkish gambit in the beginning and I think this was not a bad reading. Today I would not even be surprised to see Sarkozy coming out of the closet in support of a Turkish EU membership. He has a tendency to come up with fancy ideas, but the more you dwell upon them…

By Salam Kawakibi

29 April 2008

1) Syria was hoping to use this 1st Arab League Summit ever to be held in Damascus to boost its prestige. The no-show of eleven of the invited Heads of State could thus be seen as an embarrassing “slap in the face” for the host. How will this collective expression of disapproval impact on Syria’s regional positioning?

In reality, this was not Syria’s aim. There were other possible ways to improve its image. Its true objective was in fact achieved: that of managing to hold the summit in Damascus despite these obstacles and, notably, despite the explicitly expressed will of the U.S. Administration, which intervened amongst several Arab leaders in an attempt to dissuade their participation. In addition, the absence of nine or eleven Arab leaders has never been an indicator of success for host countries, yet it does nonetheless reflect the structural failure of the Arab regional system. Previous Arab League summits have all been characterised by a significant level of absenteeism. Arab leaders do not seem to attribute much importance to such forms of political display.

The American position was expected; however, France’s came as a big surprise when President Sarkozy came close to openly congratulating Saudi Arabia and Egypt on their decision not to go to Damascus. As such, an “embarrassing slap in the face” does not serve to fully clarify this affair. It goes beyond saying that the Syrians would have benefited from a larger Arab presence, but this was merely of secondary importance to them. I would go as far as saying that the absence of certain countries, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia, caused Syria to refocus on the organisation of the summit, and particularly, on influencing reactions on the “Arab streets”. There was yet another reason why the generalised contention felt in the region was directed at the established regimes: “they boycotted the Arab Summit in Damascus because of an American order”. Finally, no Arab summit in the history of the Arab League has had an important impact on the region’s political, economic or social spheres. These summits are no more than meetings of protocol, which Arab leaders attend to ensure their permanence on the different “thrones” of power.

2) Al-Ahram’s Wahid Abdel-Meguid stated that “There are now two axes – Iran, Syria , Hamas and Hezbollah are on one side and the rest are on the other”. How would you comment this description of the Middle East geo-political balance?

To speak of axes in the region in the present context, demonstrates a simplistic vision of the situation, with all due respect to my colleagues. In the past, the axis-model was informative, but it seems to me that currently, the pursuit of such logic only contributes to disinformation. Any observer can see that alliances are very vulnerable to change. The “axis of evil”, “Shiite growth”, “moderate countries”, and other such terms, are but expressions used to comfort certain politicians or to facilitate the discourse of certain analysts. When considering the expression so treasured in the West – “moderate countries” – which include Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, a look at their internal systems reveals that the definition of “moderate” has no clear meaning, the sole exception being in their relations with Israel. It would appear that this is the sole criteria being applied in this classification. The geopolitical balance in the region cannot be understood by simply classifying countries into axes or by brandishing imaginary dangers of a “Shiitisation” of the region. If we don’t try, for instance, to admit that Iran works on more of a nationalist, rather than religious basis, it will take a long time for us to understand this region. Alliances are made and remade based on mutual interests. Despite the growing religiosity in the region, a “traditional marriage” is no longer common practice in the politics of this region.

3) Syria regretted that a golden opportunity to make progress on the Lebanese deadlock had been lost in this Summit. What repercussions do you envision?

Once again, it seems to me that Syria did not view this summit as the occasion to resolve the crisis in Lebanon. The summer promises to be hot in Lebanon, what with the aborted Franco-Syrian initiative (even if the French did not want to recognise that an aggressive intervention by the U.S. had contributed to its failure), the dissolution of the Arab initiative, and the absence of a sense of responsibility amongst the Lebanese political class with a view to escaping the dictates of the varying regional forces. A surprising and almost dramatic gesture is needed to propel the Lebanese leaders into action, motivating them to engender an internal solution, rather than one imposed from abroad.

Knowing the country’s current political composition, this would appear almost impossible, yet one cannot lose hope. On the other hand, such a realisation does not seek to excuse and sideline the regional and international actors, by denying their responsibility as regards events in the country of the Cedar. Yet these actors cannot be directed to act if there is no “receptor” listening. Almost all security services are operating on the ground in Lebanon. Syria alone no longer determines whether it rains or shines in this country; and France even less so – hence the element common to both countries despite their current divergence: they overestimate their power and their influence.

By Salam Kawakibi, political scientist, Researcher at Arab Reform Initiative, Paris, and Associate Researcher at CIDOB Foundation, Barcelona.


By Samir El-Khoury

29 April 2008

1) Syria was hoping to use this 1st Arab League Summit ever to be held in Damascus to boost its prestige. The no-show of eleven of the invited Heads of State could thus be seen as an embarrassing “slap in the face” for the host. How will this collective expression of disapproval impact on Syria’s regional positioning?

No doubt that Syria would have much preferred to have hosted this 1st Arab League Summit Conference ever to be held in Damascus with all Arab countries represented by their leaders. But with Arab leaders so polarized, the Syrian leadership could not realistically hope to hold a successful summit, thus permitting it to regain its place within the Arab fold, without foregoing its alliance with Iran. Notwithstanding these Arab divisions, Syria was determined to hold the Summit on the set date, even if it meant convening without the presence of major Arab leaders.

Several weeks before the date set for the Summit, warning signals from Arab countries already abounded, to the effect that unless Syria played a positive role in resolving the ongoing political crisis in Lebanon, the attendance of participants would be at stake. Despite the strong Arab diplomatic pressure applied on the Syrian regime, its decision was taken: it was committed to maintaining its present course in Lebanon and Iraq, and in preserving its strategic alliance with Iran. As it turned out, the mere holding of the Summit, was considered by Damascus to be a success. 

The boycott of the Damascus Summit by a number of key Arab leaders, though embarrassing in itself, spared Syria the greater embarrassment of a fully-fledged debate on its role in Lebanon and of a Damascus Summit Declaration that could not conceal the deep divisions among Arab leaders. 

In the face of mounting pressure from the US and the West to isolate Syria and Iran, both countries, who strongly oppose the U.S. role in Iraq and support Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories, consolidated their alliance.

On the eve of the Arab Summit in Damascus, Lebanon’s Prime Minister Fouad Siniora gave a televised speech confirming that Lebanon would not attend the Damascus Summit. He blamed Syria for the political crisis in Lebanon and for playing a leading role in exacerbating the presidential void, now in its fourth month. Syria's involvement in Lebanon was predominant until its troops were ousted in April 2005, following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Yet Syria continues to entertain hegemonic aspirations in that country.

Another major source of concern for President Bashar El Assad in Lebanon is a UN inquiry, which initially found evidence of the involvement of Syrian security officials in Hariri’s killing - a charge vehemently denied by Damascus. Ever since the probe into Hariri’s assassination began in 2005, the International Tribunal investigating this case has hung over the Syrian regime like a cloud, leading to a deepening of its involvement with its political allies in the opposition, led by Hezbollah in Lebanon, in their confrontation with the Siniora Government and the parliamentary majority.

As such, the outcome of the less than successful Damascus Summit on Syria’s regional positioning is that it will continue pursuing its current regional policies in Lebanon, Iraq and in the Palestinian territories. Syria views its alliance with Iran as crucial in resisting growing US and Western pressure for Syria to change course and disengage from Iran. As for Syria’s Sunni Arab neighbours, who are close to the US, they view Shiite Iran as a dangerous regional power aligning Syria against them.

2) Al-Ahram’s Wahid Abdel-Meguid stated that “There are now two axes – Iran, Syria , Hamas and Hezbollah are on one side and the rest are on the other”. How would you comment this description of the Middle East geo-political balance?

Like all generalisations, this assessment of the Middle East geo-political balance contains an element of truth, but lacks the historical dimension and misses more than it embraces in its static portrayal of a very complex and volatile situation. The insistence on the two axes as a reality ‘now’, tells us nothing about how we got here, where we are headed and who “the rest” on the other axis are.

The existence of the Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas axis is not new – it precedes by many years the April 2003 American intervention in Iraq. Already in the seventies, Syria (under Hafiz El Assad) was the only Arab country to support Iran in its war with Iraq, while still succeeding to maintain its position within the Arab fold. The Iran-Syria alliance, which alienated Sunni Arab leaders, has strengthened noticeably over the past three years as both Syria, led by Bashar El Assad since his father’s demise in July 2000, and Iran have resisted growing US pressure by consolidating their support for Shiite factions in Iraq, for the militant anti-American Shiite Hezbollah in Lebanon and for Sunni Hamas in the Palestinian territories.

Iranian and Syrian support for Hamas in the inter-Palestinian conflict, is extremely significant because it stands out as a Shiite wedge driven between Sunni Hamas, a resistance movement combating Israel and opposed to the Fatah movement, and the mainstay of the PLO/ Palestinian Authority, led by President Mahmoud Abbas and supported by the US in the Annapolis negotiating process with Israel. Sunni Arab leaders, wary of Hamas’ Iranian patron, have kept Hamas at arms length after its take over of Gaza in June 2007.

The triangular connection between Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas is underscored by the substantial financial assistance provided by Iran in its resistance to Israel and promotion of Hamas’ defiance towards the US.
Carrot stick tactics, used to tempt Syria away from its alliance with Iran and Hezbollah, have been on the rise, as we have lately seen in the ongoing Turkish diplomatic efforts to revive peace talks between Syria and Israel on the one hand, and on the other, the recent release of information by the US concerning Israel’s bombing of a Syrian nuclear installation last September.

Over time, there are several potential sources of tension that could surface, weakening the Syrian-Iranian alliance. The implicit popular divide between Sunni Syrians, who represent the majority of the population, and the largely Shiite Iran underscores a key area of potential divergence. Any Iranian efforts to project Shiite religious influence will be resisted by the minority El Assad Alawite regime for fear of provoking the Sunni majority in Syria. In Lebanon too, any attempt made by Shiite Hezbollah, supported by Iran, to press its demand for a growing Shiite influence in politics, will be avoided for fear of alienating Hezbollah’s Christian ally, General Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, and unleashing a Sunni backlash.

Strategically, the Iranian, Syrian, Hezbollah and Hamas alliance could come under strain if either Iran or Syria decided to improve ties with the West – for example, if Iran considered it could negotiate a deal on its nuclear program that might entail foregoing its alliance with Damascus. Equally, Syria might opt for a rapprochement with Arab countries and the West to relieve its isolation, to open negotiations with Israel for a return of the Golan Heights, or to ensure regime survival. Such a deal might result in the termination of Damascus’ supporting role as a conduit for Iranian arms reaching Hezbollah in Lebanon. It could also lead to the closure of Hamas’ Political Bureau in Damascus and weaken the Iranian-Hamas connection.

Some have read the assassination of key Hezbollah leader, Emad Moghnieh, in the most heavily guarded perimeter of Damascus last February, as a sign of weakening bonds between Syria, Iran and Hezbollah.

We have considered the first axis – Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas - which is relatively clearly defined and straightforward. However, when it comes to the second axis, things are not so clear cut: who are “the rest” “on the other side”? The rest are an undefined quantity encompassing irreconcilable enemies and uneasy bedfellows. To name but a couple:

1 - Take Al Qaeda: where does it fit? In fact, Al Qaeda belongs to neither of these axes. It’s the odd man out. Al Qaeda is fanatically Sunni and rejects Shiism as a heresy to be fought. Al Qaeda is a multi-headed monster engaged in terrorism against Shiites in Iraq and Afghanistan, and is violently anti-American. Al Qaeda off-shoots have been engaged in operations throughout the Western and Islamic world – from New York, to Madrid, to London to North Africa and Lebanon. Al Qaeda is not only an enemy of the US, but also of the West in general and of Sunni-Arab and Islamic governments close to the US and the West. However, as regards the people in those same Sunni countries, it’s another story. It can be said that many Sunni Moslems feel varying degrees of anti-American sentiment and sympathy for Al Qaeda. Sunni Moslem masses have contributed money and ‘martyrs’ in support of Sunni fundamentalist Islamic movements, including Al Qaeda.

2 - We must also look at Israel and consider where it would fit in this axis of “the rest”. For the US and the West generally, Israel is an ally who receives unreserved support, especially from the US. The Sunni Arab states and the Palestinian Authority, close to the US and the West, are, however, opposed to Israel’s policies of continued occupation of Arab land, expansion of Israeli settlements and the indiscriminate killing of Palestinian civilians in Gaza and the Palestinian Occupied Territories. The inherent and irreconcilable contradictions of US policies and alliances in the Middle East have rendered the US-led axis increasingly vulnerable in the region. The failure of the Annapolis Peace Process to make any headway so-far is but one example of this.
 
Eschewing a dialogue with the other side does not secure a solution to the impasse in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, to Iran’s nuclear program or for the chaos prevailing in Iraq. The region should not have to wait until a new US Administration is installed in 2009, before the US and the West engage in a meaningful dialogue with the axis including Iran and Syria, which would also involve Hezbollah and Hamas.

3) Syria regretted that a golden opportunity to make progress on the Lebanese deadlock had been lost in this Summit. What repercussions do you envision?

With Lebanon officially deciding to boycott the Summit and major Arab states sending low-level delegations, it was obvious that the Damascus Summit could not provide an adequate forum for a settlement of the political deadlock in Lebanon, between the Western-backed governing coalition and the Iranian and Syrian-backed opposition in Lebanon, led by Hezbollah.

A few days ahead of the Summit, the Office of the Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berry, announced the 17th postponement of the parliamentary session to elect a president. With the battle lines clearly drawn in Lebanon ahead of the Damascus meeting, the summit was no “golden opportunity” to make progress on the Lebanese deadlock, or for that matter, any of the crises in the region.

The pledge made by Syria at the summit to cooperate in supporting the Arab League initiative to end the crisis in Lebanon, was conditional on not pressuring its allies in Lebanon to allow the election of a new president, unless their demands are met – a proposal rejected by the majority.

Local political actors in Lebanon look to the international and regional powers supporting them for their cue. Since those powers continue to view Lebanon as a battleground on which they cannot afford to lose, the positions of the Majority, supported by the US and the Opposition, and of those supported by Syria and Iran will remain extremely polarized in Lebanon.

REGIONAL REPERCUSSIONS

- Both Syria and Iran have manifested their defiance by confronting the U.S., in Iraq, in Lebanon, with an embattled pro-Western Government, and in Gaza and the West Bank, where tensions among Palestinians continue to grow.  Both Syria and Iran will carefully weigh potential opportunities to further challenge the U.S. and its allies in the region, while making sure that any action in support of their common agenda will not provoke military action directed against them by the US, or its ally Israel.

- Syria recognizes that its isolation from the Arab fold is the price it must pay for its alliance with Shiite Iran. It estimates, however, that it can persevere with its current policies in Lebanon until the November presidential elections in the US, which is seen as ushering in a new Administration likely to seek some form of dialogue with Syria and Iran. Nonetheless, one cannot exclude a Syrian change of course, if the carrot dangled by the US is tempting enough for it to review its regional alignment.

- The polarized Middle East, with alliances formed around the two major players – the US and Iran, will further weaken the Arab League. The failure of the Arab League initiative to resolve the Lebanese Presidential impasse is clear evidence of this trend.

- Over the past thirty years, and until April 2005, when its troops left Lebanon under Lebanese and international pressure, Syria had absolute control over political life in that country. Since that date, relations between the two neighbours have deteriorated to their lowest point, when Lebanon officially boycotted the Damascus Summit last March. President Bashar El Assad, through alliances with Hezbollah and other Lebanese opposition factions, is committed to maintaining Syrian influence in Lebanon. If Syria is to submit to US pressure into changing its regional alliances, it will attempt to secure US and Western recognition of its special role in Lebanon.

- The Saudis, supported by the US, will continue to stand behind the Siniora Government and the Sunnis in Lebanon, while maintaining pressure on Syria to loosen its grip over the opposition.

REPERCUSSIONS IN LEBANON

- In the tense atmosphere prevalent in Lebanon, fears of renewed civil conflict are ever present. Since the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005, Lebanon has endured several other assassinations of anti-Syrian figures and military personnel, as well as deadly street protests.

- Expectations in Lebanon are that the impasse over the presidential election will continue beyond the set date of May 13. However, the seemingly unbridgeable differences between the Majority, led by Saad Hariri, and the Opposition, led by Hezbollah, may be overcome fairly rapidly if signs of a regional détente between the main players – the US, Syria and Iran – were to materialize. In the meantime, social unrest, demonstrations, union action that takes on a political shape, riots and clashes, cannot be excluded. Confrontations, however, will remain contained, seeing as no political faction will venture to ignite a civil conflict.

- Though it is unlikely that a new war will break out between Israel and Hezbollah, in view of the balance of terror between the two sides and the presence of a strengthened UNIFIL (supported by the Lebanese Army) separating the former belligerents, the possibility of military conflict on Lebanon’s Southern flank cannot be excluded if the US and Israel decide to bomb Iran’s nuclear installations before the end of the Bush Administration.

- A  new wave of political assassinations in Lebanon of Government ministers and/or majority parliamentarians would be a clear indication of a deteriorating regional climate, which could degenerate into fresh confrontations between factions in Lebanon, if the US, Israel, Iran and Syria are drawn into a military confrontation. This will have unforeseen political and security repercussions in the country, rendering the internal situation untenable.

- The outcome of the US presidential election is anxiously awaited by the anti-US Opposition in Lebanon, such as Hezbollah, as it is expected to end the strong support given by the Bush Administration to the Siniora Government and to determine the new direction of US policy not only in Lebanon, but regionally in Iran, Iraq, and also in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

By Samir El-Khoury, former Ambassador of Lebanon, researcher in Palestinian refugee issues